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The U.S. military is first-rate, yet it struggles to fight and win irregular wars. 
Surprisingly, throughout the course of history great powers have had difficulty with small 
wars. One must ask then, why and how do irregulars win as often as they do? The answer 
to this question will enable the United States to support irregulars more effectively, and 
defeat irregulars more efficiently.  
This thesis considers seventeen irregular conflicts between WWII and the present 
day to determine why irregulars win when they do, and how asymmetries of motivation 
can affect the outcome of irregular wars. A mixed methodology, including heuristics, 
process tracing, and comparison of case studies is used to evaluate irregular wars and the 
motivations of the combatants. The findings suggest that asymmetries of motivation only 
partially explain why irregulars succeed. Irregulars can succeed when motivations are 
symmetric as well as asymmetric. Internal conflicts that exhibited symmetrical 
motivation were often long, bloody, and costly affairs resolved primarily by negotiations. 
Alternatively, when asymmetries of motivation have existed, the weak were able to 
influence intrinsic and extrinsic motivations to coerce their adversaries to quit.  
Ultimately, the findings from this thesis indicate that opinion and public support 
significantly influence an actor’s motivation and will to fight. In light of this, this thesis 
suggests that SOF should focus on advising irregulars to shape opinions and perceptions 
to undermine their opponents’ will to fight. Furthermore, the U.S. government should 
focus more on the application of political and psychological warfare to enable U.S. SOF 
operations in support of both counterinsurgency and unconventional warfare operations.  
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In any war, the readiness to suffer and die, as well as to kill, represents the 
single most important factor. Take it away, and even the most numerous, 
best organized, best trained, best equipped army in the world will turn out 
to be a brittle instrument. This applies to all wars regardless of time, place, 
and circumstance.1  
—Martin van Creveld 
War is one of the most ancient and elemental facets of human and societal 
interaction. It is like chess, a game of strategy in which the players try to outsmart and 
outmaneuver their opponents. In a contest such as this, a player has several paths to 
victory; annihilating the opponent in battle, skillful diplomacy, or use of coercion or 
deterrence. All of these paths are open and available to the strong. The weak have fewer 
options, due to their inferior size, strength, capability, and technology. And yet, as recent 
history demonstrates, superior conventional military strength is becoming less effective 
against the weak and less likely to produce a quick and decisive victory—or victory at all. 
In fact, as evident in Algeria, Vietnam, and Afghanistan, the strong often struggle to fight 
and win irregular wars against weaker opponents.2 The weak have been increasingly able 
to coerce, disrupt, and in some cases, overthrow stronger adversaries.3 One must ask 
then, why and how do irregulars win as often as they do?  
Motivation is an important factor in war. Fundamentally, “Motivation may be the 
intersection between irregular and conventional war.”4 In fact, many strategists such as 
Clausewitz, Heydte, Mao, Galula, Schelling, Huth, and George, as well as Petraeus, and 
Kilcullen, have attempted to understand the strategic interaction of motivations in general 
                                                 
1 Martin van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York : Toronto : New York: Free Press ; 
Collier Macmillan Canada ; Maxwell Macmillan International, 1991), 160. 
2 Max Boot, Invisible Armies: An Epic History of Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the 
Present, 1st ed. (New York, NY: Norton, 2013), 559. Boot’s database of 443 irregular conflicts dating back 
to 1775 finds that irregulars win 25.5 percent of the time and force a draw an additional 10.8 percent of the 
time. However, since 1945 Boot finds that irregulars are winning more often, or 40.3 percent of the time.  
3 Ibid., xxvi. 
4 Doowan Lee, Operationalizing Asymmetries of Motivation, Meeting, March 8, 2016. 
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war, irregular war, and limited war.5 Although, beyond acknowledging the importance of 
motivation and identifying factors that impact motivation in war, these strategists have 
not fully considered the multiple dimensions of motivation and how they influence the 
outcome of irregular warfare.    
This chapter will first identify the problem and question at hand. Then, it will 
review the theories of irregular warfare, and explore what success means for the weak. 
This chapter will then review existing arguments that attempt to explain why irregulars 
win when they do. And finally, this chapter will explain how motivation is evaluated in 
the subsequent chapters.  
A. THE PROBLEM 
Understanding of irregulars, and their success, has been impeded by conventional 
mindsets and organizational structures. Often, the strong approach irregular wars with 
poorly defined goals and an unreasonable expectation of a short and decisive victory.6  In 
doing so, we fail to understand the true nature of irregular war and how success is 
achieved in such conflicts. We must consider and evaluate irregular warfare and success 
                                                 
5 Carl von Clausewitz, Michael Eliot Howard, and Peter Paret, On War, First paperback printing 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1989); Friedrich August von der Heydte, Modern Irregular 
Warfare: In Defense Policy and as a Military Phenomenon, 1st English ed. (New York, NY: New 
Benjamin Franklin House, 1986); Zedong Mao, On Guerrilla Warfare (Mineola, NY: Dover Publications, 
2005); David Galula and John A. Nagl, Counterinsurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice, PSI Classics of 
the Counterinsurgency Era (Westport, CT: Praeger Security International, 2006); Thomas C. Schelling, 
Arms and Influence (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1976); Paul K Huth, Extended Deterrence and the 
Prevention of War (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1989);  Alexander L. George, Forceful Persuasion: 
Coercive Diplomacy as an Alternative to War (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 
1991); Department of the Army, Counterinsurgency  (FM 3–24), 2006; David Kilcullen, “Countering 
Global Insurgency,” Small Wars Journal, November 30, 2004.  
6 Andrew P. N. Erdmann, “The U.S. Presumption of Quick, Costless Wars,” Orbis 43, no. 3 (June 
1999): 363–81, doi:10.1016/S0030-4387(99)80077-5. 48–49. Erdmann argues that the notion of a quick, 
cheap, and decisive victory has become dogma. In reality, as he argues, most contemporary irregular 
conflicts are protracted, expensive, and not decisive. Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense. Remarks 
Prepared For Delivery By The Honorable Caspar W. Weinberger, Secretary of Defense. “The Uses of 
Military Power.” National Press Club, Washington, DC: November 28, 1984. Weinberger explains that the 
decision to commit forces to hostilities overseas is less clear and more difficult than in the past. Robert 
Mandel, The Meaning of Military Victory (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2006). 4. Mandel also 
points out that uncertainty often surrounds what states are pursuing or protecting in irregular wars. He 
argues that this is the result of ambiguous policies and shifting and vague national security interests. 
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from the perspective of the weak; and more fundamentally, why people or individuals 
fight—and how to make them stop fighting.  
The success of irregular actors is explained in many ways; though, the actual 
cause of irregular success is often confused with factors that only contribute to irregular 
success. For example, scholars in accord with Jeffery Record claim that success in 
irregular war is the result of external support provided by a third party, which enables 
irregular actors to overcome a disadvantage against a stronger adversary.7 Other scholars, 
such as Connable and Libicki, believe that irregular success is determined by access to 
safe havens that shield irregular actors from their adversaries.8 Alternatively, some 
individuals such as Ivan Arreguín-Toft suggest that success is due to superior strategy.9 
Still, other authors such as Lewis Gann contend that the answer is more complex—
irregulars’ success is a combination of their ability to overcome organizational 
weaknesses and their ability to break the will of their opponent.10 While these 
explanations identify several factors that contribute to irregular success, they do not fully 
account for why the weak win or why the strong sometimes quit and leave on their own.   
B. THE QUESTION 
To understand how motivation explains why the weak sometimes prevail, this 
thesis poses the following question: Why and how do irregulars win when they do and 
how does asymmetries of motivation affect the outcomes of irregular wars? Only a few 
authors, such as Gann, Mack, and Mandel have considered the will to win as the cause 
                                                 
7 Jeffrey Record, Beating Goliath: Why Insurgencies Win (Washington, DC: Poole: 2009), 22–24. 
8 Ben Connable and Martin C. Libicki, How Insurgencies End (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010), 
xvii, 34–40.  
9 Ivan M. Arreguín-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict, Cambridge 
Studies in International Relations 99 (NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
10 Lewis H. Gann, Guerrillas in History, Hoover Institution Studies 28 (Stanford, CA: Hoover 
Institution Press, 1971), 69, 84, 91. Gann contends that irregular actors require support from foreign 
regular forces, and a regular and secure source of supplies to succeed. Also, Gann emphasizes that 
irregular success hinges on the will to win and the human factor. Ultimately, Gann concludes that irregulars 
can succeed if the struggle is protracted, they maintain a united front in the eyes of the world, the enemy is 
disunited, and the enemy’s goals are not worth the effort.   
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for success in irregular war.11 Therefore, this thesis will examine how the dynamics of 
motivation affect the outcomes of irregular conflicts. In addition, this thesis will attempt 
to reveal how irregulars manipulate and shape motivations to exploit asymmetry of 
motivations in order to increase their likelihood of success.  
C. IRREGULAR WARFARE AND IRREGULARS  
This is another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origin―war 
by guerrillas, subversives, insurgents, assassins; war by ambush instead of 
by combat, by infiltration instead of aggression, seeking victory by 
eroding and exhausting the enemy instead of engaging him.12  
—President John F. Kennedy 
Irregular warfare is a concept that has been debated and conceptualized in many 
ways. This is because “IW is a complex, ‘messy,’ and ambiguous social phenomenon that 
does not lend itself to clean, neat, concise, or precise definition.”13 Terms such as “small 
wars,” “asymmetric wars,” “gray zone conflicts,” “low-intensity conflicts,” “military 
operations other than war,” “guerrilla war,” and “unconventional war” have been 
developed to fill the void left in the wake of our understanding of the oldest form of 
warfare—irregular war.14 Currently, the U.S. military defines irregular war as: 
A violent struggle among state and non-state actors for legitimacy and 
influence over the relevant populations(s). Irregular warfare favors 
indirect and asymmetric approaches, though it may employ the full range 
                                                 
11 Ibid.; Andrew Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of Asymmetric Conflict,” 
World Politics 27, no. 02 (January 1975): 175–200, doi:10.2307/2009880. 177–179; Mandel, The Meaning 
of Military Victory.127.  
12 John F. Kennedy, “Address to the Graduating Class, U.S. Military Academy, 6 June 1962” (Speech, 
West Point Military Academy, June 6, 1962), http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/?pid=8695. 
13 Department of the Defense, Irregular Warfare (IW) Joint Operating Concept (JOC), Version 1, 
1007, http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/concepts/joint_concepts/joc_iw_v1.pdf. 6.  
14 Jeffrey B. White, “A Different Kind of Threat: Some Thoughts on Irregular Warfare,” Studies in 
Intelligence 39, no. 5 (1996), https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-
publications/csi-studies/studies/96unclass/iregular.htm; Boot, Invisible Armies, xxiv. 
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of military and other capacities, in order to erode an adversary’s power, 
influence, and will.15  
This definition is problematic as it fails to encapsulate the essence of irregular 
warfare.16 Therefore, it is useful to consider other definitions. John Arquilla explains that 
irregular war can be defined in three different ways based on the size of the force 
involved and the tactics they use.17  In the first case, Arquilla finds that small units wage 
irregular wars, typically against larger adversaries, using innovative means. Second, 
irregular wars are waged by guerrillas against an occupying force or invading power, 
using hit and run tactics and the popular resistance typified by Ho Chi Minh and Mao 
Zedong. And finally, Professor Arquilla explains that irregulars often use terrorism to 
compel or coerce their adversary into compliance.  
Similarly, Friedrich August von der Heydte finds that irregular warfare is often 
waged by small units and won through a multitude of small individual operations.18 
Heydte concludes that irregular war is waged “outside the conventions” and “laws and 
norms” created for conventional war.19 He also notes that it can transpire internally or 
                                                 
15 U.S. Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, “Joint Publication 1–02: Department of 
Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms” (Department of Defense, February 25, 2016), 
http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp1_02.pdf.  
16 Ultimately, this definition fails to address some of the important defining characteristics of irregular 
warfare and references some questionable terms and general features. The use of “violence” as a 
descriptive feature of irregular warfare is problematic as violence is not only relative, but also a common 
feature of warfare in general. Secondly, it may be argued whether irregular actors are fighting for 
legitimacy and influence—or for some other reason such as control over relevant populations or 
independence from illegitimate governors and invaders. Further, “asymmetric approaches” is a colloquial 
term that has little meaning or descriptive value in military doctrine and strategy. Eric V. Larson, Brian 
Nichiporuk, and Thomas Szayna, “Assessing Irregular Warfare: A Framework for Intelligence Analysis” 
(RAND, 2008). Larson, Nichiporuk, and Szayna point out that current irregular warfare definition is 
problematic as irregular warfare is a general term used to describe and classify a diverse set of actors, 
multiple forms of conflict, and a long list of operations and activities. Arquilla, Insurgents, Raiders, and 
Bandits How Masters of Irregular Warfare Have Shaped Our World, 67, notes that this military definition 
fails to address the fact that both strong and weak actors use special operations techniques in irregular 
warfare, such as insurgency, terrorism, and small-unit operations. Further, Arquilla notes that irregular 
warfare activities, operations, and techniques can be used in conventional conflicts or in general warfare as 
well.   
17 Arquilla, Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits How Masters of Irregular Warfare Have Shaped Our 
World, 4–5. 
18 Heydte, Modern Irregular Warfare, 3.  
19 Ibid., 9. 
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internationally, it can occur before, during or after conventional war, and it is typified by 
the blurring of lines between war and peace, or, as he claims, “war in peace.”20 Finally, 
Heydte notes that irregular war is fundamentally a “war of attrition” and “[A]n act of 
violence to force the adversary to submit to our will.”21  
Finally, irregular warfare is often considered a “weapon of the weak.”22 Because 
the weak lack the resources and capabilities to engage their adversary conventionally, 
they are forced to use unconventional and indirect ways and means to fight and win. 
Though as Colin Gray concludes—the notion of the irregular is an ambiguous concept: 
“That can mean enemies of any genus who choose to fight in an irregular mode; or it may 
refer to foes who are deemed to be irregular by definition because they are not the 
licensed sword arms of officially recognized polities.”23 Thus, irregular warfare is also a 
“tool of the strong.”24 Apart from the nature of irregular war and irregular actors, 
irregular warfare is also delineated from conventional warfare due to the asymmetry that 
exists between belligerents.   
Asymmetry is a defining factor in irregular war because of the extreme inequality 
that exists between adversaries.25 Asymmetries occur in many forms: between force size; 
capability; technology; interests; will, etc. In fact, because asymmetries exist in every 
war, and the term has been used to describe various disparities in war, the “Asymmetric” 
label has lost its value.26 Therefore, for the sake of clarity, asymmetry is only used to 
describe the difference in relative motivation that exists between belligerents in this 
                                                 
20 Ibid., 9–11, 83. 
21 Ibid., 38, 93. 
22 Gann, Guerrillas in History, 91. 
23 Colin S. Gray, Irregular Enemies and the Essence of Strategy: Can the American Way of War 
Adapt? (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2006), 8.  
24 Heydte, Modern Irregular Warfare, 91. 
25 Arquilla, Insurgents, Raiders, and Bandits How Masters of Irregular Warfare Have Shaped Our 
World. 8. Many scholars and military professionals define wars between small units and larger forces as 
asymmetric wars. However, as Professor Arquilla notes, this label is problematic because all wars are 
fundamentally asymmetric for the simple fact that a fair fight defies the principles of war.   
26 Robert M. Cassidy, “Why Great Powers Fight Small Wars Badly,” Military Review (September-
October 2008): 41–53. 43.  
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thesis. Within this context, asymmetry of motivation is conceptualized as the difference 
between total or limited commitment to a conflict.  
1. Total versus Limited Commitment 
Commitment is a reflection of the actor’s motivation, means, or goals and it is 
referred to in this thesis as total or limited. According to Robert Osgood, “Limited wars 
were to be fought for ends far short of the complete subordination of one state’s will to 
another’s, using means that involve far less than the total military resources of the 
belligerents.”27 In contrast to this, Mandel argues that total war implies that “all human 
and material resources of the belligerents are mobilized and employed against the total 
national life of the enemy.”28 Thus, within the context of irregular warfare, the strong 
rarely, if ever, leverage all of their resources against the weak, while the weak must use 
every resource at their disposal to succeed.  
In most cases, the threat is existential for the weak; their struggle is one of 
survival. As a result, the weak typically exhibit a high threshold of pain and are willing to 
suffer any cost because they have nothing to lose.29 In comparison, the strong are 
typically not willing to pay any price, as the weak do not pose an immediate threat to 
their vital interests.30 Cassidy notes, “[F]or the great power in an asymmetric situation, 
full military mobilization is neither politically prudent nor militarily necessary.”31 
Finally, because the conflict may only be one of several major foreign or domestic 
political affairs that the strong is juggling, it cannot afford to be totally invested or 
engaged militarily, economically, or politically in a limited irregular war.   
                                                 
27 Robert Endicott Osgood, Limited War Revisited, A Westview Special Study (Boulder, CO: 
Westview Press, 1979), 2. 
28 Robert Endicott Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1970), 3, 5. 
29 Cassidy, “Why Great Powers Fight Small Wars Badly,” 47.  
30 Record, Beating Goliath, 3. Record notes that the strong exhibit a “lower political tolerance of 
blood and treasure losses” in irregular war. 
31 Ibid., 44.  
 8 
Ultimately, one’s political goal is critical in determining their level of 
commitment in irregular warfare. As Clausewitz argued, war is an extension of politics; 
“The political object—the original motive for war—will thus determine both the military 
objective to be reached and the amount of effort it requires.”32 Furthermore, because war 
is a rational act, “[T]he value of the object must determine the sacrifices to be made for it 
in magnitude and duration. Once the expenditure of effort exceeds the value of the 
political object, the object must be renounced and peace must follow.”33 Put differently, 
an actor’s level of commitment is directly related to the value they place on their political 
goal. This is the crux of the matter: The political end must be worth the effort, or the 
motivation to pursue the end will crumble.  
By virtue of their nature, the strong generally exhibit limited commitment while 
the weak exhibit total commitment in irregular warfare. Although, this is not a hard and 
fast rule for the strong or the weak; motivation and commitment fluctuate over the 
duration of a conflict as belligerents achieve battlefield gains and losses, as external 
support and access to safe havens fluctuates, and as current events shape domestic and 
international sentiments. It bears asking then, why and how motivation and commitment 
shifts, and whether it accounts for irregular success. First, it is necessary to consider the 
definition of success or victory in irregular war.   
2. Defining Success in Irregular Warfare 
Success in irregular warfare is subject to debate, and, in reality, seldom appears as 
initially envisioned.34  Muddying our understanding of success is the fact that “victory 
has had dissimilar and often unclear and contradictory meanings for winners and 
                                                 
32 Clausewitz, Howard, and Paret, On War, 81. 
33 Ibid., 92. 
34 Of note, I am not attempting to demonstrate, or make the claim, that irregulars can only win through 
the attrition of the will or motivation of the strong alone. Irregulars must first overcome organizational 
hurdles and resource shortages to simply survive. They must recruit and mobilize personnel and persuade 
friendly, enemy, and neutral parties that their cause is just. Furthermore, in many instances, the irregulars 
are simply outmatched, in size, capability, or skill and are forced to quit. But every now and then, irregulars 
succeed in destroying their opponents will and convincing them that their goals are not worth pursuing. In 
such cases, the necessary and sufficient conditions are met and victory ensues.    
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losers.”35 Additionally, as Mandel points out, “victory in limited war is trickier to 
demarcate—and often to achieve—than in total war.36 As a result, it is often said that the 
irregular wins as long as he does not lose, and the strong lose as long as they do not 
win.37 Put differently, the irregular wins by merely surviving. While there may be some 
truth to this, it is overly simplified and of limited use.  
Success for the weak can be defined as complete victory or negotiated peace. 
Within the context of complete victory, irregulars must completely remove the external 
influence or occupiers from their sphere of influence. The irregular is fundamentally 
weaker than the strong and are less likely to defeat their adversary militarily. Though, the 
weak can succeed in the face of military defeat.38  Stalemates or draws often lead to 
negotiations that result in political compromises. Consequently, success is also defined as 
any negotiated settlement that achieves even the slightest political end that results in a 
better peace for the irregulars.39 In this sense, irregulars can win in various ways—by 
overthrowing the “government, successful annexation of independent territory, 
recognition of minority rights, or dramatic political success.”40 Thus, irregulars can 
succeed militarily by defeating their adversary’s forces, politically by compelling or 
coercing the strong to quit, or by securing political advantages through negotiations.  
3. Explaining Why Irregulars Succeed   
Several scholars have attempted to explain the success of irregulars, and in doing 
so, have attributed it to various factors. Although these explanations are useful in 
describing the factors that contribute to irregular success, they often fail to explain 
adequately how and why irregulars succeed. This is not in any way to discount the 
                                                 
35 Mandel, The Meaning of Military Victory, 1.  
36 Ibid., 37. 
37 Cassidy, “Why Great Powers Fight Small Wars Badly,” 43. 
38 Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars,” 177. 
39 Basil Henry Liddell Hart, Strategy, 2nd rev.ed. (New York, NY: Meridian, 1991), 357. Liddell Hart 
reminds us that wars are waged for one reason—a better peace. “Victory in the true sense implies that the 
state of peace, and of one’s people, is better after the war than before.”  
40 Connable and Libicki, How Insurgencies End, 14, 20. Libicki notes that peace is rarely permanent.  
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relevance and importance of their arguments or explanations. If any one of these factors 
is found absent or lacking, irregular success is highly unlikely. Furthermore, these factors 
and their impact on irregulars fluctuate across the spectrum and duration of irregular 
warfare. Also, irregulars rarely benefit from all factors simultaneously or to the fullest 
extent possible. Therefore, none of these factors alone can explain the success of the 
weak against the strong. Nonetheless, it is important to review the dominant arguments 
made for why the weak succeed over the strong in irregular war.  
a. Asymmetry of Interest  
The theory of “superior will” is an age-old concept that has been discussed in 
depth by great thinkers from Sun Tzu to Clausewitz, to Galula. Though, more recently, 
Andrew Mack’s seminal article, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars: The Politics of 
Asymmetric Conflict,” published in World Politics in 1975 continued the debate over the 
role of motivation, or the will to win, in irregular warfare. Mack claims that irregular 
success is not found through military might, but rather, “from a progressive attrition of 
their opponents political capability to wage war.”41 According to Mack, irregulars can 
win by imposing continued and unreasonable psychological and political costs on their 
adversary.42 This, he claims, will destroy the state’s political will to continue the 
struggle, making the state’s “military capability—no matter how powerful”—totally 
irrelevant.”43 As Mack argues, because the state’s security is not directly at risk, the costs 
outweigh the benefits of continued war, and thus, the irregular will succeed.44  Though, 
beyond this, Mack does not fully elaborate on how irregulars create or impose political 
and psychological costs. For this, we look further, to Arreguín-Toft’s theory of strategic 
interaction.   
                                                 
41 Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars,” 177.  
42 Ibid., 185.  
43 Ibid., 179. 
44 Ibid., 181. 
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b. Asymmetry of Strategy  
Ivan Arreguín-Toft considers strategy and finds that irregulars succeed when the 
strong choose the wrong strategy, or the opposite approach as the weak. Arreguín-Toft 
argues that relative power matters, but the strategic interaction between actors matters 
more.45 Therefore, he set off to illuminate the strategies and counter-strategies that would 
enable success or failure in irregular war.46 Arreguín-Toft concludes that irregulars 
inevitably lose if they match their adversaries’ strategy; if they employ a direct strategy 
against their opponent’s direct strategy, or an indirect strategy against their indirect 
strategy.47 Alternatively, the weak win when they choose the opposite strategy as the 
strong; the weak win if they use an indirect strategy against their adversary’s direct 
strategy or a direct strategy against their opponent’s indirect strategy.48 Also, because 
Arreguín-Toft found that time favors the weak, he concludes that the strong will 
ultimately abandon the fight to avoid increasing costs—“such as declaring war, 
mobilizing reserves, raising taxes, or sustaining additional casualties.”49 Based on this, 
Arreguín-Toft argues that the indirect strategy is the best option for the irregulars because 
it is the most difficult to defeat. From his argument, it is clear that strategy is a significant 
factor that contributes to the success of the irregulars. Though, more importantly, 
Arreguín-Toft’s theory again links motivation to costs. This speaks to a more significant 
psychological catalyst of success than strategy alone.   
                                                 
45 Arreguín-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars, 18. 
46 Ivan M. Arreguín-Toft, “How the Weak Win Wars: A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict,” 105. Ivan 
Arreguín-Toft defines direct approaches as those that target an adversary’s armed forces in order to destroy 
that adversary’s capacity to fight. The direct approach for the strong is the attack while the direct approach 
for the weak is the defense.  Conversely, he defines indirect approaches as those that seek to destroy an 
adversary’s will to fight. The indirect approach for the strong is barbarism while the indirect approach for 
the weak is guerrilla warfare or terrorism.  
47 Arreguín-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars, 39. 
48 Ibid., 39, 122–123.  
49 Ivan Arreguín-Toft, “How the Weak Win Wars A Theory of Asymmetric Conflict,” International 
Security 26, no. 1 (2001): 105.  
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c. Asymmetry of Resources  
Jeffery Record takes Arreguín-Toft’s theory one-step further in considering what 
other factors contribute to the success of irregulars. Record notes that the weak 
sometimes win because the strong “appear to suffer from some combination of inferior 
political will, inferior war strategy, and an inability to isolate insurgent forces from 
external support.”50 Though, Record argues that external assistance is particularly 
important because it enables “the weak to impose considerable military and political pain 
on the strong,” which he believes, compels the strong to quit.51 Thus, as Record, argues, 
external support is not only necessary, but must be sufficient for irregulars to succeed. 
Though, while external assistance can help irregulars overcome resource shortfalls, it 
typically does not fully close this gap, nor is it reliable or constant. Therefore, we must 
consider Gil Merom’s analysis of the cost-benefit calculus that impacts the strong’s will 
to fight irregulars.   
d. Asymmetry of Violence  
Merom focuses his analysis on the cost of war, the level of violence, and the will 
to win. Merom argues, “democracies fail in small wars because they find it extremely 
difficult to escalate the level of violence and brutality to that which can secure victory.”52 
He asserts that the strong lose when the center of gravity shifts from the battlefield to the 
domestic market place of ideas by the educated elite, number of casualties, level of 
violence, and international conditions.53 Therefore, Merom concludes that the strong lose 
due to the normative difference equation that is influenced by the free market place of 
                                                 
50 Record, Beating Goliath, x, 23.  
51 Ibid., vii, 24, 130. “External assistance can take many forms; from political support, to provision of 
money, to supply of arms, military advice and territorial sanctuaries and the introduction of foreign military 
forces.” 
52 Ibid., 15, 78–79. When it comes to normalizing brutality, Merom notes that Western powers 
compartmentalize small wars and dehumanize insurgents and delegitimize their cause to “free themselves 
from the moral restraints that prevent the use of excessive brutality.” He also notes that states can resort to 
brutality and barbarism to destroy an insurgent or revolutionary if they can “monopolize the supply of 
information” and “isolate the battlefield” to prevent their actions from souring the will of their domestic 
constituency. 
53 Ibid., 75. 230–231.  
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ideas.54 Conversely, he concludes that the weak win because they are more motivated, 
and will sacrifice more because they have more at stake if they lose.55  This statement is 
tautological though. Therefore, it is necessary to consider how irregulars affect the “free 
marketplace” to enable their success.   
4. Evaluating Why and How Irregulars Succeed in Irregular Warfare 
Each of these authors provides useful insight into the factors that influence the 
outcomes of irregular wars. At the center of each argument is the claim that irregular 
success is realized through their ability to exact high costs on their opponent’s will to 
win. Though, other than Andrew Mack, few have considered whether success is the result 
of the asymmetry of motivations in irregular warfare. Furthermore, Mack only briefly 
considers this theory without fully developing how the asymmetry of motivations affects 
the outcome of irregular warfare or how irregulars manipulate or exploit their adversary’s 
motivation to enable success. This may be because motivation is vague; it is subjective, 
less tangible, hard to quantify and other explanations are more fungible.  
Here lies a gap in our understanding of why irregulars win. This begs the 
question, is it possible that the weak succeed because they can generate and sustain more 
internal motivation while decreasing their opponent’s motivation, or resolve to persist? 
Furthermore, how is motivation manipulated and how might it change our current 
approach and strategy in irregular war?   
This thesis will attempt to understand why irregulars succeed and how motivation 
influences the outcome of irregular warfare. This thesis is separated into two parts to 
evaluate the impact of motivation on the outcome of irregular warfare. Part One of this 
thesis consists of Chapters II through VI. Chapter II establishes the methodology and 
framework that will be used in this thesis to evaluate why and how irregulars win and 
                                                 
54 Ibid., 20, 22. Merom defines the “normative difference” as the difference between the cost of war 
and what objectives and methods are morally acceptable.  
55 Gil Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and the Failures of France in 
Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), 11. 
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how their success relates to motivation. Chapters III, IV, and V then consider fifteen 
irregular conflicts to illuminate why irregulars win when they do. Then, Chapter VI 
summarizes the lessons learned across the three periods in Chapters III, IV, and V to 
reveal why irregulars succeed when they do. Part Two then evaluates how commitment 
and motivation fluctuate in irregular warfare, how irregulars manipulate motivation, and 
how asymmetry of motivations affects the outcome of irregular warfare.  Part Two 
consists of Chapters VII, VIII, and XI. Chapters VII and VIII first trace motivations in 
two specific conflicts to assess how irregulars manipulate motivation to influence the 
outcome of irregular warfare. Finally, Chapter XI will tie all of these chapters together to 





This thesis seeks to understand how irregulars succeed when they do, and 
specifically, how motivation influences the outcome of irregular warfare—an onerous 
task, as motivation is conceptually complex and multifaceted. In fact, Merom fittingly 
asks, “How is one supposed to measure the relative intensity of “will” independently, and 
without falling into the tautological trap of inferring it from the results of war?”56 To 
avoid this pitfall, and to account for alternative explanations, this chapter establishes the 
methodology that will be used to structure the analysis of motivation, and illuminate the 
ways and means irregulars use to win.57  
This thesis uses a mixed-methodology to explore the role of motivation in 
irregular warfare. This chapter will first discuss how heuristics is used in Part One, to 
look broadly at the evolution of irregular warfare since World War II, to determine if 
motivation is a constant factor, or more or less significant based on the nature of the 
conflict.58  Next, this chapter will elaborate on how the process tracing method is used in 
Part Two to look at specific cases in greater detail, to explore how motivation fluctuates, 
and how this relates to irregulars’ success. And finally, this chapter will establish the 
framework that will be used to identify and evaluate asymmetry of motivations in Part 
Two of this thesis.  
A. PART ONE: ASSESSING WHY IRREGULARS WIN  
Lewis Gann’s formative work, Guerrillas in History, provides a concise but 
comprehensive review of guerrillas and guerrilla warfare throughout four periods of time: 
                                                 
56 Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars, 12. 
57 Stephen Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1997), 11. The dependent variable being assessed is the success of the weak in irregular warfare. The 
independent variable is motivation. Van Evera defines the independent variable as “A variable framing the 
causal phenomenon of a causal theory or hypothesis;” and the dependent variable as “A variable framing 
the caused phenomenon of a causal theory or hypothesis.”  Also, he defines conditional variables as “A 
variable framing an antecedent condition. The values of condition variables govern the size of the impact 
that independent variables have on dependent variables.” 
58 Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social 
Sciences, BCSIA Studies in International Security (Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press, 2005), 94. 
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the preindustrial age; the industrial revolution and the age of imperialism; the early 
twentieth century; and the period leading up to World War II.59 Like Gann’s work, Part 
One of this thesis will look broadly at irregular conflicts to “[I]nductively identify new 
variables, hypotheses, causal mechanisms, and causal paths.”60 In doing so, irregular 
warfare will be evaluated heuristically across the next three distinct periods of time: the 
post-World War II period; the mid-to-late Cold War period; and the post-Cold War 
contemporary period of irregular warfare.61  
This thesis will first consider the anti-colonial irregular wars and internal irregular 
conflicts that embody the struggle for self-determination and independence of the post-
World War II era, between 1945 and 1962. Although, these irregular conflicts are not 
unique to the period, these types of irregular wars are prevalent throughout history—from 
the Maccabean Revolt to the American Revolution, to the Boxer Rebellion, and the 
Algerian War of Independence.62 This thesis will focus on the irregular conflicts that 
occurred in the wake of World War II, such as the First Indochina War, the Mau Mau 
Rebellion, and the Malayan Emergency, to discover how motivation influenced 
nationalist struggles in the post-colonial world. Additionally, this period will consider the 
rise of leftist guerrillas, as in the Huk Rebellion, to examine how motivation influenced 
early communist struggles during the post-WWII and early Cold War periods.    
Next, this thesis will consider the irregular wars of the mid-to-late Cold War era 
that occurred between 1963 and 1991. Some of the classic Cold War era irregular 
conflicts include the Vietnam War, the Colombian Crisis, the Irish Troubles, and the 
                                                 
59 Gann, Guerrillas in History. 
60 George and Bennett, Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences, 94.  
61 Robert J Bunker et al., Old and New Insurgency Forms, 2016, 
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pubs/download.cfm?q=1313. 17–20. Although this thesis 
parses irregular conflicts in distinct periods, it does so on the premise that the basic characteristics and 
features of irregular warfare are not exclusive to one period. More importantly, these three periods are not 
strictly bound in time as periods may, and often do overlap.   
62 Jon Brunberg, “Colonial Wars,” Wars Since 1900, The Polynational War Memorial (2004-2013): 
http://www.war-memorial.net/wars_all.asp?tags=Colonial+Wars&submit=Find&q=3; Max Boot, “Invisible 
Armies Insurgency Tracker,” Council on Foreign Relations, 18 April 2013: http://www.cfr.org/wars-and-
warfare/invisible-armies-insurgency-tracker/p29917. 
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Soviet-Afghan War.63 These conflicts are defined by the struggle between leftist 
expansion and Western ideals, and the competition between the United States and the 
Soviet Union. These wars were also predominantly fought by rural peasant-guerrillas 
under the banner of socialism, inspired by the teachings and leadership of Mao Tse-Tung, 
Ho Chi Minh, Fidel Castro and Che Guevara.64  Finally, these irregular conflicts were 
shaped and characterized by external support and influence and demonstrated the 
growing impact of the media.  
Irregular warfare evolved with the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
disintegration of leftist economics and ideology. Internal-crisis and instability 
characterize the third period of irregular warfare, as nations splintered under ethnic, 
racial, religious, or tribal friction.65 Additionally, the prevalence of non-state actors and 
the use of proxies and surrogates by shadowy strongmen (Russia, China, Iran, etc.) in 
gray zones also define this period.66  Furthermore, this period is uniquely influenced and 
shaped by several major global trends: the use and availability of new technologies; 
resource competition due to expanding populations; a shift in demographics toward 
urbanization and littoralization; and the global diffusion of power due to expanding 
                                                 
63 Jon Brunberg, “Communist Guerrilla Wars,” Wars Since 1900, The Polynational War Memorial 
(2004-2013): http://www.war-memorial.net/wars_all.asp?tags=Colonial+Wars&submit=Find&q=3; Max 
Boot, “Invisible Armies Insurgency Tracker,” Council on Foreign Relations, 18 April 2013: 
http://www.cfr.org/wars-and-warfare/invisible-armies-insurgency-tracker/p29917. 
64 Max Boot, “The Evolution of Irregular War,” Foreign Affairs March/April 2013, 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/2013-02-05/evolution-irregular-war. 
65 Charles Krulak, “From the Seal,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. Spring 1999, 
http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a525526.pdf.79; Scott Gates, Havard Mokleiv Nygard, and Havard 
Strand, “Trends in Armed Conflict 1946–2014” (Oslo, Norway: Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), 
January 2016), http://file.prio.no/publication_files/prio/Gates %20Nygård,%20Strand,%20Urdal%20-
%20Trends%20in%20Armed%20Conflict,%20Conflict%20Trends%201-2016.pdf. Internal irregular 
conflicts were the most predominant form of conflict in the post-Cold War era. 
66 United States Special Operations Command, “White Paper—The Gray Zone,” September 9, 2015, 
https://cle.nps.edu/access/content/group/4d4da4c3-67ad-4e59-8a9a-
5d457ee1c663/1%20Intro/Gray%20Zones%20-
%20USSOCOM%20White%20Paper%209%20Sep%202015.pdf.1. By definition, the gray zone has come 
to represent conflicts that are characterized by ambiguity about the nature of the conflict, the parties 
involved, the policy being pursued, and the legality of actions, activities, and operations employed. 
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economic growth worldwide.67 Finally, while many of these irregular wars are brief, they 
often are only one chapter of a larger conflict—such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and 
the Colombian Crisis. Ultimately, the post-Cold War period will expose how new 
technology, tactics, and tools influence the outcome of contemporary irregular conflicts. 
Part One of this thesis will attempt to answer why the weak sometimes prevail 
against the strong. On top of this, Part One will identify the factors that impacted 
irregular warfare the most over the last seventy years to determine the significance of 
motivation as a causal factor for irregular success. Then, to evaluate how irregulars 
exploit asymmetry of motivations by influencing intrinsic and extrinsic motivation, and 
to take a more in-depth look at the cause-effect relationship between motivation and 
success, this thesis will use the process tracing method in Part Two of this thesis.68 
B. PART TWO: ASSESSING HOW IRREGULARS WIN  
Motivation is a physiological and psychological process and the impetus of 
human behavior.69 Motives can be understood as one’s wants and needs; the magnitude 
of which are defined by how far one is willing to go to achieve them, and how they react 
to positive and negative stimuli. The intent of Part Two is to trace the belligerent’s 
commitment over the duration of the conflict to identify asymmetries of motivation and 
to demonstrate how motivation ebbs and flows over the course of a conflict. This process 
will ensure motivation is assessed and accounted for without inferring the impact of 
motivation from the proximate results of these activities alone 
                                                 
67 Kimberly Amerson and Spencer B. Meredith, “The Future Operating Environment 2050: Chaos, 
Complexity and Competition,” Small Wars Journal, July 31, 2016, http://smallwarsjournal.com/jrnl/art/the-
future-operating-environment-2050-chaos-complexity-and-competition. 
68 Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science, 64.  
69 Xiaoyan Xu et al., “Motivation and Social Contexts: A Cross national Pilot Study of Achievement, 
Power, and Affiliation Motives,” International Journal of Psychology 47, no. 2 (April 2012): 111–17, 
doi:10.1080/00207594.2011.590493. Xu et al. note, “Motivation is one of the most important determinants 
of human behaviors; it produces inner forces that guide and direct human behaviors.” Daniel Katz, 
“Obituary: Floyd H. Allport (1890-1978),” American Psychologist 34, no. 4 (1979): 351–53, 
doi:10.1037/h0078276. Floyd Allport is considered “[T]he father of experimental social psychology.;”  
Floyd Henry Allport, “The Physiological Basis of Human Behavior,” Social Psychology, 1924, 17–41. 
Allport argues that human behavior is the result of electrical and chemical neural reactions transmitted 
through the spinal cord, from the brain, as a result of stimuli (a physiological need or cognitive desire) 
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Assessing motivation in irregular warfare is a three-step process. First, an initial 
assessment is conducted to determine whether an actor’s commitment is total or limited 
at the very beginning of each conflict. Then, commitments are traced from this 
motivational baseline to identify fluctuations in motivation over time. Significant 
fluctuations will be analyzed to identify asymmetry of motivations.  
Then, any asymmetries of motivations are evaluated and assessed to explore the 
antecedent conditions to each change, to isolate the actions, activities and operations that 
shape and modify motivation. This will serve to unpack the ways in which motivation is 
manipulated and exploited. To this end, each case study will be evaluated to determine 
how irregulars shape their opponents’ motivations, and thus, their behavior. Also, each 
case study will be evaluated to determine how irregulars shape their motivation, and how 
this contributed to their success.  
Finally, a controlled comparison will be conducted to evaluate the significance of 
asymmetries of motivations in irregular warfare. Also, the controlled comparison will 
highlight common ways and means irregulars use to influence intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivation.70 Furthermore, this comparison will enable this theory of motivation to be 
compared to the competing theories offered by Mack, Arreguín-Toft, Record, and 
Merom.71  
This methodology and framework will accomplish three ends; it will identify 
asymmetries of motivation, evaluate the relationship between success and motivation, 
and reveal antecedent conditions of motivational exploitation and manipulation that result 
in behavioral changes.72  Though, motivation must first be understood and a framework 
must be established before we can assess asymmetry of motivations in irregular warfare.  
                                                 
70 Ibid., 56.  
71 Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars;” Arreguín-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars; Record, 
Beating Goliath; Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars. 
72 Van Evera, Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science, 74.  
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C. ASSESSING MOTIVATION IN IRREGULAR WARFARE 
Motivation (mo·ti·va·tion/mōdəˈvāSH(ə)n): Noun, the process of 
starting, directing, and maintaining physical and psychological activities; 
includes mechanisms involved in preferences for one activity over another 
and the vigor and persistence of responses.73 
—American Psychological Association  
Motivation in conflict is dynamic; it waxes and wanes as a result of a multitude of 
factors—the irregular, the population, their adversary, and their adversary’s population 
and military, international politics, time, proximity, cost, etc. Therefore, to assess 
motivation, it is necessary to make several assumptions.  
First, one’s motivation cannot be conclusively known or defined in absolute 
terms, as researchers must rely on observations, interviews, and reports subject to one’s 
perspective and memory.74  Second, motivation is evaluated best in relative terms by 
comparing and contrasting indicators of motivation between periods of time.75 Third, 
motivation is a spectrum, with no motivation on one end of the spectrum and total 
motivation on the other. Fourth, behavior is often motivated by more than one need or 
want; multiple requirements or needs may motivate a single behavior at any one point in 
time.76 And finally, one’s actions to influence the motivation and behavior of an 
opponent may produce a relative change in their motivation.77 Given these assumptions, 
                                                 
73 “Glossary of Psychological Terms,” American Psychological Association, 
http://www.apa.org/research/ action/glossary.aspx?tab=13. 
74 Maferima Touré-Tillery and Ayelet Fishbach, “How to Measure Motivation: A Guide for the 
Experimental Social Psychologist,” Social and Personality Psychology Compass 8, no. 7 (July 2, 2014), 
doi:10.1111/spc3.12110, 328. “[M]otivation is a psychological construct that cannot be observed or 
recorded directly.” 
75 Ibid., 328.  
76 Abraham H. Maslow, “A Theory of Human Motivation,” Psychological Review 50 (1943), 370–396, 
391. 
77 Doug McAdam, “Tactical Innovation and the Pace of Insurgency,” American Sociological Review 
48, no. 6 (1983), 736. Doug McAdam’s tactical interaction theory explains that actions taken by one actor 
produce counter-actions by their opponent to keep pace with and outmatch each other. Herwig Kressler, 
Motivate and Reward (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire ; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 25. 
Expectancy theory states: Motivation = Expectancy x Instrumentality x Valence. Thus, according to 
expectancy theory, one’s motivation is influenced by their ability to translate effort and performance into 
success.  
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the first step in establishing an assessment framework is to unpack the theoretical 
foundations of motivation. 
Motivation is generally examined from three perspectives: needs-based 
motivation (the why, or the reason for human behavior); process-based motivation (the 
how, or the strategies used to manipulate motivation); and reinforcement-based 
motivation (the what, or the stimuli that conditions behavior).78  From this, four markers 
can be used to indicate the temporal variation of motivation in irregular wars. These 
markers will then be used to construct a framework from which motivation can be 
evaluated.  
1. Needs-Based Motivation Markers 
Individual motivations are best understood within the framework of needs-based 
theories of motivation developed first by Abraham Maslow. This theory focuses on the 
most basic factors, the intrinsic, or internal factors that drive people to behave a certain 
way.79 Fundamentally, individuals seek to fulfill basic needs first to sustain biological 
function and to ensure safety and security before they seek out lesser needs associated 
with a sense of belonging, self-esteem, and self-actualization.80 Similarly, Henriksen and 
Vinci’s combat motivation theory suggests that there are five reasons why people engage 
in war; three are reasonable motives; economic, communitarian, and existential; and two 
are “senseless” motives; coercion and barbarism.81 These two explanations help explain 
                                                 
78 Steven Lattimore McShane and Mary Ann Young Von Glinow, Organizational Behavior: 
Essentials, 1st ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2007), 24. 
79 Maslow, “A Theory of Human Motivation,” 391. Abraham Maslow believed that “[s]ome behavior 
is highly motivated, other behavior is only weakly motivated” and “[s]ome is not motivated at all (but all 
behavior is determined).” 
80 Steve Roesler, “All Things Workplace,” Talent & “Misunderstanding Maslow” Factor, February 
13, 2010, http://www.allthingsworkplace.com/2010/02/talent-the-misunderstanding-maslow-factor.html; 
Maslow, “A Theory of Human Motivation,” 372–382; Maslow, “A Theory of Human Motivation,” 386. 
This hierarchy is not rigid or absolute between individuals, particularly between individuals of different 
nationalities; John R Schermerhorn, Richard Osborn, and James G Hunt, Organizational Behavior 
(Phoenix]; New York: University of Phoenix ; Wiley, 2002), 148. Preferences often vary because 
“Individual values and attitudes—both important aspects of motivation—have strong cultural foundations.” 
81 Rune Henriksen and Anthony Vinci, “Combat Motivation in Non-State Armed Groups,” Terrorism 
and Political Violence 20, no. 1 (December 28, 2007): 87–109, doi:10.1080/09546550701677623, 93–94. 
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what moves individuals towards collective action but they fall short in explaining how 
irregular groups mobilize individuals and foster collective action. 
Collective action is paramount to the success of movements, groups, and 
irregulars in particular. Irregulars must consciously work to mobilize individuals to 
participate, either actively or passively, to create favorable conditions that enable them to 
survive and succeed. To mobilize individuals toward a purposeful end, irregulars, and 
movements in general, use diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational frames to structure 
their narrative.82 These three frames ultimately determine how well groups mobilize 
individuals to foster collective action.  
Narratives can be skewed, fabricated or overstated for internal or external 
consumption for a multitude of reasons. Though, false narratives are often short-lived, 
transparent, and fail to mobilize individuals over the long-term.  Therefore, narratives can 
generally be used to gain “valuable insights into the mental landscape of its creators and 
those who embrace them; it offers a glimpse into the dreams and aspirations of how they 
believe the world ought to be and their paths for realizing that new world order.”83 As a 
result, a group’s narrative, and changes to it, can be used to assess their commitment and 
motivation over time. Furthermore, an actor’s narrative may also reveal the strength of 
these motives and how far they are willing to go to achieve their goals. Thus, any changes 
to a group’s narrative or stated goals are the first indicators or markers of an actor’s 
commitment.   
                                                 
82 David A. Snow and Robert D. Benford. “Ideology, frame resonance, and participant mobilization.” 
International Social Movement Research 1, no. 1 (1988), 199. In other words, it reveals their grievances; to 
what or whom they attribute their problems to; what they believe the solution to be; and why individuals 
should participate. As Snow and Benford argue, “the success of participant mobilization, both within and 
across movements, depends upon the degree to which these three tasks are attended to.”    
83 Heather S. Gregg, “Fighting the Jihad of the Pen: Countering Revolutionary Islam’s Ideology,” 
Terrorism and Political Violence 22, no. 2 (March 11, 2010): 292–314, doi:10.1080/09546551003597584, 
294.  
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2. Process-Based Motivation Markers  
Process-based theories of motivation focus on the cognitive process of motivating 
and mobilizing individuals and groups through activated or deprived needs.84 Expectancy 
theory suggests that individuals and groups act to the extent that they believe “their effort 
(Expectancy) will lead to acceptable performance and that their performance will be 
rewarded (Instrumentality), and the value of the rewards is highly positive (Valence).”85  
In other words, if individuals and groups believe they are capable, that their goals are 
within reach, and worth dying for, they are more likely to participate. Conversely, if there 
is doubt, or if the goals are not worth the effort, their participation will suffer.  
Expectancy theory informs collective action in the sense that expectancy, valence, 
and instrumentality directly correlate with group commitment and force size.86 This is to 
say, when expectancy, valence, and instrumentality are high, individuals are more likely 
to view collective action as beneficial and will participate to a greater extent. In other 
words, force size will grow. Similarly, it is reasonable to assume that commitment and 
mobilization decrease when expectancy, valence, and instrumentality are low, resulting in 
a decrease in force size.  
It logically follows; changes in force size may indicate changes in a group’s 
commitment and motivation.87 As an actor’s force size grows, so too does the actor’s 
commitment and motivation. In much the same fashion, when an actor’s force size 
decreases, as a result of combat attrition or otherwise, commitment and motivation suffer. 
                                                 
84 C. N Cofer and M. H Appley, Motivation: Theory and Research (New York: John Wiley, 1964). 
159.  
85 Fred C. Lunenburg, “Expectancy Theory of Motivation: Motivating by Altering Expectations,” 
International Journal of Management, Business, and Administration 15, no. 1 (2011),   
http://www.nationalforum.com/Electronic%20Journal%20Volumes/Luneneburg,%20Fred%20C%20Expect
ancy%20Theory%20%20Altering%20Expectations%20IJMBA%20V15%20N1%202011.pdf., 2; Kressler, 
Motivate and Reward, 25. Or put differently: Motivation = Expectancy x Instrumentality x Valence. 
Process-based motivation strategies have been developed within the business and marketing field to 
improve overall performance—which often translates into productivity and earnings—the ultimate goal 
within the business sector. 
86 Lunenburg, “Expectancy Theory of Motivation: Motivating by Altering Expectations,” 1–5. 
87 Ibid. 
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Therefore, the second motivation marker in a conflict is any change in force size between 
periods of time.  
Building on this, an actor’s commitment and motivation are also directly related 
to the size of their operational area and the complexity and frequency of their attacks. 
Aggression is a learned behavior that fluctuates in response to rewards and punishment.88 
Therefore, as with expectancy and valence, as commitment and motivation increase, so 
too does the frequency and intensity of aggressive behavior.  
An increase in the size and intensity of a group’s operations generally reveals an 
increase in their commitment and motivation. For example, actors that resort to extreme 
forms of violence or execute massive swarming operations may indicate that they are 
more committed than those that conducted sporadic attacks or use limited force.89 
Conversely, a sign of decreased commitment and motivation, and decreased expectancy 
and valence, is a decline in the frequency or intensity of operations, or a decrease in the 
size of their operational area. As a result, changes to the breadth and depth of an actor’s 
actions, activities, and operations between periods of time form the third indicator of 
motivation.   
3. Reinforcement-Based Motivation Markers 
Reinforcement-based motivation is primarily concerned with extrinsic forces that 
drive behavior. For example, external actuation of specific stimuli will manipulate 
motivation, thereby shaping behavior. This classical conditioning technique is “a form of 
learning through association,” whereby introducing the desired stimulus elicits a specific 
                                                 
88 C. N Cofer and M. H Appley, Motivation: Theory and Research (New York: John Wiley, 1964), 
740–447. Cofer and Appley explain that aggression, and the prevalence of aggression is not only explained 
by instinctive reaction to frustrations, but also, by an acquired drive that is a learned behavior. In addition, 
aggression is determined by: the frequency and intensity with which frustrations and annoyers are 
experienced; the extent to which aggressive or attacking behavior is reinforced or punished; the amount of 
social facilitation present; and temperament.  
89 John Arquilla and David F. Ronfeldt, Swarming & the Future of Conflict (Santa Monica, CA: 
RAND, 2000), vii. Arquilla and Ronfeldt note, “Swarming is seemingly amorphous, but it is a deliberately 
structured, coordinated, strategic way to strike from all directions, by means of a sustainable pulsing of 
force and/or fire, close-in as well as from stand-off positions.” 
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behavioral outcome.90 Similarly, operant conditioning can be used to modify behavior by 
manipulating its consequences.91 This process is explained by the law of effect, which 
states: “[B]ehavior that results in a pleasing outcome is likely to be repeated; behavior 
that results in an unpleasant outcome is not likely to be repeated.”92 Thus, a 
reinforcement technique, such as positive or negative rewards, or punishment, can be 
introduced to modify behavior.93  In essence, these two strategies are primarily 
concerned with manipulating stimuli to produce a desired outcome. 
New behaviors can be created and old behaviors can be extinguished. For 
example, new behavior can be shaped by continuously rewarding precursors to the 
desired behavior.94 On the other hand, fear and the desire to avoid pain or undesirable 
situations are also strong stimuli. In fact, “Fear is one of the strongest natural emotions in 
man” that motivates behavior.95  Consequently, punishment can be used to induce fear to 
ultimately curb or extinguish certain behaviors.96  Therefore, one’s tolerance of 
punishment, willingness to suffer repeated pain, and rising costs of blood and treasure are 
indications of motivation.  
A change to an actor’s willingness to endure the cost of war is the fourth and final 
motivation indicator. Costs can be assessed in several ways—economic, political, social, 
or material costs—and measured in relative terms between two periods of time. Thus, a 
                                                 
90 Schermerhorn, Osborn, and Hunt, Organizational Behavior, 148. 
91 Ibid., 149. 
92 Ibid., 149. 
93 Ibid., 150–153. Positive reinforcement is the administration of positive rewards to increase the 
likelihood of repeating the behavior. Negative reinforcement, or avoidance, is the withdrawal of negative 
consequences to increase the likelihood of repeating a certain behavior. Punishment is the administration of 
negative consequences to discourage an unwanted behavior.  
94 Ibid., 150. “Shaping” is the process of creating new behavior through positive reinforcement. 
“Modifying” behavior is the process of conditioning and reinforcing existing behaviors that you desire 
more or less of.  
95 Department of the Navy United States Marine Corps, Small Wars Manual, United States Marine 
Corps, 1940 (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1940), 
http://www.au.af.mil/au/awc/awcgate/swm/ch01.pdf, 23.  
96 Daniel H. Pink, Drive: The Surprising Truth about What Motivates Us, Reprint (New York: 
Riverhead Trade, 2011), 34.  
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willingness to tolerate higher costs, and a willingness to accept risks and endure pain is a 
sign of high motivation. Furthermore, an actor that is willing to engage in immoral or 
barbaric practices, unconstrained by collateral damage or human rights, or willing to act 
in the face of growing domestic or international condemnation is likely to be more 
motivated. Also, changes to an actor’s risk or pain tolerance indicate a negative change in 
motivation. Therefore, an actor’s motivation is directly related to any changes in cost-
benefit or risk-reward calculations.  
4. Motivation Assessment Framework  
To identify asymmetry and to evaluate motivations over time, this thesis will use 
the following markers: changes in narrative and goals; changes in force size; changes in 
breadth and depth of activities, actions, and operations; and changes in willingness to 
accept the costs of war. By themselves, these markers are only observations. Though, by 
comparing and contrasting changes between each marker over space and time, it is 
possible to assess motivation.  
Ultimately, these markers will help determine the relative difference in motivation 
between periods of time and between belligerents in Part Two of this thesis. In the end, 
this process will illuminate asymmetry of motivations, which can then be further studied 
and evaluated to understand how motivation is shaped and exploited.  First, Part One of 
this thesis and the following chapters will consider the significance of motivation 
compared to other factors influencing the success of the weak in irregular warfare. This 














III. IRREGULAR WARFARE IN THE POST-WWII PERIOD 
The seeds of many revolutions were sown well before the end of the Second 
World War. Twentieth-century Western ideology championed the rights of liberty, 
equality, and political freedom and renounced the virtues of colonialism.97 As a result, 
irregulars of this time period often enjoyed the support of the newly structured 
international community. Additionally, leftist ideals began to gain traction as the 
disenfranchised latched on to common grievances such as government corruption and 
abuse, social exploitation, and land distribution inequities. As these principles took root, 
the weak often found solace in pro-communist and socialist movements. Thus, these 
conflicts, such as the Huk Rebellion, are best defined as internal irregular conflicts fought 
under the banner of communism between a leftist irregular force and a legitimate 
government.  
Although this became a dominant trend, particularly during the Cold War, the 
post WWII era is also defined by nationalism and anti-colonialism. Indigenous irregulars 
of this period were mostly competing to remove the remnants of colonial influence from 
their lands to gain freedom and independence.98 In some instances, the weak met little 
resistance in gaining their independence.99 Colonial powers such as France and Great 
Britain were financially, militarily, and politically weakened as a result of World War II 
and were less willing to engage in messy conflicts.100 Although, when colonies were of 
                                                 
97 Woodrow Wilson, “President Wilson’s Fourteen Points,” January 8, 1918. 
https://cle.nps.edu/access/content/group/a7ccddab-0631-4ea2-82ed 71c9d3bed7b7/Course%20Documents/ 
Wilson%2014.pdf, 4. “The principle of justice to all peoples and nationalities, and their right to live on 
equal terms of liberty and safety with one another, whether they be strong or weak.” “President Wilson’s 
Declaration of War Message to Congress,” April 2, 1917: “To fight thus for the ultimate peace of the world 
and for the liberation its peoples…for the rights of nations great and small and the privilege of men 
everywhere to choose their way of life and of obedience...” 
98 Laqueur, Guerrilla Warfare, 384.  
99 Boot, Invisible Armies, 322–325. 
100 Laqueur, Guerrilla Warfare, 383. “The European colonial powers, gravely weakened as a result of the 
war, lacked the financial and military resources and the political will to retain their overseas possessions against 
the rising tide of independence movements.” Also, the issues spurring wars of national liberation and 
independence were mostly socio-economical grievances such as land reform. These issues enjoyed popular 
support among indigenous subjects that suffered colonial exploitation for several generations.    
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strategic or economic significance or retaining them became a matter of pride, irregulars 
found themselves engaged in brutal and costly struggles with foreign powers.101  
A. INDONESIAN NATIONAL REVOLUTION: 1945–1949 
The Indonesian National Revolution was one of the earliest wars of liberation 
after World War II. The Indonesian people were fully committed; they had “[A] national 
will to independence, the military means to achieve it, and the administrative ability to 
sustain it.”102 Conversely, the Dutch were limitedly committed, although, they believed 
that it was their “divine right” to rule Indonesia.103 Indonesian Nationalists engaged the 
Dutch in an irregular war that lasted nearly four years. Although the Dutch were better 
equipped and capable, they struggled to pacify the Indonesians and lost international 
support for their cause as a result of the brutality of their actions.104   
By 1949, the Dutch folded under international pressure and conceded politically 
to the Indonesian Republic.105 For their part, Indonesia did not achieve independence as a 
result of the irregulars’ actions alone. Indonesian Nationalists struggled to make any 
                                                 
101 Boot, Invisible Armies, 325–326. Britain only fought to hold on to a few colonies; either because 
they were deemed of strategic significance or to prevent the Communists from taking over. However, 
France was often less inclined to hand over colonies. They wanted to hold on to their empire in order to 
“resurrect lost glory and erase the humiliation of defeat.”  
102 Robert B. Asprey, War in the Shadows: The Guerrilla in History (New York: W. Morrow, 1994), 
760, 765. Although the Japanese left the Indonesians postured and capable of assuming their own destiny, 
the Dutch were not of the same mind and they were able to hold on to their colony initially due to the political and 
financial support of the United States and Great Britain. At the same time, the Dutch could not afford to hold on to 
Indonesia without this funding, nor did they have the forces or resources to secure their interests in the region.  
103 Ibid., 762–3.  
104 Ibid., 766. The Dutch were struggling financially after World War II and could not afford to return 
to Indonesia to administer peace without American aid; by 1947 the Netherlands had spent $400 million 
and they were failing to prevail against the Nationalist forces. Asprey notes that 145,000 Dutch troops were 
mostly defending from strongpoints and on the defensive by January 1948. Laqueur, Guerrilla Warfare, 
287. The Dutch also lacked a force large enough to secure their interests in Indonesian. As Laqueur notes, 
“The Dutch army was, in the words of one observer, incapable of occupying an overcrowded area of fifty million 
people, short perhaps of an outright campaign of terror, for which the Dutch were “temperamentally unsuited.” 
Factor in an economy in ruin, the prospect of general turmoil, the condemnation of the United Nations, facing the 
strong disapproval of the United States and their other allies, the Dutch opted for withdrawal and Indonesia 
became a sovereign republic.”  
105 Asprey, War in the Shadows, 766. In 1949, the Dutch folded under international pressure after the 
United Nations Security Council called for an immediate ceasefire, governments around the world 
protested Netherlands actions at The Hague, and the United States withheld Marshall Plan aid.   
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significant headway against the Dutch; strategically they floundered, and resources 
became scarce without the aid of external support. Also, the Indonesians were unable to 
impose significant political and psychological costs on the Dutch or shift the focus of the 
war on to their domestic situation. Despite their shortcomings, the Indonesians benefited 
from the recent shift in political ideals and morals; colonialism had lost favor in the new 
world order, and nations were less willing to support colonial enterprises. 
The Indonesians benefitted from the presence of an asymmetry of motivations. 
Though, the Dutch ultimately quit fighting due to financial strain, and most importantly, 
external pressure placed upon them by the international community. Ultimately, the 
Indonesians achieved their independence in 1949 and the Dutch lost their motivation to 
prevail because the Dutch were compelled to quit by the international community. 
In effect, an asymmetry of motivations may explain why the Indonesians prevailed in 
this case.  
B. HUK REBELLION: 1945–1952 
The Hukbalahaps rebels were not as lucky as the Indonesian Nationalists. The 
Huks and the Philippine Government were equally committed to winning this war. 
Though, after nine long years of guerrilla operations, the Huks failed to defeat their 
adversary.106 Early in the war, the communist Huks achieved moderate success against 
the corrupt Philippine government. At first, the Huks were able to foster significant 
support for their cause; their goals to curb government corruption and address land 
reform appealed widely to the poor and the middle class. Also, their guerrilla strategy 
proved effective against the inept, ill-equipped, and poorly led Philippine military and 
police. While they lacked any external support, they benefitted from the protection of 
                                                 
106 Kenneth Hammer, “Huks in the Philippines,” In Modern Guerrilla Warfare, Fighting Communist 
Guerrilla Movements,1941-1961, ed. Franklin M. Osanka (New York: The Free Press, 1962), 171–181. 
Led by Luis Taruc, the Huks were a peasant militant movement formed in 1941. The group was mostly 
comprised of intellectuals, politicians and army personnel that were organized during WWII to harass the 
enemy rear and make the island intolerable for the Japanese. They were well trained and experienced, by 
1945 they had fought over 1200 engagements and had at least 5000 men, 10,000 reserves, and 35,000 
auxiliary personnel. But after WWII, the Huks were marginalized and changed their name to the Peoples 
Liberation Army (Jukbo Ng Mapagpalaya Sa Bayan), or the HMB, and won popular support under the 
guise of land reform. By 1950, the HMB numbered over 20,000 and controlled most of Luzon.  
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thick jungle sanctuaries throughout the Philippines. Though, the Huks lost the initiative 
following the rise of Ramon Magsaysay in 1950.107 
In the end, the Huks proved to be no match for the United States-backed 
Philippine forces or the political prowess of Magsaysay.108 While both sides used 
psychological warfare, the Philippine government prevailed by countering the Huks 
messaging with a political strategy that deflated the Huks cause and won support of the 
local population. Finally, the government brought the war to an end by offering the Huks 
amnesty and positive incentives to disengage, while also offering the local population 
rewards for information leading to the kill or capture of the remaining Huk fighters. 
The demise of the Huks is mostly due to the competence, capability, and overall 
strategy of Magsaysay and his forces.109 For their part, the Huks failed in many respects 
to adapt and overcome as their goals became irrelevant over time and their strategy 
proved to be futile. The eventual surrender of Taruc and his Huks in 1954 is the result of 
their physical isolation, their lack of external support, and their failure to expand their 
narrative to recruit more fighters and build more support. Despite their lack of success, 
the Huks remained committed to the end, which accounts for the length of the rebellion. 
Unfortunately, time was not on their side; the protracted nature of this war only served to 
increase the Huks’ suffering as support for their cause deteriorated. 
The Huks’ failure can be distilled to two time periods: before 1950 and after 
1950. In both of these periods, the Huks failed to engender significant domestic and 
                                                 
107 Boot, Invisible Armies, 405; Asprey, War in the Shadows, 749.  
108 Boyd Bashore, “Dual Strategy for Limited War,” In Modern Guerrilla Warfare, Fighting 
Communist Guerrilla Movements, 1941–1961, ed. Osanka, 187–200; Boot, Invisible Armies, 48, 403–404. 
Magsaysay was advised and heavily influenced by an American Advisor, Edward Lansdale.  Lansdale was 
instrumental in Magsaysay’s rise to prominence and for the effectiveness of this counter-Huk strategy and 
political reforms.  
109 Boot, Invisible Armies, 403–405. Magsaysay’s motto was “All-Out Friendship or All-Out Force.” 
Magsaysay reorganized the military and brought an end to corruption within the military. With the aid of Colonel 
Lansdale, Magsaysay trained the military to respect the people and personally inspected their operations and 
conduct to ensure they were behaving. He also encouraged the people to report bad behavior to build better civil-
military relations and improve popular support for his efforts. Overall, Magsaysay was responsible for devising 
political reforms that deflated the Huks cause by addressing land reform issues and by instituting free and fair 
balloting during the 1951 and 1953 elections.   
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international support—their cause never resonated beyond the jungles of the Sierra 
Madre Mountains or the Candaba Swamp.110 Specifically, before 1950, the Huks failed 
to build widespread support for their cause and failed to turn the people against their 
government.111 After 1950, the Huks failed to address their organizational weaknesses 
and adapt to Magsaysay’s strategic shift. As a result, the Philippine government prevailed 
because they were able to isolate the irregulars and win the support of the population.  
Ultimately, this irregular conflict lacks a clear asymmetry of motivations, as both sides 
were equally committed. Though, this conflict, and specifically, Magsaysay and Lansdale 
do demonstrate the importance of popular support, strategy and external influence in 
irregular warfare.  
C. FIRST INDOCHINA WAR: 1946–1954 
As the Huks struggled against the Philippine government, the Viet Minh fought to 
expel the French from Indochina. The Viet Minh pursued a total goal of independence 
while the French were only seeking a strategic “backdoor” into Asia.112 In other words, 
the Viet Minh were completely committed while French were only limitedly committed.  
The Viet Minh were successful for many reasons, which can be explained by the 
arguments made by Arreguín-Toft, Merom, Record, and Mack.113 First, the Viet Minh 
                                                 
110 Osanka, Modern Guerrilla Warfare, Fighting Communist Guerrilla Movements, 1941–1961. 
111 Asprey, War in the Shadows, 749–753. The Huks had the advantage over the Philippine 
government after the Japanese surrendered. The Huks were experienced, well organized, and had access to 
their weapons that had been stashed away after the end of WWII. In addition, the government forces were 
in no position to counter the Huks; the police force was small and the military was still recovering from the 
war. Both forces were not well trained and their heavy-handed methods resulted in more recruits for the 
Huks. In addition, Roxas failed to enact proper reforms and allowed corruption to run rampant.  
112 Ibid., 801. Asprey notes that despite France’s insistence on the strategic nature of Vietnam, French 
Indochina was not a strategic key but more of a strategic convenience as it was a way into china. Paul 
Linebarger, “Indochina: The Bleeding War,” In Modern Guerrilla Warfare, Fighting Communist Guerrilla 
Movements, 1941–1961, ed. Osanka, 245. The French ruled in Indochina for about 55 years; from 1885 
until 1940 when they pulled the majority of their forces out to focus on the war in Europe. Before WWII, 
Indochina was a “weird colonial composite within the French empire.” It was actually five countries that included 
Cochin China, Annam, Tonkin, Cambodia, and Laos. By 1951, three countries were officially recognized: French 
Indochina, Cambodia, and Laos with Viet Nam emerging as a fourth emerging country under Ho’s communist 
movement under the auspices of the Viet Minh.  
113 Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars;” Arreguín-Toft, How the Weak Win Wars; Record, 
Beating Goliath; Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars. 
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adjusted and adapted their military strategy several times based on their success and 
failures against the French Expeditionary Forces. As the Viet Minh learned, matching 
France’s direct warfare strategy most often proved disastrous.114 After several strategic 
blunders, Ho Chi Minh and Giap recognized that their only hope of beating the French 
was to use guerrilla tactics and a Maoist strategy.115 Beyond this, the Viet Minh also 
succeeded because they were able to shift the focus to the domestic French population, 
thereby decreasing France’s overall motivation to persist in Indochina.116 This was 
mostly the byproduct of rising financial costs and mounting casualties incurred by the 
French, which ultimately called their goals and strategic interests in the region into 
question.117 Although, the Viet Minh also benefited from extensive third-party assistance 
                                                 
114 Bernard Fall, “Indochina: The Seven-Year Dilemma,” In Modern Guerrilla Warfare, Fighting 
Communist Guerrilla Movements, 1941–1961, ed. Osanka, 258.  
115 Ngo Van Chieu, “Journal of a Vietminh Combatant,” In  Guerrilla Strategies: An Historical 
Anthology from the Long March to Afghanistan, ed. Gérard Chaliand (Berkeley: University of California 
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Chaliand, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), 132. Ho and Giap learned to use the terrain to 
their advantage to disadvantage the French conventional strategy and their superior vehicles and weapons. 
By drawing the French off the roads and out of the cities and into the swamps and the jungles, the Viet 
Minh were able to defeat the French army and demoralize French troops. 
116 Asprey, War in the Shadows, 711. Inspired by the communist Viet Minh, the French communists 
executed a domestic subversive campaign targeting the movement of soldiers and material to Indochina. In 
addition, as French cost and casualties continued to grow, the war in Indochina became known as la sale 
guerre and even non-communists French citizens called for the withdraw of French expeditionary forces.  
117 Boot, Invisible Armies, 362. The eight-year war, fought immediately after WWII, cost the French 
an additional 92,000 men, an inconceivable number for a nation struggling to rebuild. Bernard Fall, 
“Indochina: The Seven-Year Dilemma,” In Modern Guerrilla Warfare, Fighting Communist Guerrilla 
Movements, 1941–1961, ed. Osanka, 258. They had over 250,000 Soldiers committed in Indochina at a 
time when the strategic need for forces was in Western Europe and they expended a great amount of 
capital, effort, and manpower in constructing, and then securing the De Lattre line (A fortified line of 
10,000 forts, bunkers and concrete emplacements supplemented by centrally located heavy and medium 
artillery positions, covering the entire delta river basin). Asprey, War in the Shadows, 818. The French 
soldiers often could not explain why they were fighting in Indochina; for the most part, France did not have 
a comprehensive strategy and could not articulate what was strategic about its colonial claim there. 
Ultimately, the French Expeditionary Forces lost 170,000 casualties, 75,000 missing soldiers, and it cost 
France $7.5 billion with an additional cost of $4 billion in United States aid.  
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in the form of external political, material, and moral support from the Chinese.118 
Furthermore, several political opportunities enabled the Viet Minh’s success. First, the 
Viet Minh exploited the disruption of French rule in Indochina during the outbreak of 
WWII, and the collapse of Japan after the war, to cement their influence in Vietnam and 
declare independence. Second, the Soviet Union and Communist China officially 
recognized Ho and his government in 1949, lending the Viet Minh legitimacy and 
increased credibility and support for their cause.119 Third, the Viet Minh benefited from 
the United States’ frustration in Korea and the international communities desire to end 
both wars.120  Despite this, the French remained fully committed until their losses at Dien 
Bien Phu persuaded them to leave.  
The success of the weak in this irregular conflict is explained by the presence of 
asymmetry of motivations. The Viet Minh ultimately defeated the French, militarily and 
politically, by employing a flexible strategy; by bleeding the French dry physically and 
financially; and by targeting their adversary’s will to fight by influencing the French 
domestic population. Of these factors, the Viet Minh’s true success was due to their use 
of political and psychological warfare. The Viet Minh not only focused these efforts 
outward toward their adversary, but also inwardly toward their mass base to ensure 
                                                 
118 Bernard Fall, “Indochina: The Seven-Year Dilemma,” In Modern Guerrilla Warfare, Fighting 
Communist Guerrilla Movements, 1941–1961, ed. Osanka, 255. As Fall notes the Viet Minh was the 
byproduct of Ho Chi Minh’s relationship with the OSS during WWII. Ho’s guerrilla force grew as a result 
of this relationship as they were provided with weapons, training, and radios that enabled them to increase 
in size and strength. Boot, Invisible Armies, 355. The Viet Minh benefited greatly from the Chinese 
Communists defeat of the Nationalists in 1949; after this, the Viet Minh had access to Chinese training 
camps and advisors. Paul Linebarger, “Indochina: The Bleeding War,” In Modern Guerrilla Warfare, 
Fighting Communist Guerrilla Movements, 1941–1961 ed. Osanka. The Viet Minh also benefited from the 
Chinese and Soviet industrial complexes that funneled weapons and materials to their guerrillas and 
conventional forces throughout Vietnam. Conversely, a long logistical tail that hindered their operations 
and capabilities in Indochina plagued the French.  
119 Asprey, War in the Shadows, 694.  
120 Ibid., 797.  
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continued support in the face of rising costs, repeated setbacks, and the barbaric and 
brutal French counterinsurgency tactics.121  
In the end, the French were compelled to leave Indochina as a result of increased 
domestic and international pressure that arose in the wake of defeat at Dien Bien Phu.122 
In other words, the Viet Minh won because the French lost the will to fight. This case not 
only highlights the relevance of asymmetry of motivations, but also, the role of 
motivation in collective action. Furthermore, this case demonstrates the influence of 
popular support on motivation and how irregulars can manipulate opinions and 
perceptions to defeat their adversary. 
D. MALAYAN EMERGENCY: 1948–1960 
The Malayan Race Liberation Army (MRLA) was armed, trained, and employed 
against the Japanese by the British SOE Forces during WWII.123 After the war, the 
MRLA tried to contest British control and were totally committed to achieving their 
independence. Though, the British were committed to maintaining their colony in 
Malaya. First, the British were not willing to give up Malaya because it was the largest 
exporter of natural rubber at the time, and second, to prevent the spread of communism in 
South East Asia.124 Nevertheless, as important as Malaya was, the British were only 
                                                 
121 Ibid., 701–705. Ho and Giap divided the country up into zones, provinces, districts, inter-villages 
and villages. They also recognized the need for popular support so they emphasized the historical grievance 
of land reform and used trained agitation-propaganda teams to focus on the issue of Doc-Lap—
independence. In addition, they used the Cong An, a special secret police, and Trinh Sat, a special military 
intelligence force, and Dich-Van, a special terrorist organization to maintain social control over the 
population.  
122 Asprey, War in the Shadows, 711, 818. The French army’s defeat at Dien Bien Phu was a major 
psychological blow to the French people and their government. This battle was a turning point and was 
instrumental in convincing the French government to seek a way out of the war. The expeditionary forces 
lost several thousand soldiers and many more were missing or captured. As the casualties mounted and the 
cost of the war surpassed three billion francs, the French leftist claim that the la sale guerre should be 
abandoned found increasing support. Laqueur, Guerrilla Warfare, 267. Ultimately, French domestic war 
weariness made continuing the war impossible.  
123 Boot, Invisible Armies, 379. Malaya had a guerrilla army supported by the Allies in WWII, 
specifically, SOE Force 136.  
124 Ibid., 381.  
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limitedly committed to defeating the MRLA. Therefore, an asymmetry of motivations 
existed between the belligerents in this case. 
Nonetheless, the predominant ethnic Chinese communist MRLA failed to defeat 
the British. This was primarily because MRLA did not recognize the lack of anti-British 
sentiment, nationalist leanings, or grievances among the Malays.125 As a result, under the 
skilled leadership of Generals Briggs and Templer, the British isolated the MRLA from 
their support network, won the support of the Malay population, and starved the 
“bandits” out.126  
The MRLA’s failure is due to a multitude of factors; such as strategy, resources, 
and external support.127 Furthermore, despite the length of the insurgency, the MRLA 
failed to exact any real political and psychological cost on the British.128 Instead, the 
MLRA’s subversion and sabotage efforts only served to damage critical economic 
infrastructure; further alienating the Malay population. Aside from the MRLA’s actions, 
their downfall is the result of Britain’s brilliant counterinsurgency campaign, which 
                                                 
125 Julian Paget, “Emergency in Malaya,” In Guerrilla Strategies, ed. Chaliand, 270.  
126 Asprey, War in the Shadows, 790–794. The Malayan Emergency only cost the British about $21.5 
million to resettle over 250,000 people, establish a police force of 84,000, a military 55,000 strong, and a 
home guard of 60,000 ethnic Chinese. As Asprey notes, superior technology and resources played a minor 
role in the Malayan counterinsurgency campaign. Leadership, intelligence, and special operations blended 
with political and psychological warfare was the key to defeating the MRLA.  
127 Laqueur, Guerrilla Warfare. 288–291. The Chinese guerrillas in Malaya had no active sanctuary, 
no secure line of supply and they failed to secure popular support. They survived by extorting locals and relied 
on the Chinese shanty towns for material support and sanctuary.  Julian Paget, “Emergency in Malaya,” In 
Guerrilla Strategies, ed. Chaliand, 270–271. Paget notes that the MRLA communists never aroused world 
opinion or garnered international support for their cause. They also lacked a friendly base outside Malaya 
or a friendly border to use as a safe-haven (Thailand was not friendly toward communists and the royal 
navy controlled the coast). In addition, the MRLA three-phased Maoist strategy failed to move beyond the 
first phase.   
128 Asprey, War in the Shadows, 794. Overall, the twelve year war only cost the British security forces 
about 2000 lives while the guerrillas killed or kidnapped nearly 3,283 civilians and lost roughly 6,000 
MRLA fighters.   
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focused on political and psychological measures rather than on brutal military tactics.129 
Ultimately, the MRLA failed to develop a narrative that resonated with the larger Malay 
population; they failed to secure international support; and more importantly, they failed 
to persuade, coerce, or compel the British to leave Malaya.   
This is an interesting case because the irregulars lost although an asymmetry of 
motivations existed between the belligerents. This is undoubtedly because the irregular 
force was almost as foreign to the local population as the British were. Furthermore, the 
MRLA’s narrative failed to resonate with the Malays. Thus, although the MRLA were 
highly committed, the local population was not. Like the First Indochina War, this case 
highlights the relationship between motivations, popular support, and collective action.  
Furthermore, this case highlights the importance of political and psychological warfare in 
wars fought for limited goals.  
E. MAU MAU UPRISING: 1952–1960 
The Mau Mau Uprising was an irregular war between the Kikuyu Central 
Association (KCA), known as “The Movement,” or by the locals as the Gikuyu and 
Mumbi, and the British between 1952 and 1960.130 Within Kenya, the KCA’s 
commitment and motivation grew as “The Movement” became more popular among the 
local population. In contrast to this, the British were only limitedly committed and were 
not overly concerned with the uprising at first.  
The rebels were able to secure popular support over time because of the nature of 
their cause, existing tribal networks, their focus on educating the masses, and local 
                                                 
129 James Dougherty, “The Guerrilla War In Malaya,” In Modern Guerrilla Warfare, Fighting 
Communist Guerrilla Movements, 1941–1961 ed. Osanka, 299–305. The British instituted a resettlement 
program that physically, psychologically, and politically isolated the guerrillas from their base of support. It 
also offered would-be MRLA supporters’ clean drinking water, electricity, and housing, which increased 
support for the British. Boot, Invisible Armies. 392. The British instituted a massive psychological warfare 
campaign that included a rewards program for turning in MRLA personnel and they dropped millions of leaflets 
that offered guerrillas a safe way to surrender. 
130 Donald Barnett and Karari Njama, “Mau Mau From Within,” In Guerrilla Strategies, ed. Chaliand, 
141–162; Asprey, War in the Shadows, 873. The Mau Mau Uprising was mostly defeated by 1956 however 
pockets of resistance continued to rebel against the British until 1960.  
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religious practices.131  Unlike most irregular wars of the time, the Mau Mau Uprising was 
fueled more by tribalism and competition over resources than by communism or 
nationalism.132 Early on, the Mau Mau achieved moderate success with hit and run 
tactics and their ability to avoid detection in the Aberdare Range. The Mau Mau rebel 
operations also cost the British an astounding 130 million pounds and stretched the 
British even further (they were still attending to insurrections in Indonesia and Malaya 
and recovering from WWII). Though, the success of the Mau Mau rebels was fleeting as 
their increased activity raised British concerns in Kenya. Initially the rebels were only a 
minor threat to the British, but as violence escalated, the British were forced to deploy 
additional soldiers and resources to contain the rebellion.133 Therefore, although British 
commitment increased, it still remained limited compared to the Mau Mau’s total 
commitment.  
Despite their limited success, the Mau Mau were eventually exhausted and 
defeated by the British forces in Kenya. Ultimately, the Mau Mau were completely 
focused internally; they failed to bring attention to their cause outside of Kenya. In 
addition, the Mau Mau framed their narrative around narrow grievances such as land 
reform and religious freedom, but they never addressed wider concerns such as the 
legitimacy of Britain’s claim to Kenya. As a result, the Mau Mau failed to achieve 
                                                 
131 Ibid., 873;  Frank Kitson, Low Intensity Operations: Subversion, Insurgency and Peacekeeping 
(London: Faber and Faber, 2010), 33; Donald Barnett and Karari Njama, “Mau Mau From Within,” In 
Guerrilla Strategies, ed. Chaliand, 141–162; Asprey, War in the Shadows,144-145. The Mau Mau spent 
four years educating Kenyans on the virtue of rebelling on the basis of land reform, freedom of religion, 
and independence from British rule. They used ritualistic oaths to indoctrinate new followers and to 
promote people within the organization. The oaths resembled aspects of the Kikuyu religious practices that 
included animal sacrifice and witchcraft. These practices were used to induce membership and feelings of 
belonging, responsibility, respect and fear, and a sense of duty. Violations of the oath resulted in harsh 
punishments and death.   
132 Asprey, War in the Shadows, 862.  
133 Asprey, War in the Shadows, 871–883. The KCA membership grew to 250,000 by 1952 and they 
organized themselves according to seven district committees, each with a division, location and sub-
location to coordinate their activities against the British. They also started using terrorism to intimidate the 
colonial government and white settlers. By 1953, the British had deployed over 10,000 soldiers, expanded 
the police force to 15,000 with 6,000 auxiliaries, and a home guard of 20,000 Kenyans. They also expanded 
their operations into the Mau Mau jungle safe-havens and increased their aerial bombing campaign. Within 
one year, the British had arrested 150,000 suspects, killed over 11,000 Mau Mau guerrillas, and captured 
2,500 more. The Mau Mau morale plummeted, the leadership became fractured, and their operations 
dissipated until the uprising was effectively crushed by 1956.    
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widespread domestic and international support for their cause. This may indicate that 
their commitment and motivations were out of synch from the Kenyan majority. Finally, 
like the Malayans, the Mau Mau fell victim to the experience and success of the British; 
the British crushed the uprising by isolating the irregulars and penetrating the rebel 
groups with pseudo-gangs.134  
Ultimately, although an asymmetry of motivations existed between the Mau Mau 
and the British, the irregulars failed to coerce or persuade the British to leave. In the end, 
the British succeeded because they were able to isolate the irregulars, preventing them 
from threatening Britain’s political, economic, or military interests. As a result, the Mau 
Mau Uprising was defeated and the British continued to govern Kenya Colony until they 
chose to grant Kenya its independence in 1963.135   
This case again not only highlights the relationship between motivation and 
popular support, but also highlights how the strong can prevail when asymmetry of 
motivations exist. Within the context of limited warfare, this case highlights the 
importance of special operations and limited use of force by external forces, combined 
with political and psychological warfare, to defeat a totally motivated irregular group.  As 
this case reveals, isolating the irregulars, building and maintaining local support, and 
retaining moral authority for the presence and actions of a counterinsurgency force is 
paramount to overcome asymmetry of motivations.  
F. CUBAN REVOLUTION: 1953–1959 
Fidel Castro and his 26th of July Movement’s struggle against the Batista 
Government in Cuba is a unique and curious irregular war. Both Castro and Batista were 
                                                 
134 Frank Kitson, “Counterinsurrection in Kenya,” In Guerrilla Strategies, ed. Chaliand, 164–165; 
Asprey, War in the Shadows,  884. The British rounded up Nairobi’s Africans in1954 for screening and 
successfully broke the Mau Mau support network by sending thousands of Mau Mau suspects to detention 
camps. The British also started a resettlement campaign and moved over a million natives into villages that 
could be more easily secured. Frank Kitson’s pseudo gangs and the cordon sanitiare proved to be a major 
obstacle for the Mau Mau. By 1955, British Special Forces tracked down the remaining 2,000 Mau Mau in 
the Aberdare forest and captured the last Mau Mau leader—Kimathi—and in effect, the Mau Mau 
resistance ended.  
135 Even though the Mau Mau lost, the Kenyans were granted independence by the British in the early 
1960s.   
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completely committed throughout the duration of the revolt. Though, Castro’s forces 
remained wholly inferior—poorly trained, equipped, and led—compared to Batista’s 
American-backed army.136 Also, Castro was disadvantaged by very modest amounts of 
external support compared to the large amounts of resources and assistance the United 
States provided to Batista.137 Furthermore, Castro’s force was not sufficiently trained, 
equipped, or experienced enough to take on the Cuban police and military, resulting in 
multiple strategic blunders for the 26th of July Movement. Fortunately for Castro though, 
Batista suspended civil liberties, censored the Cuban press, and his government was 
increasingly viewed as corrupt.138   As a result, fractures developed within Cuban society. 
By exploiting this, Castro was able to defeat the Batista government politically with little 
actual fighting.  
Castro was not much of a military strategist, nor was anyone else in the 26th of 
July Movement. Although Castro did understand the importance of popular support; he 
ultimately succeeded against the Batista regime as a result of his political strategy. Castro 
used propaganda extensively to exploit the cruel and harsh tactics of the Batista regime 
and to build domestic and international support for his cause. In fact Castro’s stroke of 
genius, and what ultimately won the revolution, was his use of the media to politicize and 
internationalize his cause in 1957 by inviting Herbert Mathews to interview and profile 
him for the New York Times.139  Virtually overnight, Castro became an international 
sensation and the savior of the Cuban people. In turn, the 26th of July Movement was 
                                                 
136 Asprey, War in the Shadows, 934.  
137 Ibid., 948–950. Castro enjoyed limited external support initially; his forces were able to seek 
refuge in Mexico and received small amounts of support and aid from Batista’s former adversary, Prio 
Socarras. 
138 Ibid., 946.  
139 Ibid., 953.  
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able to expand its narrative and gain widespread international support for its cause, 
particularly within Washington.140   
This conflict lacked asymmetry of motivations; both Batista and Castro were 
equally motivated and employed all of their resources against each other. Castro and the 
26th of July Movement prevailed because they won support from the majority of the 
domestic and international community.  
In the end, Castro’s strategic defeat of the Cuban military in 1958, and his 
political campaign to win the support of the domestic population and the international 
community destroyed Batista’s motivation and compelled him to leave the country in 
1959.141 Thus, unlike the Huks, and despite symmetrical motivations, Castro prevailed 
because he had swayed popular support and persuaded the Cuban population, and the 
American government, that Batista was corrupt and needed to be removed from power. 
This enabled Castro to coerce and compel Batista to leave the country.   
This case reveals several factors that influence the outcome of irregular warfare. 
Notably, this case demonstrates that irregulars can succeed in the absence of an 
asymmetry of motivations. Furthermore, this case demonstrates that irregulars can prevail 
solely with the aid of popular support. Ultimately, this case indicates that popular support 
may serve as a driving force on motivation and the will to win.  
G. DOMINANT TRENDS IN THE POST-WORLD WAR II ERA 
The irregulars of the post-WWII era had two significant advantages. First, in most 
circumstances, the irregulars were fighting weakened colonial powers that were 
recovering politically, economically, and socially from the devastation of WWII. Second, 
the establishment of the United Nations reaffirmed the international communities’ 
                                                 
140 Ibid., 964–967. Castro’s 26th of July Movement established several clubs in American cities to 
disseminate propaganda and he used a clandestine radio broadcast, named Radio Rebelde, to push his 
propaganda domestically. Che Guevara, “Reminiscences of the Cuban Revolution,” In Guerrilla Strategies, 
ed. Chaliand, 185 “When we began to broadcast from our own transmitter, the existence of our troops and their 
fighting determination became known throughout the Republic; our links began to become more extensive and 
complicated.” Boot, Invisible Armies, 437–438. Castro also brought in other reporters such as Bob Taber 
from CBS to report on his activities and to bolster his domestic and international support.  
141 Asprey, War in the Shadows, 965–970.  
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commitment to ensuring liberty, justice, and freedom for all. This second development 
signaled a shift in international norms; in this new age, colonialism and the exploitation 
of native peoples by the strong were abhorrent and intolerable.  
1. Irregular Success in the Post-WWII Period 
Of the six cases reviewed in this chapter, irregulars succeeded in three 
instances—the Indonesian National Revolution, the First Indochina War, and the Cuban 
Revolution.142 Furthermore, in the case of the Malayan Emergency and the Mau Mau 
Uprising, independence was granted within two years of the war ending. Thus, while 
irregulars do not always succeed at first, these cases suggest that irregulars may prevail 
over time if an asymmetry of motivations is present.  
Each of these irregular wars is unique, and each of the six irregulars achieved 
varying levels of success. Nevertheless, these cases indicate that the weak must overcome 
a basic threshold to have any chance of succeeding against the strong. Irregulars cannot 
survive without the basics: popular support; a reliable logistical source; and most 
importantly, commitment and motivation.  
2. Factors Influencing Irregular Success 
The cases in this period all indicate that strategy is an important factor, although 
they suggest that it does not sufficiently explain why irregulars succeed. Instead, these six 
cases demonstrate that successful irregulars adjust their strategy according to their 
capabilities, and as required by their adversary and their environment. The Viet Minh for 
example, employed various strategies against the French. When conventional tactics 
failed, the Viet Minh switched to guerrilla tactics, and when the enemy and the terrain 
dictated, such as at Dien Bien Phu, they revert to more conventional, or positional 
warfare. In fact, sometimes irregular success has less to do with their own strategy or 
                                                 
142 Boot, Invisible Armies, 559. While this is only a small sample of irregular wars fought during this 
time period, this is very close to Max Boots finding. Boot notes that since 1945, irregulars are winning 
more often, or 40.3 percent of the time.   
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capabilities than the competence and capability of their adversary, as was the case of the 
Indonesian National Revolution and the 26th of July Movement.   
Looking broadly at all of the actors in this period, it becomes evident that strategy 
matters in a more general sense. Beyond direct and indirect strategic interaction, 
successful irregulars and successful states in this period invariably won through political 
and psychological strategies. Looking at the successful states in this period (the Huk 
Rebellion; the Malayan Emergency; and the Mau Mau Uprising), the strong prevailed by 
focusing on political solutions to isolate the irregulars and deflate their cause rather than 
just annihilating them. Similarly, when irregulars succeeded (The Indonesians, the Viet 
Minh, and the Cubans), it was most often the result of a political strategy that focused on 
gaining international support and legitimacy while targeting their opponent’s cause, 
raising the political and psychological cost of the war, to increase fractures in their 
opponent’s domestic situation. This suggests that popular opinion and support is more 
significant in explaining why irregulars win than strategy alone.     
The three cases in which these irregulars succeeded outright—the Indonesian 
National Revolution, the First Indochina War, and the Cuban Revolution—suggest that 
irregular success correlates with their adversaries’ ability to generate and sustain 
favorable domestic and international support. When the international community is 
persuaded that the irregular’s cause is legitimate while their adversaries’ actions are 
unjust, immoral, and repugnant—success follows for the weak. This may be related to the 
actions of the irregulars, or the result of their adversary’s actions alone. Regardless, these 
cases indicate that popular opinion and support is a significant factor influencing irregular 
success. Additionally, as the Viet Minh demonstrated, shifting the focus from the 
battlefield to an adversary’s domestic situation can lower their opponent’s political will 
and popular support to compel them to quit.  
The Indonesian National Revolution, the First Indochina War, and the Cuban 
Revolution indicate that irregulars have a better chance of succeeding when social or 
political fractures exist, or can be created, within their adversary’s organization and 
society. In the case of the First Indochina War, France suffered and was plagued by 
financial, political, and social fractures that later contributed to their downfall. Similarly, 
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financial issues evolved into political fractures when the Dutch lost Marshall Aid and 
international support for their actions in Indonesia. Similarly, although the Cubans were 
markedly better off than most, the irregulars exploited the social and political fractures 
that developed between Batista, his military, and his American support network.143 In 
effect, irregulars can force their opponent to choose between continuing the war and 
risking the welfare of their nation. These cases also demonstrate that exporting the war to 
an adversaries’ domestic population takes finesse. There is a fine line between persuading 
a population that their government’s goals are unjust or unworthy of their effort, and 
bolstering their adversaries’ cause and vilifying themselves. In addition to raising 
political and psychological costs, and in addition to exploiting existing fractures, this 
period indicates that internationalization is a significant mechanism irregulars use to 
influence popular support and reduce their adversary’s commitment and motivation.  
Internationalization appears to be the most significant factor or mechanism 
irregulars used in this period to influence popular support and shape and manipulate their 
opponents will to fight in the period between 1945 and 1962. Of the three instances of 
irregular success, the irregulars were defeated militarily, but prevailed politically.144  The 
irregulars accomplished this by petitioning the international community on their own or 
were assisted by external sympathizers that petitioned on their behalf. In some cases, 
such as in Indonesia, the international community refused to stand by while the strong 
exploited the weak, so they intervened on behalf of the weak. Thus, as these cases 
suggest, international support is a significant equalizer for the weak and a contributing 
factor to their success. It just goes to show that the strong may overpower the weak, until 
the international community overpowers the strong. Castro, Ho, and the Indonesian 
nationalists proved that internationally backed irregulars are capable of persuading, 
politically coercing, and compelling the strong to quit.  
                                                 
143 Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars. 
144 Asprey, War in the Shadows, 958–970. Castro’s forces were the exception. Although they were not 
overly successful against Batista’s inept military forces, Castro’s guerrillas were also not defeated 
militarily. The Cuban military was trained and armed by the United States based on their experience in 
Korea. As a result, the Cuban military was not equipped or trained to fight a war against guerrillas in 
mountainous terrain. Thus, Castro’s forces were able to evade capture or attrition while their political 
strategy eroded Batista’s legitimacy and power in Cuba.  
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3. Explaining Why Irregulars Won  
The cases in this chapter suggest that irregulars could compel or coerce their 
opponent to quit and prevailed most often when asymmetries of motivation existed. The 
irregulars accomplished this by increasing the cost of the war through indirect means, by 
shifting the focus of the war to their adversaries’ domestic situation, by exploiting 
existing political and social fractures, and most importantly, by internationalizing their 
cause. In other words, irregulars manipulated popular support to exploit asymmetry of 
motivations to convince or compel their adversary to quit.  
Alternatively, when motivations were symmetrical, as in the case of the Cuban 
Revolution, irregulars succeeded by surviving in safe havens while politicizing and 
internationalizing their cause to build domestic and international support to erode their 
opponent’s will to fight. Batista failed because he lost popular support of the Cuban 
masses to Castro. Additionally, Batista also eventually lost international support and the 
assistance of the United States. Based on this evidence, and the case of the Huk 
Rebellion, internal wars during this time period were often decided by popular support; 
whichever side convinced the domestic population and the international community that 
their cause was just and worthy of their support eventually prevailed.145 In effect, this 
suggests that irregular conflicts after World War II were decided by popular support.  
This chapter reveals that irregulars won by influencing popular support. This 
conclusion suggests that there is an undeniable link between motivation and popular 
support. As the Indonesian National Revolution, the First Indochina War, and the Cuban 
Revolution indicate, asymmetry of motivations may not be as significant as the strategic 
interaction and the relationship between popular support and motivation. Whether there 
is a reciprocal relationship between the two, or one has a larger effect on the other, is 
unclear. Nonetheless, it is evident that there is a direct relationship between popular 
support and motivation. 
                                                 
145 It bears mentioning, when both the irregular and the state are foreign entities, such as in Malaya, 
whoever commanded respect of the domestic population won the war.   
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The nature of irregular warfare changes over time and whether these factors 
remain relevant in later periods is yet to be determined. As colonialism fell by the 
wayside, the competition between the East and the West gained momentum. The next 
chapter will review irregular warfare in the mid-to late-Cold War era between 1963 and 
1991. This analysis will be used to determine if the conclusions from this chapter are 
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IV. IRREGULAR WARFARE IN THE MID- TO LATE-COLD 
WAR PERIOD 
Irregular conflicts in the mid- to late-Cold War era were peculiar and complex. In 
general, many of these conflicts were ideological-leftist struggles against government 
establishments and Western ideals. As such, these conflicts typically evolved into 
shadowy proxy struggles between the United States on one side and the Soviet Union on 
the other, in which both injected support and resources to further their causes.   
Unlike wars of national liberation, the mid-to late-Cold War era irregular conflicts 
were largely internal wars that arose due to weak governance and unequal distribution of 
wealth and resources. For the most part, these irregular conflicts tended to be protracted, 
lasting many years. As a result, the Cold War era irregular conflicts ebbed and flowed 
between periods of extreme violence and more muted stalemates. This makes it difficult 
to determine who the clear winner was.  
Analytically, Cold War era irregular conflicts lack a definitive typology. The last 
vestiges of colonialism were fading by the late 1970s and with them the notion of old-
style evil empires vulnerable to the international community’s moral and ethical 
principles. In some cases, these Cold War era irregular conflicts were fought over 
territory and fueled by ethnicity, race or religion. At other times, these wars were strictly 
domestic struggles for control between a state and an irregular force. Regardless, 
international intervention and terrorism pervade Cold War era irregular conflicts.  
The next section will review several of the most important irregular conflicts from 
this period. In doing so, this chapter will consider the belligerent’s commitment and the 
dominant factors that shaped each war. Ultimately, this chapter will evaluate how 
asymmetry of motivations affected irregular warfare during this period. Additionally, this 
chapter will reveal how some irregulars succeeded or failed. Finally, this chapter will 
evaluate several factors to determine which shaped the nature of irregular warfare the 
most during the mid to late Cold War era.  
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A. THE SECOND CHIMURENGA WAR: 1964–1979  
The Second Chimurenga, also known as the Rhodesian Bush War, was a by-
product of British colonialism in Africa. As a self-governing colony, the white minority 
Rhodesian government was totally committed to maintaining control over the indigenous 
African majority, to preserve their way of life and prosperity.146 Conversely, the 
indigenous African majority was equally committed to establishing majority rule, to bring 
about social and economic reforms, and to end government exploitation and oppression. 
For the first twelve years, the white Rhodesians dominated the weak and fractured 
Zimbabwean African National Liberation Army (ZANLA) and the Zimbabwean African 
Peoples Revolutionary Army (ZIPRA) forces by applying counterinsurgency tactics 
learned in Malaya and Kenya.147 The Rhodesian Defense Forces and the Black African 
Rifles also benefitted from the assistance of South African Selous Scouts and the British 
Special Air Service.148  These forces were instrumental in locating, isolating, and 
defeating irregulars hiding in game reserves and cross-border sanctuaries.  
                                                 
146 Herbert M. Howe, “The Rhodesian Conflict 1966–79,” In Prolonged Wars: A Post-Nuclear 
Challenge, ed. Karl P. Magyar and Constantine P. Danopoulos (University Press of the Pacific, 2002), 195–
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To avoid the Rhodesian Defense Forces, the Patriotic Front relied on safe havens 
in neighboring Zambia and Angola.149 Using these sanctuaries, ZANLA and ZIPRA 
forces grew in size and strength with material aid and advisory support from the Soviet 
Union, China, and Cuba.150 By the mid-1970s, support for their cause and Zimbabwean 
nationalism exploded after Angola and Mozambique achieved majority rule and 
independence from Portugal. Mozambique’s independence further enabled the ZANU 
and ZAPU when it closed its borders to the white minority government, weakening 
Rhodesia’s economy. Though in the end, it was the loss of military aid and support from 
South Africa and the United States that destroyed Smith’s white minority government’s 
motivation to continue. Smith recognized that delaying elections and denying majority 
rule was futile without the external support.151 Under the close watch of Britain, the 
Rhodesian government and the African Nationalists signed the Lancaster House 
Agreement, ending the conflict and paving the way for elections.152 In 1979, the 
irregulars succeeded in establishing majority rule; Robert Mugabe was elected Prime 
Minister, and by 1980, Zimbabwe officially gained independence from the British. 
The irregulars succeeded in Rhodesia because the Rhodesian government was 
unable to isolate ZANLA and ZIPRA forces, and they failed to control the narrative. 
Despite a tireless effort to censor the press and paint the irregulars in a negative light, the 
government failed to legitimize their actions and eventually lost international support. 
Additionally, fear of communist encroachment in Angola and Mozambique compelled 
the West to intervene. The United States pushed the Rhodesian government to reform and 
hold elections before leftist groups co-opted the indigenous African nationalist majority. 
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By all accounts, the international community pressured the white Rhodesian 
government to consider majority rule as a result of its’ illegitimate actions against the 
African majority.153 Additionally, several external factors enabled the irregulars to 
prevail over the white minority government: the perceived injustice of the white minority 
government’s cause; a fear of communism spreading to Rhodesia, and ultimately, the 
Rhodesian government’s loss of external aid and support.154 Therefore, because 
motivations between the belligerents were symmetrical, this was a war of attrition.  
The irregulars succeeded in this conflict because their support was more durable, 
enabling them to outlast and outpace the white minority government.  In conclusion, this 
case demonstrates the significance of external support and the effect of asymmetry of 
resources in irregular warfare, particularly as it relates to internal conflicts defined by 
symmetrical motivations.  
B. ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT: 1967–1991 
The Palestinian-Israeli conflict is a complex, continual irregular war fought over 
land and fueled by religion, nationalism, and social and economic inequalities. The 
Palestinians have stayed fully committed and motivated since they were displaced from 
Palestine in 1948. Similarly, Israel has maintained full commitment and motivation to 
ensure their survival since their inception. Thus, the Israel-Palestinian conflict was born 
as both the Palestinians and the Israelis refused to acknowledge each other’s right to exist 
and each other’s claim to Jerusalem.   
This conflict was also influenced by conventional contests between Israel and 
neighboring Arab states and by external events such as the 1980 Iran-Iraq war, and more 
importantly, the Cold War between the United States and the Soviet Union.155 
Nevertheless, Palestinian nationalism and motivation surged as Israel expanded 
settlements in the West Bank and Gaza in the 1960s. Additionally, their commitment 
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grew after the 1967 War, resulting in the formation of the Palestine Liberation 
Organization (PLO).156 Regardless, as the Fatah retaliated against the Israeli occupation 
force with small-scale attacks, the Israeli Likud party continued to encourage settlement 
of Palestinian lands.157 Both sides were equally motivated, and decades of hostility and 
perceived injustice fueled enmity between Jews and Palestinians alike.  
Initially, Palestinian motivation suffered because they were too disorganized and 
lacked the resources and experience required to resist the professional, capable, and well-
armed Israeli Defense Forces.158 Therefore, Arafat politicized and internationalized the 
Palestinians cause by appealing to the UN. This effort convinced the UN to affirm the 
Palestinian’s right to self-determination and independence and granted them observer 
status in the UN.159  Additionally, the UN adopted Resolution 3379, declaring Zionism a 
form of racial discrimination.160 Much to Israeli’s disappointment, these three resolutions 
were major political wins for the PLO; it boosted Palestinian motivation and legitimized 
their cause.  
Unfortunately, these measures failed to restrain Israeli expansion, convince Israel 
to grant the Palestinians a homeland or address the conditions of the occupied territories. 
Thus, after twenty years of Israeli occupation, a mass movement in 1988 developed into 
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the First Intifada.161  Israel’s commitment remained total as they responded with an iron 
fist and overwhelming force to quell the uprising.162 In turn, Palestinian commitment 
rose as the Israelis instituted harsh population control measures, such as cutting 
electricity and telephone lines, imposing curfews, destroying crops, and arresting 
thousands of people.163  This motivated the PLO to initiate a new diplomatic effort in 
1988 to end Israeli occupation.164  At the same time, Hamas emerged as an alternative to 
the PLO, appealing to Palestinians that wanted to take a harder stance against Israel 
occupation.165 By 1991, the First Intifada began to lose momentum as war weariness set 
in. As a result, both sides met for the first time face to face at the Madrid Conference to 
discuss peace.166  This marked the beginning of the second phase of the Israeli-
Palestinian conflict.  
As the Cold War came to an end, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict remained 
undecided. The Israelis had failed to contain the PLO and Hamas, and the Palestinians 
had failed to carve out a homeland. As leaders from both sides continued to seek political 
solutions to the conflict, commitment and motivation remained high among radicals on 
both sides of the conflict; right wing Israelis continued to push settlements into 
Palestinian territories, and bitter young Palestinians retaliated with a new fervor.  
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Ultimately, continued clashes and violence undermined the peace process, 
propelling this conflict into the post-Cold War era. In the end, regardless of their 
government’s efforts, motivations remained symmetrical between the Israeli and the 
Palestinian people. Nonetheless, the first period of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict 
suggests that political strategies are more effective in achieving success when 
motivations are symmetrical. Furthermore, this first period reveals the importance of safe 
havens for irregulars, as well as, the influence of international organizations and nation 
states in internal irregular conflicts.  
C. COLOMBIAN CONFLICT: 1964–1991  
The Colombian conflict began as a communist struggle against a weak and 
corrupt Colombian government in the 1960s and 1970s. Several guerrilla groups first 
emerged to contest government abuse and corruption and gained popularity as a result of 
economic and social hardship among Colombia’s poor and rural populations. These 
groups, the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarieas de Colombia (FARC), Ejército de 
Liberación Nacional (ELN), Ejército Popular de Liberación (EPL), Movimiento 19 de 
Abril (M-19), were heavily influenced by leftists ideologies and received external support 
from the Soviet Union, Cuba, and Venezuela.167 As these groups gained power and 
influence, the Colombian government became more committed and motivated to defeat 
and neutralize them. Ultimately, the Colombian conflict became a convoluted internal 
conflict characterized by periods of intense violence between the Colombian military, 
right-wing paramilitaries, left-wing irregulars, and drug cartels. 
By the 1980s, the FARC had gained control throughout southern and eastern 
Colombia and the central highlands.168 Furthermore, the FARC acted as a de facto 
government in rural areas that lacked government representation. As a result, the FARC’s 
influence over the Colombian population grew, as did their wealth (from taxing legal and 
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illegals businesses, such as the coca trade) and military experience and capability (from 
fighting drug traffickers who contested their control in the region).169 Additionally, the 
FARC’s commitment and motivation increased after their Seventh Conference in 1982, in 
which it rebranded itself as the FARC-Ejercito del Pueblo (FARC-EP), and instituted a 
new strategy to increase their political influence in Colombia.170 As a result of this, the 
FARC convinced President Betancur’s government to sign the Uribe Accords in 1984; 
setting conditions for a cease-fire and peace talks.171 For a brief period, violence 
subsided between the FARC and the Columbia government as both sides became more 
committed to ending the war than to continuing it.  
During this period of calm, the FARC joined forces with the Colombian 
Communist Party to establish the Unión Patriótica (UP).172 Although, the UP’s political 
success in the 1986 elections threatened the newly elected President Barco’s control in 
Colombian politics. In effect, the prospects for peace were leader dependent—as one 
Colombian president proved willing to negotiate and end the conflict, subsequent 
Colombian leaders refused. As a result, the peace process collapsed in 1987 as the 
Colombian military and paramilitary forces assassinated UP leadership, fueling a new 
war between the government and the guerrillas.173 In turn, the FARC joined the 
Coordinadora Guerrillera Simón Bolívar (CGSB) in 1987, to unite political and military 
efforts with M-19 and the EPL.174 This enabled the CGSB to force the government back 
to the negotiating table in 1991 to discuss a formal peace process.  
The government’s and the irregular’s commitment and motivation fluctuated 
throughout this period. The growing influence of drug Cartels, which absorbed several 
right-wing paramilitary groups (whose actions were as violent, if not more so than the 
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irregulars), further complicated this conflict.175 Frustration and war weariness set in as 
violence continued, driving the Colombian population to push the government to seek a 
political solution to end the conflict. Nevertheless, negotiations were problematic, as both 
sides remained fully committed and refused to compromise. Colombia’s President 
Gaviria did not want to agree to anything other than demobilization while the FARC 
refused to accept any deal unless it addressed economic, political, and military reforms 
and human rights.176 Thus, by 1991, both actors remained equally motivated, and neither 
could agree on terms of peace. As a result, the Colombian conflict continued into the 
post-Cold War era.   
D. THE IRISH TROUBLES: 1969–1991  
Lasting decades, The Irish Troubles were an internal conflict in Northern Ireland 
between the Catholic Republicans and the Protestant Loyalists. This irregular conflict 
arose from the social, political, and economic oppression of the Catholic minority by the 
Protestant majority in Northern Ireland. In 1969, in the wake of increased social unrest, 
the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) split off from the Original Irish 
Republican Army (IRA), to protect the Catholic population and to unite Northern Ireland 
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with the Republican of Ireland.177  Although the Protestant majority in Northern Ireland 
was equally motivated to resist the PIRA, as they desired to remain English subjects. 
Additionally, because Northern Ireland was a member of the United Kingdom, Britain 
was compelled to intervene to contain the violence and end the conflict. Accordingly, 
because the Catholics and Protestants were all equally committed and motivated to 
prevail, what resulted was a long, complex, and costly political and military struggle.  
Nevertheless, the British were only limitedly committed, which created an asymmetry of 
motivation between the PIRA and the British.  
What began as a limited conflict with low-level violence between the PIRA and 
the Ulster Defense Forces, evolved into a larger struggle after the introduction of direct 
rule and British forces in 1972.178  That same year, British soldiers killed thirteen 
unarmed men during a civil rights rally in Derry on Bloody Sunday, changing the 
dynamic of the conflict, swelling the ranks of the PIRA, and uniting the Irish Republic 
against the British.179 As a result, the PIRA increased their guerrilla attacks in Northern 
Ireland and began a “prolonged and spectacular bombing campaign in England,” 
destroying pubs and government buildings.180 As the PIRA continued to escalate their 
armed struggle throughout the 1970s, Sinn Fein began a complementary effort to resolve 
the conflict politically in Northern Ireland.181  
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The 1980s saw an increase in violence as the PIRA clashed with British and Loyalists 
forces. During this period, the Irish Republicans gained legitimacy and support for their 
cause as British policies, such as “shoot to kill” directives and the use of Diplock courts 
further marginalized Catholics.182 Additionally, the 1980s prisoner hunger strikes 
mobilized the masses and “fixed the image of the IRA as the national liberation 
movement.”183 On top of this, throughout the 1980s, the PIRA enjoyed increased support 
from the Libyan government and sections of the U.S. population.184 As a result, the PIRA 
became more committed, while the British government’s motivation wavered due to 
rising political and psychological costs.185  
The British came to realize in the early 1980s that their military effort was 
futile.186 In turn, Margaret Thatcher renewed Britain’s political effort with the Irish 
government, resulting in the 1985 Anglo-Irish agreement.187 This opened up a role for 
the Irish government in Northern Ireland’s affairs and put the option of a united Ireland 
back on the table.188 Still the Unionists and Loyalists, as well as Sinn Fein and the PIRA, 
opposed this agreement.189 Thus, although the British and Irish governments were 
motivated to end the conflict, parties on both sides refused to compromise and continued 
violence stalled further progress. 
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By 1990, the conflict was again locked in a stalemate as the British negotiated with 
Sinn Fein leadership.190 Unfortunately, the dialogue ended in 1991 after it failed to reach a 
mutually agreeable solution.191  Nonetheless, the British government maintained secret 
discussions with Sinn Fein as their desire to end the conflict increased. Thus, the PIRA 
continued to resist as the Cold War came to an end and any further hope of ending the conflict 
rested on Sinn Fein’s ability to persuade them to put down their weapons. 
Despite the desire for peace, commitment and motivation remained symmetrical as 
suspicions grew between the Irish Republicans and the Ulster Loyalists.192  This suggests 
that divisions can exist within irregular groups and states whose commitment and 
motivations run counter to the rest.  This explains why both sides can push for conflict 
resolution to no avail. Furthermore, this conflict, and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, 
indicates that popular support is less of a factor in sectarian driven irregular conflicts that 
are characterized by symmetrical motivations.  
E. THE SOVIET-AFGHAN WAR: 1980–1989 
The Soviet-Afghan War shares many similarities with the American experience in 
Vietnam. Both countries intervened on behalf of a friendly regime. Also, both countries 
became entangled in messy conflicts fueled by external powers. In this context, the 
Soviet Union was only limitedly committed to ensuring the political survival of the 
Communist-Afghan government.193 Conversely, the Afghans were totally committed to 
expelling the Soviet Union, whom they saw as a foreign occupier.194 Thus, while the 
Soviet-Afghan War only lasted nine years, it was one of the most destructive irregular 
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conflicts within the past fifty years. Over one million Afghans were killed, many more 
were wounded, and millions were displaced into neighboring Pakistan and Iran.195   
Afghans lack a general sense of nationalism or unity, but their history is a 
testament to their overwhelming collective aversion to foreign occupation.196 Regardless 
of tribe, religious sect, or nationality, Afghans and Muslim volunteers alike were fully 
committed and highly motivated to drive the Soviet Union out of Afghanistan.197 This is 
not to say the Afghan resistance was organized; the Mujahedeen remained disjointed, and 
loyalties seldom extended beyond the boundaries of the tribal villages. Rather, the 
Afghan resistance’s commitment was total, as this became a religious war against a 
foreign invader and a fight for honor and freedom guided by the Pashtunwali moral 
code.198 
Afghan Mujahedeen, fighting on horseback with WWI Enfield rifles and cheap 
copies of Kalashnikovs, were no match for the superior and technologically enabled 
Soviet military.199 The Red Army quickly secured the urban areas, although the 
mountainous terrain, disease, and logistical issues plagued Soviet progress in rural 
Mujahedeen safe havens.200  As a result, the Soviet’s implemented a massive bombing 
campaign to neutralize and isolate the Afghan irregulars. This failed to destroy the 
Afghan’s commitment to fight. The Afghan irregulars retaliated against the Soviets by 
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ambushing convoys and attacking isolated outposts.201 On top of this, the introduction of 
stinger missiles into Afghanistan by the United States enabled the irregulars to reduce the 
Soviet Union’s air superiority, and eventually their motivation.202   
Conversely, the Mujahedeen’s motivation increased substantially due to political 
support and military aid from the United States and Saudi Arabia and the sanctuaries 
provided by Pakistan and Iran.203 Additionally, the Mujahedeen benefited from the 
Soviet Union’s barbaric military strategy.204 The Soviet Union not only managed to 
alienate the Afghans with their indiscriminate bombing, widespread use of landmines, 
and war crimes, but they also aroused international attention, which led to widespread 
criticism of the Red Army and increased support for the Mujahedeen.  
In the end, the Soviet Union’s barbaric strategy widened political and economic 
fractures, eroded their commitment to the Communist-Afghan government, and 
decreased their motivation to fight the Mujahedeen. As a result, Mikhail Gorbachev 
charted a new political course to preserve the Soviet Union.205  Thus, the Soviet Union 
eventually lost the will to fight while Mujahedeen remained fully committed and 
motivated to the end.   
The Mujahedeen exploited the asymmetry of motivations between them and the 
Soviet Union by using the Afghan terrain and guerrilla warfare strategy to increase 
political and psychological costs for the Soviets. Ultimately though, critical external aid 
and support, such as stinger missiles, enabled the Mujahedeen to prevail against the 
superior Red Army.  Therefore, this case demonstrates how a small, but significant new 
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technology, can alter the dynamics of irregular conflicts. Furthermore, this conflict 
demonstrates that terrain is a significant factor in irregular warfare; as long as the 
irregular cannot be contained, and as long as they have resources, the fight will continue.  
F. CIVIL WAR IN EL SALVADOR: 1980–1992 
The Salvadoran Civil War, like many of the other Cold War era irregular 
conflicts, was a classic struggle between a weak national government and a leftist group 
with external parties enabling both sides.206 This was a total war for the Farabundo 
Marti-National Liberation Front (FMLN), which sought political and economic reforms. 
Similarly, because the Salvadoran government’s existence was threatened, they were 
equally motivated and committed to defeating the irregulars. As a result, this conflict 
lasted for over a decade as both sides refused to quit in the face of rising costs and 
casualties. Were it not for external international pressure and intervention, this conflict 
would have continued to rage until one side ran out of men or material.  
The Salvadoran Civil War began as a popular movement; angry at government 
corruption and abuse, and disenfranchised by economic hardship, several groups emerged 
fully committed in the late 1970s to pursue government reforms.207 As protests turned 
violent, the military deposed the president and assumed control of the country. This only 
led to increased instability and violence, particularly by the Salvadoran National Guard 
and their “death squads.”208 As a result, resistance groups united and formed the FMLN 
in 1980.209   
The FMLN was extremely weak compared to their adversary; relying on modest 
military aid from Cuba and the Soviet Union, the FMLN’s small arms and guerrilla 
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strategy had little effect on the Salvadoran military.210 While the FMLN’s tactics 
included terrorism, kidnapping, political assassinations, and bombings, the extent of their 
violence and brutality was nothing like that of the government forces.211 With limited, 
but unyielding American aid, the Salvadoran government isolated the FMLN using slash 
and burn tactics that included destroying entire communities to sever the irregular’s lines 
of support.212  Eventually, the FMLN recognized that armed resistance was futile; their 
only option was to pursue negotiations with the military Junta. Unfortunately, the 
FMLN’s hopes and motivation were crushed as the newly elected President Reagan opted 
to support elections in El Salvador instead of brokering a peace deal between them and 
the Salvadoran government.213  Therefore, the FMLN and the Salvadoran forces both 
remained committed throughout the late 1980s as violence continued to plague the 
Salvadoran people.    
This conflict would have continued well beyond 1992 were it not for the efforts of 
several human rights organizations and United Nations intervention. As early as 1982, 
human rights groups, such as the Committee in Solidarity with the People of El Salvador, 
Amnesty International, the Human Rights Commission of El Salvador, and the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, worked to end human rights abuses in El 
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Salvador.214 Although it was not until 1987 when violence peaked, that the United 
Nations Secretary-General, Javier Perez de Cuellar, became personally invested in the 
peace process and succeeded in bringing both sides to the negotiating table.215 With 
United Nations oversight, El Salvador adopted the FMLN into the political process and 
worked toward reintegration and reform.  
This conflict is characterized by a symmetry of motivations; both sides were 
equally committed throughout the duration of the conflict. As a result, this was a long, 
bloody, and costly affair in which neither side can claim victory, and both the FMLN and 
the Salvadoran government share responsibility for atrocities committed during the war. 
Though, the FMLN did benefit from international intervention. The FMLN gained 
political concessions—the Salvadoran government enacted reforms to curb government 
corruption, a truth commission was established to address atrocities committed by both 
sides, and the FMLN emerged as a legitimate political party.216  
Thus, although no asymmetries of motivation existed, the FMLN succeeded 
politically as a result of a stalemate. Like the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, this case 
suggests that international organizations, non-governmental organizations, and states may 
intervene in the interest of human rights and on the behalf of the local population.  
Additionally, this conflict suggests that symmetrically motivated irregular conflicts are 
costly and bloody affairs that have the potential to continue in perpetuity unless an 
external party intervenes.  
G. DOMINANT TRENDS IN THE MID- TO LATE-COLD WAR PERIOD 
The conflicts reviewed in this chapter are but a small sample of irregular wars that 
occurred during the mid to late Cold War era; over one hundred irregular conflicts 
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occurred between 1963 and 1991.217 Several other significant irregular conflicts were 
won by the weak; such as the partisan’s success in the North Yemen Civil War and the 
National Liberation Front’s success in Southern Yemen. Also during this period, 
Hezbollah prevailed in Lebanon in 1982 and the Slovenians won their 1991 War of 
Independence.218 Alternatively, sometimes the irregulars lost, as when the Thai 
government defeated the Communists or when the German government neutralized the 
Baader Meinhof group.219 Furthermore, a few other irregular conflicts ended in a draw, 
such as the war between the Contras and the Nicaraguan government or the Tuareg 
irregulars’ struggle against the government of Mali.220 Finally, like the Colombian 
conflict, several other conflicts continued beyond this period, such as the Shining Path’s 
struggle in Peru that began in 1980 or the Moro National Liberation Front’s struggle in 
the Philippines beginning in the early 1970s.221  
In the end, this chapter addressed six of the most important irregular conflicts that 
dominated and defined this period. These six conflicts are unique and distinct; they 
occurred on six different continents between vastly different actors with different goals, 
resources, and capabilities. Additionally, these six conflicts represent various types of 
irregular conflicts that dominated the period. Also, these conflicts were shaped by many 
of the dominant factors that permeated irregular warfare during the period; they were 
costly, bloody, protracted conflicts influenced by external powers and events, in which 
some did, and some did not exhibit asymmetry of motivations.  
Max Boot refers to this period of irregular warfare as “Radical Chic,” or “The 
Romance of the Leftist Revolutionaries.”222 This may be a misnomer. Communist 
influence began to shape the modern era well before the end of World War II. Although 
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leftist movements and competition between the United States and the Soviet Union are 
defining features of the Cold War, several of the most important irregular wars of this 
period have long and complex historical narratives. In fact, many of these irregular 
conflicts, such as the Israel-Palestinian Conflict, the Irish Troubles, and even the Soviet-
Afghan war are not defined by leftist revolutionaries as much as they are by nationalism 
or by sectarian, ethnic, and tribal friction or weak governance. Thus, it is insufficient to 
define this period by the leftist revolutionaries alone.  
1. Irregular Success in the Mid- to Late-Cold War Period 
Of the six irregular wars reviewed in this period, three were internal civil wars 
(Salvadoran Civil War, Rhodesian Bush War, and Colombian conflict), one was an 
irregular war involving an occupying power (Soviet-Afghan War), and two were 
sectarian insurgencies (Israeli-Palestinian conflict and The Irish Troubles). The irregulars 
succeeded in three of the six cases (Rhodesia, Afghanistan, and El Salvador).  
Of these three cases, the irregulars prevailed in Rhodesia and Afghanistan largely 
as a result of external support and sanctuaries while the irregulars in El Salvador 
benefitted politically as a result of international intervention.  Alternatively, the three 
other conflicts continued unresolved into the post-Cold War era (Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, The Colombian conflict, and The Irish Troubles). Remarkably, the irregulars 
were not defeated outright in any of the cases reviewed during this period. These last 
three cases reveal that Cold War era struggles continuously evolve from one decade and 
crisis to the next.  
Three of the six conflicts (the Colombian conflict, the Rhodesian Bush War, and 
the Salvadoran Civil War) were internal conflicts that emerged as a result of weak or 
corrupt governance. Additionally, only two of the six conflicts were influenced by 
existing political, social, and economic fractures. The Rhodesian government eventually 
succumbed to manpower shortages and economic hardship while the Soviet Union was 
compelled to leave Afghanistan on account of their struggling economy. Instead of 
existing fractures, external support, negotiations, and terrorism appear to be the most 
important factors driving irregular success during the Cold War era.  
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2. Factors Influencing Irregular Success 
Commitment and motivation were more symmetrical during this period. In fact, 
five of the six irregular wars in this chapter are characterized by equal commitment and 
motivation. The Rhodesian Bush War, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the Colombian 
conflict, the Irish Troubles, and the Salvadoran Civil War were all fought for political and 
physical survival. In each case, a victory for one side meant the end for their adversary in 
one form or another. Thus, these cases demonstrate that the theory of asymmetry of 
motivations is severely limited, particularly in internal irregular conflicts. Likewise, 
political and psychological costs are not as influential when commitments and 
motivations are symmetrical either. In other words, when the irregular’s motivation and 
commitment is equal to their adversary’s, external support is more important and decisive 
in determining the outcome of the war.   
External support is a significant factor in each of these six cases. In fact, based on 
these cases, external support may best explain why irregulars prevailed during the mid-to 
late-Cold War period. This is not to mean that external support guarantees success, as the 
PLO and the FARC demonstrate, no amount of wealth, external support, or sanctuary 
ensures victory. Rather, external support only serves to shape a conflict—often 
prolonging it and increasing costs in blood and treasure. Put differently, external support, 
provided to the weak or the strong, is an equalizing factor that enables the conflict to 
continue until one side’s will is eroded or destroyed. The longer a conflict continues, the 
more external support becomes a deciding factor in the belligerent’s ability to persist.  
These cases also reveal that external support is particularly important when the 
terrain is unsuitable, as was the case in Rhodesia and Israel. In these circumstances, 
sanctuaries and safe havens became necessary for survival and enabled the weak to evade 
the strong. Furthermore, even when the terrain is favorable, as it was in the other four 
cases, sanctuaries and safe-havens still serve an important role; they enable the irregular 
to train, plan, prepare, and avoid general repression and attrition.   
As long as irregulars can evade their adversaries, either in jungle safe havens or 
behind friendly borders, irregulars can prolong the conflict and wear down their 
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adversary, as did the Mujahedeen. If nothing else, the conflict will continue until rising 
costs and war weariness compel the strong to grant the weak space, time, or political 
concessions. In other words, if the state cannot isolate the irregular, as is the case in Israel 
and Columbia, then the war is not likely to be won outright militarily. Thus, when a 
military solution is futile, it is necessary to look at political options to avoid further costs.  
As the Rhodesians, the Colombians, the British, and the Israelis can attest to; it 
may not be “operationally possible, politically feasible, or financially affordable” to 
destroy irregulars completely.223 When commitments are equal, and motivations run 
high, negotiating may be the only practical or rational way to gain a favorable position to 
end a protracted conflict.224 Arafat and the PLO demonstrated that irregulars succeed by 
pursuing political strategies that lead to open dialogue and negotiation. In these cases, 
negotiations were the result of two key factors—rising political and psychological costs, 
and the influence of key leaders. Although the Palestinians failed to gain statehood, they 
did achieve political and social progress. Though, sometimes irregulars cannot force 
negotiations, as in Rhodesian and El Salvador. Such circumstances require international 
intervention. 
When irregulars cannot force their adversaries to negotiate, they must rely on the 
international community to compel or coerce them to the table. In these situations, 
irregulars must carefully bring attention to their cause without demonizing themselves. 
Essentially, to win the battle of the narrative, the irregular must challenge their 
adversary’s legitimacy without exceeding the threshold of violence set by their adversary. 
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As in El Salvador, the FMLN and the government were equally brutal, so the 
international community intervened in the interest of human rights. Although neither side 
won or lost definitively, the irregulars were successful in bringing about political and 
social reforms. Thus, this becomes a perception issue for the irregulars; with modern 
technology and increased access to information, irregulars can succeed by controlling the 
narrative to create international pressure on their adversary.  
The late Cold War era also witnessed the rise of terrorism as more than a control 
mechanism. Terrorism is not a new tool; it has been used for millennia to induce fear and 
subjugate the weak. During this period though, irregulars learned to employ it as a 
strategy to defeat the strong. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Colombian conflict, the 
Irish Troubles, and the Salvadoran Civil War are all cases in which irregulars employed 
terrorism as a strategy to avoid their opponents strengths and compensate for their 
capability and resource shortfalls. The Palestinians successfully bombed buses and used 
suicide vests to reduce their exposure to Israeli Defense Forces while simultaneously 
wearing down the Israeli populations’ will to fight. Similarly, the PIRA used terrorist 
attacks and car bombs in Northern Ireland and London to raise the political and 
psychological costs of the war. Although, as the FARC and FMLN demonstrate, 
terrorism is limiting; it can undermine an actor’s legitimacy and reduced support for 
their cause.  
3. Explaining Why Irregulars Won  
Asymmetry of motivations existed in only two of the six conflicts reviewed in the 
mid-to late-Cold War period.  As these cases reveal, the majority of the irregular wars 
during this period were internal conflicts defined by symmetrical motivations. Irregulars 
only prevailed as a result of asymmetrical motivations in one of the six conflicts reviewed 
during this period. Conversely, irregulars succeeded twice when motivations were 
symmetrical. Ultimately, these cases indicate that the irregulars that prevailed during this 
period were able to evade their adversaries, increase the costs of the war, and prolong the 
conflict to erode their opponent’s will to fight. As a result, external support was not only 
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necessary but had to be sufficient for irregulars to survive before they could compel and 
convince their adversaries to negotiate.  
The cases in this period indicate that irregulars require sufficient external support 
and access to safe havens to evade their adversaries and prolong the conflict. 
Additionally, the irregulars that ultimately succeeded during this period often employed a 
political strategy to coerce or compel their adversary or gained international support or 
assistance to do so. Put differently, irregulars that persisted politically when it was 
unreasonable or impossible to persist militarily convinced enough adversarial and neutral 
parties to shift their support in favor of ending the conflict. In other words, the irregulars 
wore down their opponent’s political will to fight or gained social or political concessions 
from negotiations.  
Several Cold War era conflicts, such as the Colombian conflict, Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict, and the Irish Troubles, continued on after the fall of the Soviet Union. These 
conflicts evolved with the changes in the geopolitical landscape.  Additionally, a new 
threat, which will define the post-Cold War period, emerged from the ashes of the Soviet-
Afghan War. Al-Qaeda and global jihad are a product of the Cold War period and altered 
the nature of irregular warfare between the West and religiously motivated terrorists and 
irregulars. Additionally, significant changes in the way information is disseminated and 
received began to alter the dynamics of irregular warfare.  Therefore, the next chapter 
will assess irregular conflicts in the post-Cold War period to assess these emerging trends 
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V. IRREGULAR WARFARE IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD 
The end of the Cold War in 1991 dramatically changed the geopolitical landscape. 
Just as the damage wrought by WWII helped usher in an era of anti-colonial irregular 
warfare after 1945, the end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union 
dramatically influenced the rise of a fresh wave of irregular warfare, particularly in the 
former Soviet States.225 Furthermore, although leftist ideology continued to inspire the 
weak, the post-Cold War era has been mostly influenced by ethnic, racial, and religious 
tensions between, and within civilizations.226 In other words, convergence and 
complexity define this period as globalization promotes and enables increased flows of 
information and ideas, and population levels and density continue to increase amid more 
competition for resources.227  
The post-Cold War era has also been heavily influenced by the United States. 
Furthermore, the rise and influence of international and regional institutions also 
characterized this period.228 These two factors have changed the manner in which states 
compete with each other, and the way states employ or influence irregular conflicts to 
further their interests. Put differently, as the costs and risks of conventional warfare have 
increased, states are more reliant on indirect means and more nuanced uses of force to 
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achieve their goals.  As a result, irregular warfare is occurring more frequently as states 
increasingly use proxies to compete with one another in a multi-polar world without 
placing all of their resources and political capital on the line, and to avoid escalation or 
third-party intervention.229  
Irregular conflicts are now more often multidimensional chess matches between 
non-state actors, criminal organizations, states, surrogate forces, proto-states, states, and 
regional and international forces.230 In particular, revolutionary jihadi groups define this 
period; after the collapse of the Soviet Union, many of these groups took up arms and 
found their way into regional conflicts such as the Chechen Wars and the 2003 Iraq 
war.231 These organizations have proved more difficult to defeat as they are often 
decentralized, networked, not confined by borders nor loyal to any one state, and 
unconstrained by international law or any moral or ethical standard.232 What is more, the 
Internet has enabled irregulars more than any other technological development in recent 
history, perhaps not since the AK-47 nearly seventy years ago.233  Irregulars can now 
influence and shape the opinions of larger audiences, recruit among wider populations, 
raise funds anonymously, and engage in cyber warfare. Finally, many contemporary 
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irregulars are no longer limited to the tools or strategies of the weak.234  As technology 
becomes more accessible and modern weapons more available, irregulars are 
increasingly blending conventional and irregular warfare, confounding the nature of the 
conflict, the actors involved, and their goals and intentions.235 In effect, this phenomenon 
has fundamentally changed “asymmetries” in irregular warfare; the weak are less 
disadvantaged and better able to compete against the strong in this contemporary period. 
This chapter evaluates several irregular conflicts from the post-Cold War era.  
The chapter assesses the irregular’s commitment to determine the presence and influence 
of asymmetric motivations.  Additionally, this chapter considers what factors have most 
influenced each conflict and how and why irregulars have succeeded or failed.   
A. THE FINAL PERIOD OF THE IRISH TROUBLES: 1991–1998 
As the Berlin Wall fell, asymmetries of motivation remained between the PIRA 
who were totally committed and the British, who were limitedly committed to fighting 
over Northern Ireland. The PIRA’s commitment increased, along with their terrorist 
activity, after the Republicans failed to make progress in brokering a deal with the British 
and the Loyalists. As evidence of this, the PIRA detonated several bombs, weighing two 
hundred to one thousand pounds, throughout Belfast.236  The PIRA also continued their 
terror campaign in London, causing over eight hundred million pounds (approximately 
$1.2 billion dollars in 1994) in damage to the Baltic Exchange in London’s Financial 
District with one bomb alone.237 
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Britain’s commitment declined in the wake of these bombings. Recognizing this, 
Gerry Adams’ renewed Sinn Fein’s effort to seek a political solution. In a July 1993 press 
release, Adams stated that the Republicans: would be open to joint authority in Ireland; 
desired a peaceful resolution; and called on the PIRA to end their violence.238 This 
prompted the British government to issue the Downing Street Declaration later that fall, 
affirming that they had no strategic or economic interests in Northern Ireland and would 
support self-determination in Northern Ireland based on the will of the majority.239 In 
other words, as a result of PIRA’s terrorist activity, Sinn Fein was able to move the 
British back to the negotiating table; the Troubles had become too politically and 
psychologically costly, decreasing Britain’s commitment and will to continue the fight.  
Under significant pressure from the Irish-American lobby and Irish-allies within 
his campaign, Bill Clinton made several promises during his campaign to address the 
conflict in Northern Ireland.240 As a result, his election in 1992 brought increased 
pressure on the British and the Loyalists to negotiate with the Republicans.241 Eventually, 
as the Clinton administration became more involved, and as the British acknowledged 
Northern Ireland’s right to self-determination, the PIRA’s prospects of uniting Ireland 
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increased thereby decreasing their overall commitment and motivation to fight.  Thus, the 
PIRA announced a widespread historical cease-fire in 1994 to facilitate negotiations.242  
The PIRA’s commitment and motivation continued to decline as the Clinton 
administration increased their efforts to negotiate peace.243 In turn, Britain released their 
1995 Framework for the Future.244 These documents set an agenda for political 
discussions and suggested a political structure for a new government in Northern 
Ireland.245 Still, three issues plagued further progress: the PIRA saw disarming as 
“tantamount to surrender”; the British refused to allow Sinn Fein to participate in 
negotiations; and the Loyalists refused to stop inciting Protestant-Catholic tensions with 
their parades in Northern Ireland.246 As a result, in 1996, bombs exploded in London and 
Manchester, ending the ceasefire between the PIRA and the British.247  
Internal fractures began to emerge within the PIRA, and the organization split 
between those that wanted to pursue a political solution and those that remained 
committed to the armed struggle. This resulted in the formation of the Real IRA by a 
small faction that remained committed to the fight.248 Meanwhile, the rest of the parties 
involved had lost the will to fight. With the aid of U.S. Senator George Mitchell, the 
British and Irish governments, and the Loyalists and the Republicans brokered a deal on 
Good Friday, 17 April 1998, paving the way for a long reconciliation process that would 
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often be marred by low level PIRA and RIRA paramilitary activity and sporadic 
bombings.249 
The PIRA helped bring the British back to the negotiating table by increasing the 
political and psychological cost of the war for the British. Although it was the political 
efforts of Sinn Fein and the United States that convinced the PIRA to stop fighting which 
enabled the negotiations to succeed. Therefore, this conflict ended in a draw. The 
Republicans failed to unite Ireland, but they did gain significant political concessions that 
led to less persecution and more inclusion of Catholics in Northern Ireland’s government 
and security forces.250 Similarly, Loyalists lost some control in Northern Ireland but were 
afforded the opportunity to choose their future, and the majority voted to remain part of 
the United Kingdom.  
The lessons from this are three-fold.  First, even though the majority of the PIRA 
lost the will to fight, some members remained committed and chose to continue the 
struggle.  Thus, some participants may continue the fight on their own or form a new 
organization altogether if their parent organization demobilizes or agrees to stop fighting. 
Second, as is often the case for irregulars, success can be achieved from a stalemate. 
Finally, as long as an asymmetry of motivations existed, the PIRA would have kept 
fighting the British until they ran out of resources or the British left on their volition.  
Though, once commitment and motivations became symmetric, negotiations and a 
political solution were possible. This indicates that symmetry may be more important in 
explaining irregular success than asymmetry of motivations when conflicts are stalled.   
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B. THE FIRST AND SECOND CHECHEN WARS: 1994–1996 AND 1999–2009 
Inspired by the policies of Russian President Mikhail Gorbachev, Chechnya 
emerged from the Cold War with hope for peace and self-determination. More 
specifically, after two centuries of Moscow’s rule, the Chechens had become totally 
committed and motivated to achieve their independence.251 Therefore, as the Soviet 
Union dissolved in 1991, Chechnya declared its independence and elected Jokhar 
Dudayev as the Chechen Republic’s first president.252  
Unfortunately, Gorbachev’s successor, President Boris Yeltsin, was not as 
inclined to let Chechnya secede from the Russian Federation.  To deter other former 
Soviet states from following suit, Yeltsin tried to bring Chechnya back under Moscow’s 
control with a limited covert action program.253 When this failed, in 1994 Yeltsin 
authorized a minimal deployment of soldiers with air and artillery support to retake 
Grozny, Chechnya’s capital.254 Therefore an asymmetry of motivations existed—Russia 
was limitedly committed while the Chechens were totally committed.   
Conflict, criminal violence, and economic hardship define post-Cold War 
Chechnya.255 The Chechen Wars are often distinguished between three time periods: the 
First Chechen war between 1994 and 1996, the Second Chechen War between 1999 and 
2000, and the insurgency in Chechnya that continued until 2009, with isolated events still 
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taking place today. Throughout all of these periods, the Chechens have lived up to their 
reputation as fiercely capable and committed irregular mountain warriors.256   
First, in 1994, the Chechens’ total commitment and motivation were evident as 
they fiercely defended their capital from the Russian invaders and made quick work of 
the unprepared and ill-trained Russian armor units.257 Russia responded with relentless 
artillery and air bombardments, but they failed to reduce the Chechen rebels’ 
commitment and motivation.258  As Grozny was reduced to rubble, the Chechen rebels 
returned to the countryside and the surrounding mountains where the urban fight became 
a village war.259 Although, Russia’s casualties in Grozny had an inverse effect on their 
commitment; as Russia’s military suffered more losses, the Russian government became 
more committed and motivated to fight. 
Throughout 1995 and 1996, the Chechen rebels slowly chipped away at Russia’s 
commitment and motivation on two fronts. Fueled by Wahhabism, Shamil Basayev’s 
rebels conducted several high-profile terrorist attacks deep in Russian territory.260  
Opposite Basayev, Maskhadov’s guerrillas, inspired mostly by nationalism and tribalism, 
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set out to retake Grozny with a swarm of small-unit strikes.261 After Maskhadov 
succeeded in holding Grozny in 1996, Russian motivation and commitment collapsed as 
the political and psychological costs became too great for President Yeltsin.262 Although, 
as the Russian Army withdrew in 1996, any semblance of peace in Chechnya was lost as 
rebel leaders vied for power.263   
Ultimately, the Russians lost the first Chechen war as a result of asymmetry of 
motivations.  Specifically, the Russians lost the will to fight and became less committed 
than the Chechens who remained totally committed through the end. The Chechens 
accomplished this by extending their terrorist attacks into Russia to increase fractures 
between the Russian population and their government. Additionally, the media also had a 
significant influence on shaping Russian perceptions on the war. These two factors raised 
the political and psychological costs for President Yeltsin and compelled him to pull the 
Russian army out of Chechnya. Though, this was only temporary; the Russians had not 
completely lost the will to fight and remained limitedly committed to taking back 
Chechnya.   
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Basayev’s terror campaign and the growth of Islamic fundamentalism gave Putin 
the justification he needed to bring Chechnya back into the fold and retake Grozny.264  
The Russian army returned with renewed commitment and new tactics based on the 
lessons they learned from their previous failures in Chechnya.265 As a result, Grozny 
quickly fell and Russia established direct rule over Chechnya in 2000. Still, Basayev and 
Maskhadov remained committed and each continued their operations; Basayev and his 
Muslim warriors conducted terrorist attacks and suicide bombings while Maskhadov 
adopted new guerrilla warfare tactics, using IED’s, snipers, and helicopter traps to contest 
Russian control in Chechnya.266 It was only after Maskhadov’s death in 2005 and 
Basayev’s death a year later that the rebels’ commitment decreased and many rebels lost 
the will to fight.267  
In the end, Russia defeated the Chechen rebels in the Second Chechen War 
politically and militarily despite an asymmetry of motivations. The Russians 
accomplished this in part, by restricting and censoring the media to isolate the Russian 
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people from the conflict.268  This indicates that the Russians were keenly aware of the 
impact of popular opinion and the need to insulate the Russian population from the 
realities of war. In turn, the Russians were able to control the flow of information and 
convince the Russian people that the Chechen Rebels were merely radical Islamic 
terrorists intent on killing Russian citizens. This provided the Russians with great 
freedom of action, enabling them to apply a level of brutality, violence, and destruction 
seldom seen in the modern age—with the exception of few destructive and devastating 
conflicts such as the Second Congo War.269 Thus, although they were limitedly 
committed, Russia’s willingness to use excessive force enabled them to isolate and 
exterminate the rebels by reducing the country to rubble.270  Nonetheless, sporadic 
fighting continues, as some Chechen mountain guerrillas remain committed to one day 
driving the Russians out of Chechnya once and for all.271       
C. THE COLOMBIAN CONFLICT: 1991 TO PRESENT 
As the Colombian conflict emerged from the Cold War, the possibility of peace in 
Colombia remained dark and distant. Simply put, the irregulars and the Colombian 
Government each remained fully committed and failed to agree on a path toward peace. 
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The CGSB demanded political and economic reform, while the Colombian Government 
refused any conditions on top of guerrillas’ demobilization. Consequently, the FARC 
resumed their political and military efforts with renewed vigor following the eighth 
FARC conference and the dissolution of the CGSB in 1993.272  
This period of the Colombian conflict was also shaped by the United States’ War 
on Drugs, the rise of the AUC, and Plan Colombia.273 As the FARC continued to struggle 
for control, they became increasingly reliant on the drug trade to fund and sustain the 
fight against the Colombian military and the AUC.  As a result, by the 1990s, the 
FARC’s motivation and commitment had increased significantly as their numbers 
swelled to over 18,000 fighters and their control extended to over half of the 
municipalities in Colombia.274 Although, the FARC’s commitment and motivation 
decreased as they became increasingly disconnected from the population; the FARC 
became viewed more as criminals and narco-traffickers and less as an irregular group 
fighting for political and social change.275 On top of this, the U.S. government’s Plan 
Colombia injected tens of millions of dollars into the Colombian government to boost its 
economy, neutralize the FARC, and counter the drug trade.276 This increased the 
Colombian government and military’s commitment and motivation while decreasing the 
FARC’s commitment and freedom of maneuver.  
The September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks had a significant impact on the 
Colombian conflict. Within several months of al-Qaeda’s attack in New York City, the 
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Bush administration moved to label the FARC as a terrorist group.277 This allowed the 
United States to increase its commitment to the Colombian government.278 In turn, this 
added support enabled President Alvaro Uribe’s government to gain the initiative, forcing 
the irregulars to change their strategy from the offensive to the defensive.279 Though, 
internal government corruption and human rights abuses decreased the Colombian 
government’s legitimacy and popular support.280 The Colombian military and the AUC’s 
actions were as violent, if not more so, than the irregulars.281 Over the years, this blurred 
the legitimacy of the government’s cause and advanced the irregulars’ recruitment and 
popular support in rural areas outside of government control. As a result, the Colombian 
government’s commitment and motivation decreased while the FARC’s increased. 
The FARC have survived years of oppression as a result of favorable terrain and 
the financial benefits of the drug trade. Similarly, the U.S. equipped, trained, and advised 
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Colombian military has become a capable and professional counterinsurgency force.282 
After fifty years of violence, war weariness has set in throughout Colombia, compelling 
Colombia’s current President, Juan Manuel Santos to negotiate with the FARC.  
This conflict spanned fifty-two years because the FARC and the Colombian 
government’s commitment and motivation remained mostly symmetrical. Both the FARC 
and the Colombian government remained totally committed and motivated for the 
majority of the conflict. Now, after fifty-two years, the Colombian government and the 
FARC’s commitment and will to fight have decreased and both are ready and willing to 
negotiate. 
This case reinforces the importance of transformational leadership, like Gerry 
Adams, President Santos’ is in a unique and historical position to establish peace in 
Colombia once and for all. Although, any mutually acceptable agreement is plagued by 
enmity that has built up over decades between the Colombian military, the AUC, the 
Colombian people, and the FARC.283 Despite this, the Colombian Government and the 
FARC have agreed to a new peace agreement in November 2016 after four years of 
negotiations.284 However, whether the Colombian Congress ratifies this agreement after 
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the Colombian people rejected the last deal in October of 2016 is yet to be seen.285 Thus, 
this conflict remains unresolved as low-level violence continues to threaten the prospects 
of peace in Colombia.  
D. ISRAELI-PALESTINIAN CONFLICT: 1991 TO PRESENT 
The end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union changed the 
dynamics of the Middle East “superpower” rivalry.286 The United States facilitated peace 
talks in Washington, resulting in the 1993 Israel-PLO Peace Accord. 287 This effectively 
ended the First Intifada, but it failed to address Palestinian statehood, the expansion of 
Israeli settlements, or the Palestinian refugee crisis.288 Regardless, these negotiations 
improved Palestinian commitment and motivation.  Specifically, the 1993 Peace Accord 
led to the formation of the Palestinian Authority in 1994 and the end of twenty-seven 
years of Israeli occupation of Gaza and the Jericho pass.289 This increased the 
Palestinians motivation and commitment while signaling a decrease in Israel’s 
commitment and willingness, resulting in an asymmetry of motivation in the fight over 
the occupied territories.   
Peace was fleeting in the Middle East as unresolved core grievances inflamed 
tensions in 2000, resulting in the Second Intifada. Unlike the First Intifada, this phase of 
the conflict was more violent. The Palestinian irregulars attacked Israelis and civilian 
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infrastructure with small arms, rockets, and suicide attacks.290 Conversely, the IDF’s 
response to the Second Intifada was more measured than the first; they focused on 
targeting terrorist leadership, isolating militants with a massive wall, and disrupting 
terrorist cells through intelligence operations and precision strikes.291 The Second 
Intifada ended five years later in 2005 as internal friction intensified between Hamas 
and Fatah following Arafat’s death.292 This friction was the result of differences in 
commitment and motivation; while the PA desired to establish a secular political state, 
Hamas was intent on establishing Sharia Law and refused to recognize Israel.293  This 
friction eventually caused Hamas to split from Fatah in 2007, with Hamas in Gaza and 
Fatah in the West Bank.  
 Since the mid-2000s the Palestinian Authority has prevailed by engaging Israel 
politically. The PA has evolved from a social movement and militant organization to a 
full-fledged pseudo-government with non-member observer status in the UN and 
bureaucratic institutions that provide social services to the Palestinian people.294  As a 
result, the PA have separated themselves from terrorist activities, built international 
support for their cause, and boosted their credibility as the protector of the Palestinian 
people. Nevertheless, some hardliners, particularly in Hamas, remain highly motivated 
and committed to its struggle against Israel. As a result, periodic fighting has occurred, 
particularly in 2008 and 2014 as more rocket attacks were launched from the Gaza Strip 
into Israel.  
The PA’s success can be traced to their ability to adapt organizationally. As a 
result of Israel’s superior resources and capabilities, the PA has learned how to exploit its 
external support networks to avoid repression and confrontation with Israel’s defense 
forces. Additionally, the PA has succeeded in combining complex operations with 
                                                 
290 Harms, The Palestine-Israel Conflict, 171–173.  
291 Ibid., 173–200. 
292 Ibid., 201. 
293 Ibid., 206–207. 
294 Boot, Invisible Armies, 476.  
 87 
propaganda and psychological warfare for maximum effect.295 Finally, the PA has 
succeeded by politicizing and internationalizing their cause. This not only generated 
significant support for the Palestinian people but has also restrained Israel’s use of force.  
Despite the continued suffering and rising costs, both the Israelis and the 
Palestinians remain entrenched in their beliefs.  As a result, this conflict endures; Israel 
continues to target irregular terrorist networks, leadership, and infrastructure to secure its’ 
territory, while Hamas strives to counter Israel and reconcile with the PA and Fatah.  In 
other words, this conflict is far from over. Though, Israel’s war-weariness and their 
willingness to negotiate with the PA indicate that a solution may only be a few years off. 
Additionally, the international concern and support for peace in the Middle East 
continues to grow.296 Moving forward, though, it is unclear how this new dynamic will 
shape Israeli and Palestinian commitment and motivation to war and peace.  
E. THE LEBANON WAR: JULY–AUGUST 2006 
The 2006 Lebanon war was a unique irregular war between Israel and Hezbollah, 
particularly because Hezbollah is not a typical irregular or non-state actor. Hezbollah is a 
“state within a state” and a “transnational military and political organization receiving 
direction from external powers such as Iran and Syria.”297 In other words, Hezbollah 
provides services to the Lebanese population and serves as a de facto government in 
Southern Lebanon, but is not bound by international law, conventions, or state borders. 
Additionally, its fighters are trained in Iranian-based training camps and Lebanon by 
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Iranian military trainers and advisors.298 Therefore, Hezbollah is much more capable than 
other regional irregulars such as Hamas; they can, and have employed conventional as 
well as unconventional strategy and tactics, and state of the art weapons against Israel.   
Hezbollah launched Operation Waad al-Sadek, or Honest Promise, to free 
Hezbollah members from an Israeli jail in July of 2006.299  In effect, Hezbollah was 
pursuing limited goals, so, their commitment and motivation was limited at first.  
Though, Hezbollah’s commitment became total after the IDF’s retaliatory airstrikes and 
incursion into Southern Lebanon. This change in Hezbollah’s commitment is evident by 
the numbers of soldiers they lost and the number of rockets they fired; they employed 
everything they had against Israel.300 Furthermore, there is evidence that Nasrallah, 
Hezbollah’s political, military, and spiritual leader, had planned and prepared for such an 
opportunity following Israel’s initial withdrawal from Southern Lebanon in 2000.301 This 
indicates that Hezbollah, a political organization within Lebanon, and a militant proxy of 
Iran, was totally motivated to defeat Israel. 
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Israel responded to Hezbollah’s initial rocket attack and raid with a large air 
campaign followed by a ground offensive into Southern Lebanon.302 Though, this 
response was tempered by Israel’s recent struggle against Hamas in Gaza; the Israeli 
military was exhausted, and the Israeli population was fearful of another protracted 
war.303 Furthermore, Israel’s actions were restrained by the relationship between 
Lebanon and the United States, and because they wanted to avoid confrontation with 
Syria and Iran.304  Furthermore, despite the massive destruction of the Israeli airstrikes 
and artillery, the IDF mobilized a fraction of their forces and the Israeli government was 
careful to avoid escalation with the Lebanese. For these reasons, the Israelis were 
limitedly committed. Therefore, an asymmetry of motivations existed between Hezbollah 
and the Israelis’ during the 2006 Lebanon War.  
This conflict came on the heels of the Second Intifada and the IDF responded and 
fought Hezbollah as they did Hamas.  Although, Hezbollah was not behaving as typical 
irregulars; they fought from prepared positions, defended ground, and used advanced 
weaponry and technology, such as anti-tank guided missiles and unmanned aerial 
vehicles.305 In other words, Hezbollah was fighting conventionally at times and 
unconventionally at others; there was a “blurring of conventional systems with irregular 
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forces and nontraditional tactics.”306  This enabled Hezbollah to destroy several Israeli 
tanks and restrict the IDF’s freedom of maneuver with mined obstacles while they 
engaged from concealed positions within civilian buildings. Ultimately, this reduced 
Israel’s technical advantage, frustrated the Israeli government and military, and prevented 
the Israelis from achieving a decisive victory against the irregulars as they had in the past. 
Though, it did not reduce Israel’s commitment and motivation or compel them to quit. 
By design, Hezbollah integrated its fighters into the civilian terrain and 
infrastructure, persuading domestic and international audiences that Israel bombed 
civilians and committed war crimes.307 To this end, Hezbollah used their media, the al-
Manar TV station and al-Nour radio to shape domestic and regional perceptions of the 
war to maintain intrinsic motivation and commitment among the Lebanese people and the 
surrounding Arab community.308 Hezbollah also exploited new media to reach the 
international community; this became the first “live war” streamed or “broadcast via 
broadband.” 309 This new media enabled Hezbollah to reinforce the narrative that Israel’s 
actions were “disproportionate,” unjustified, and immoral.310  In effect, Hezbollah won 
the battle of the narrative and reduced Israel’s commitment and motivation by exploiting 
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their open society and the Internet to sow uncertainty, chaos, disorder, and frustration.311 
Therefore, Hezbollah defeated Israel politically by destroying their legitimacy and by 
convincing the international community to compel and coerce Israel to leave Lebanon.  
As is typical in irregular warfare, the Lebanese population in Southern Lebanon 
suffered the most as a result of this war.312 Hezbollah also suffered military setbacks.313 
Nonetheless, Nasrallah was quick to claim the 2006 Lebanon War a “divine victory.”314 
Hezbollah continued to advance this narrative to legitimize their cause, boost popular 
support, and increase their credibility as the defender of the Lebanese people against 
Israeli aggression.315 Alternatively, this was a major political and psychological blow to 
Israel. They were humiliated; the IDF had failed to defeat Hezbollah, the Israeli air force 
was accused of war crimes, the Israeli population was discouraged, and the Israeli 
government was compelled by the international community to leave Lebanon for the 
second time.316  
In effect, Israel’s morale was low, but they remained committed and motivated 
and would have persisted were it not for the United Nations and international pressure 
from the United States and France.  Therefore, Israel was not defeated militarily, but 
rather politically as a result of Hezbollah’s political and psychological warfare strategy 
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and their use of the media. In other words, Hezbollah remained committed and motivated 
through to the end while Israel lost the will to persist and was compelled to quit. 
Ultimately, Hezbollah prevailed as a result of the asymmetry of motivation that existed 
between them and the Israelis. 
F. AL-QAEDA’S WAR AGAINST THE WEST: 1996–PRESENT 
Al-Qaeda’s War against the West, the “far enemy,” began well before September 
11, 2001.  The departure of the Red Army from Afghanistan and the collapse of 
the Soviet Union left al-Qaeda without an enemy.317 The 1990–1991 Gulf War and 
continued U.S. troop presence in and around the Arabian Peninsula provided al-Qaeda 
with a cause that resonated throughout the Muslim World. Osama bin-Laden issued his 
first fatwa and declaration of war in 1996, indicating his total commitment and 
motivation to remove the “Americans Occupying the Land of the Two Holy Places.”318 
Unfortunately, the significance of the fatwa resonated only slightly with the Clinton 
Administration and barely with the America public.  
Al-Qaeda’s slow rise to stardom emanated from Afghanistan, growing with 
sporadic, but deliberate, terrorist attacks on American, Israeli, and takfir or apostate Arab 
regimes. Osama bin-Laden oversaw the planning, preparation, and execution of several 
al-Qaeda attacks throughout the early 1990s.319 First, in 1991, al-Qaeda attacked the 
King of Afghanistan in Italy, then, a year later, al-Qaeda bombed two Aden hotels 
targeting U.S. troops, which was followed by an attack on the Saudi National Guard in 
Riyadh in 1995, and the bombing of the Egyptian Embassy in Pakistan.320   
The son of a successful Saudi construction tycoon, Osama bin-Laden was an 
entrepreneur who latched on to the notion of a global jihad and the importance of a 
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unified ummah.321  To these ends, Osama bin-Laden set out to establish an international 
terrorist conglomerate that was unified in attacking the West without tying themselves to 
one geographic region or benefactor as Hezbollah or Hamas did. Osama bin-Laden ran 
his organization as a corporation with managerial and administrative functions; he 
established an organizational culture and identity through formal Islamic education and 
military training.322  Further, he established a formal hiring and vetting system to expand 
his affiliate network around the globe.323 Aside from advancing global jihad, al-Qaeda 
was one of the first terrorist groups to establish a robust media production and 
propaganda arm, Al-Sahab, and exploited new media and Internet technology to expand 
their influence.324 Furthermore, al-Qaeda differed from other terrorist groups because 
they attempted to break the Shia-Sunni divide by cutting across historical and sectarian 
barriers and drawing on membership from all levels of Muslim society.325   
Still, the enormity of the threat al-Qaeda imposed only became more apparent 
after the 1998 U.S. Embassy bombings in Tanzania and Kenya, and the attack on the USS 
Cole in 2000.326 United States commitment and motivation grew steadily as a result of 
these attacks, but remained only limitedly committed to defeating al-Qaeda. 327  
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The United States became more committed and motivated after al-Qaeda’s 
September 11, 2001, attacks on the World Trade Center.  Rather than mobilizing all of 
the U.S. military and its resources, the “Global War On Terror” was to be a limited 
response; relying on U.S. and allied Special Forces and air power to neutralize al-Qaeda 
and the Taliban. To accomplish this, the Bush administration enacted Article Five for the 
first time in the NATO’s history.  Within months, the United States and coalition forces 
had broken the Taliban’s hold on Afghanistan and displaced al-Qaeda’s leadership into 
neighboring safe havens in Pakistan and Iran.328 This was a temporary setback for al-
Qaeda that forced them to adapt organizationally, but their commitment and motivation 
remained absolute.329  
As the war in Afghanistan raged on, Osama bin-Laden went public and used his 
newly minted terrorist fame to franchise al-Qaeda; expanding his network and 
operational reach throughout the Middle East, Africa, and Asia. Conversely, U.S. 
commitment and motivation continued to expand to a new front as the Bush 
Administration investigated links—which turned out to be illusory—between the “Axis 
of Evil” (Iraq, Iran, and the DPRK) and al-Qaeda.330 With the invasion of Iraq in 2003, 
American forces became engaged in a limited war on two fronts—Afghanistan and Iraq. 
This two-front war is arguably the closest the United States has been to being totally 
committed since WWII. Concurrently, Osama bin-Laden’s network, and al-Qaeda, as a 
whole, became exponentially stronger and more committed as new terrorist groups 
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pledged their allegiance to them and new recruits and resources joined up in response the 
U.S. invasion of Iraq.331  
Al-Qaeda in Iraq arose in the wake of the U.S. invasion of Iraq. Although, this 
official affiliate, formerly known as Jama’at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad, began to diverge from 
Osama bin-Laden’s ideology and goal of global jihad.332 While al-Qaeda Central was 
playing the long game to reestablish the caliphate for the entire umma, Zarqawi’s AQI 
was more committed and motivated to protecting the Sunni population from Nouri al-
Maliki's Shia-dominated government and the more immediate establishment of an 
Islamic State in Iraq.333 The emergence of this Sunni threat and the growing insurgency 
in Iraq prompted an increase in U.S. commitment, resulting in the 2007 surge and the 
creation of the Sahwa movement.334 Regardless of this increased U.S. commitment, and 
the death of Osama bin Laden in 2011, al-Qaeda continued to expand, as did their 
commitment and motivation.335  
After a decade of limited war, the United States had only achieved moderate 
success against al-Qaeda; bin-Laden’s death was symbolic for the United States but 
inconsequential for al-Qaeda at large. As costs increased and public support for the war 
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against al-Qaeda waned, President Obama kept his promise to extricate the U.S. military 
from Iraq in 2011 and reduce U.S. forces in Afghanistan by 2014, effectively reducing 
U.S. commitment and motivation to a new low.336 Though, as U.S. commitment and 
presence decreased, al-Qaeda’s affiliates grew in number and size throughout the Middle 
East, Africa, and Asia. On top of this, Maliki's oppression of the Sunni population after 
the departure of U.S. forces, and the outbreak of the Syrian Civil War provided Abu Bakr 
al-Baghdadi’s force with an opportunity to exploit sectarian tensions to mobilize the 
Sunni population in support of the Islamic State.337  
What began for al-Qaeda as a global jihad against the West, the “far enemy,” has 
devolved into mostly local and regional struggles fueled by sectarian, ethnic, and tribal 
tensions in weakly governed and failing states.338 Nevertheless, Salafi Jihadism prevails 
even in al-Qaeda’s absence, particularly in Syria where the Islamic State’s commitment 
and motivation continue to grow, even as they lose territory and meet increasing 
opposition.339 As a result, since 2014 U.S. commitment and motivation has increased to 
defeat terrorism and the Islamic State. Currently, the U.S. military, and Special 
Operations Forces in particular, remain in Afghanistan, are back in Iraq, and deployed 
throughout the Middle East and Africa to defeat the remaining global terrorist threat.340  
Al-Qaeda did not defeat the United States militarily or politically, but neither has 
the United States defeated al-Qaeda’s ideology and its influence on terrorist groups 
around the world. The United States has achieved varying levels of success in disrupting 
and defeating al-Qaeda and its affiliates in Southeast Asia, the Middle East, and 
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Africa.341 Unfortunately, though, the United States has spent trillions of dollars and 
thousands of lives to do so, and as a whole has lost a significant amount of soft power, 
credibility and influence in the Middle East largely due to the controversial invasion of 
Iraq in 2003.342  
While the Islamic State’s future remains uncertain and al-Qaeda affiliates 
continue their jihad against the West, the United States remains limitedly committed, 
though much less than in the past. To date, the Islamic State has emerged, more or less, 
as a proto-state and their commitment and motivation remains total as their regional 
influence grows.343 As a result, there continues to be an asymmetry of motivations 
between the Islamic State and the United States.  Thus, this chapter of the war will 
continue until the Islamic State is defeated or the United States quits. Unfortunately, 
Salafi Jihadism and global Islamic jihad will likely remain a problem for the West 
well into the future, particularly in ungoverned corners and failed states, but at home 
too as digital media enables angry and marginalized individuals to self-radicalize 
and join the fight. 
G. DOMINANT TRENDS IN THE POST-COLD WAR PERIOD 
The collapse of the Soviet Union ushered in a new era of irregular warfare.  The 
incidence of armed conflict and warfare, in general, dropped significantly after the Cold 
War.344  The 1990s were relatively calm, except for the prevalence of ethnic, racial, and 
religious violence, particularly in the former Soviet States that were evolving and 
undergoing nation building. The Chechen Wars were chosen for this chapter because of 
this dynamic change. The post-Cold War diffusion of power shaped the Irish Troubles, 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the Colombian conflict. Additionally, because these 
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irregular conflicts crossed into the current era, this chapter has continued the analysis to 
determine how post-Cold War dynamics impacted motivations and irregular warfare in 
general.  
Al-Qaeda’s 2001 terrorist attacks marked a growing trend of increased non-state 
violence in the twenty-first century.345 Therefore, this chapter reviewed the rise of al-
Qaeda to evaluate how the rise of global terrorism influenced conflict dynamics in the 
Middle East, Africa, and Eastern Europe. Additionally, this era saw the rise of interstate 
competition through proxy warfare. To reflect this trend, this chapter also reviewed 
Hezbollah’s war with Israel in 2006. These conflicts were not isolated events or 
anomalies, but were representative of the time and of post-Cold War irregular conflicts. 
There are numerous other irregular warfare examples that are worth studying.  For 
example, the Somali Civil War has plagued the Horn of Africa for nearly three decades, 
and has evolved from a nationalist and tribal struggle to a revolutionary Islamic war 
waged by al-Shabaab. Additionally, numerous state, regional, and international forces 
have participated in the conflict as well—to no avail.  Similarly, several irregular 
conflicts, from RENAMO’s reemergence in Mozambique to the Libyan Civil War and 
the Tuareg Rebellion, have occurred throughout Africa since the end of the Cold War.  
These conflicts are significant in their own right and deserve their own analysis in the 
future. 
The Color Revolutions and the Arab Spring, in particular, have had significant 
political and social influence in several countries throughout Africa, Europe and the 
Middle East. This chapter did not review these conflicts though because they are better 
analyzed separately as they are distinctly different from the cases analyzed in this thesis 
and deserve their own consideration within the context of asymmetry of motivations in 
social movements. Having said this, they are not totally unrelated, just unique enough to 
warrant separate consideration.  
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Finally, the ongoing War in Donbass is worth noting too as it is a complex 
irregular war with between the Ukrainian government and the Donetsk People’s 
Republic, the Luhansk People’s Republic, and covert and clandestine Russian forces. In 
addition to these conflicts, dozens more have shaped the geopolitical landscape 
throughout the world. Nevertheless, this chapter focused on six of the most significant 
conflicts that have had the largest impact on or best define current trends in irregular 
warfare. This period of irregular warfare is mostly defined by the rise of hybrid warfare, 
religiously motivated terrorism, the influence of networks, the importance of popular 
opinion and transformational leaders, and the influence of the United States.  
1. Irregular Success in the Post-Cold War Period 
Irregular success is less obvious in the post-Cold War era than in the two previous 
periods. Irregular wins are easily identified when the strong quit and leave altogether.  
Though in this period, the strong only left (temporarily) two of the six conflicts reviewed 
in this chapter—the 2006 Lebanon War and the First Chechen War. Beyond this, the Irish 
Troubles ended in a draw; the Russians nearly annihilated the Chechens in the Second 
Chechen War. The Colombian conflict, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and al Qaeda’s 
War Against the West continue to this day.  
These six conflicts demonstrate that peace is only a temporary feature in the post-
Cold War era. When one side quits or moves to negotiate, hardliners split off and 
continue the armed struggle anew. Thus, post-Cold War conflicts are continuously 
evolving and reigniting; the Real IRA has picked up where the PIRA left off. Chechen 
rebels still act out from time to time; and the Islamic State has emerged from al-Qaeda.  
Nevertheless, irregulars did succeed to some degree, just not in the sense of a complete or 
decisive, political or military victory over their opponents.  
If the definition of success and victory is expanded beyond simply driving the 
strong out, irregular success is more prevalent during this period. By expanding the 
definition of success to any measure that results in a better peace, irregulars prevail in 
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four out of the six cases in this chapter.346  First, the Irish Republicans secured political 
concessions in negotiations with the British, ending the Irish Troubles and improving 
Catholic-Protestant relations in Northern Ireland.  Second, The Chechen rebels raised the 
political and psychological costs for Yeltsin, compelling him to pull the Russian Army 
out in 1996, ending the First Chechen War.  Then, Hezbollah exploited the media and the 
international community to compel Israel to pull out of Southern Lebanon in 2006. 
Additionally, al-Qaeda, and now the Islamic State, have tied up U.S. resources and left 
the U.S. government significantly weakened after fifteen years of counterinsurgency and 
counterterrorism operations.  
2. Factors Influencing Irregular Success 
The United States played an important role in five of the six conflicts.  The U.S. 
government sometimes has power to help move conflicts closer toward peace, as in the 
Troubles, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, and the 2006 Lebanon Crisis.  Conversely, the 
United States can also fuel conflicts when it is in their interests, such as the “War on 
Drugs” in Colombia and wars involving al-Qaeda and their affiliates. As history can 
attest, United States interventionism is episodic and highly dependent on an 
Administration’s desire to get involved in overseas entanglements. Whether the United 
States continues to engage terrorists worldwide, or mediate conflicts into the next period 
of irregular warfare is yet to be determined.  
The Cold War and post-Cold War chapters reveal that conflicts often continue for 
several decades when motivations are symmetrical.  Put differently, when both sides are 
totally committed, the war will likely continue, albeit not at the same pace or ferocity, but 
sporadic fighting and violence will persist.  This is until a leader emerges to break the 
stalemate with negotiations. As this chapter demonstrates, transformational leadership is 
another defining feature of conflict resolution during the post-Cold War period. Leaders 
                                                 
346 Basil Henry Liddell Hart, Strategy, 2nd rev. ed. (New York, NY: Meridian, 1991), 357. Liddell 
Hart reminds us that wars are waged for one reason—a better peace. “Victory in the true sense implies that 
the state of peace, and of one’s people, is better after the war than before.” 
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such as Gerry Adams, President Clinton, Yitzhak Rabin, and President Santos among 
others, attempted to bring parties together to establish a lasting peace.  
Public opinion has also become a significant factor affecting motivations and the 
outcomes of irregular wars. Specifically, communications technology is advancing at 
increasing pace, disseminating information more quickly and broadly. As a result, 
irregulars can reach wider audiences in real-time to shape perceptions and wage 
psychological and information warfare for the cost of a cellphone, laptop, and network 
connection or satellite uplink. Hezbollah and al Qaeda in particular are adept at 
recruiting, fundraising, and disseminating propaganda and, more importantly, using the 
Internet for political and psychological warfare purposes. On top of this, the Internet has 
enabled irregulars to skip several procedural steps and allowed them to reduce tactical 
and organizational risks. Irregulars no longer need to rely on traditional agents, 
movement entrepreneur, and brokers as they had in the past, to reach larger audiences and 
appeal to the sympathetic audiences for support.  
Networks also are a defining feature of this period.  This is not to say that 
traditional and hierarchical organizations have fallen by the wayside.  Several of the most 
networked irregulars still have some hierarchy at the top to synchronize, coordinate, and 
drive the organization forward.  Networks are not uncommon in irregular warfare; the 
weak repeatedly have learned to compartmentalize and work in cellular structures to 
avoid government repression and extermination.  Though al-Qaeda did revolutionize the 
concept of network-structured irregular warfare. Osama bin-Laden’s notion of global 
jihad expanded relationships and membership worldwide, enabling him to grow a 
network that can act independently, or swarm, with broad guidance.  In effect, this serves 
to overextend, frustrate, and demoralize their adversaries while limiting costs, risks, and 
exposure to their core groups.  
Religiously motivated terrorism has also become a defining feature of the 
contemporary operating environment. Previously, terrorism was used as a form of control 
or a tool of persuasion within a state.  This period witnessed the rise of global jihad and 
the use of terrorism to coerce or compel “far” and “near” enemies. al-Qaeda’s narrative 
and ideology spread out of Afghanistan in the early 1990s and into Chechnya where it 
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mixed with Wahhabi conservatism, then into Iraq in the early 2000s where it evolved into 
Salafi Jihadism. What is remarkable about this factor is that it is becoming more frequent 
and more concentrated. Ironically, this conflicts with al-Qaeda’s original intent for global 
jihad, which focused purely on destroying the West and its allies.  Now, more so than 
ever before, terrorism is being used in irregular intrastate conflicts against civilian targets, 
most of whom are Muslims residing in Iraq, Nigeria, Syria, Afghanistan, or Pakistan.347  
Still, religiously motivated terrorism has proved difficult to defeat or deter; a 
comprehensive and effective strategy to counter ideologically motivated warfare has 
evaded the greatest conventional minds and strategists of the twenty-first century.   
Finally, this period is defined by complexity and convergence in the sense that 
technology and interconnectedness are complicating isolated conflicts, and irregular 
warfare methods are increasingly mixed with conventional warfare strategy and 
tactics.348 To this point, in the Lebanon War of 2006, Hezbollah used live-stream media 
to influence public perception and shape opinions while Iran provided state of the art 
anti-tank missiles, signals intelligence equipment, and unmanned aerial vehicles to use 
against the IDF. This enabled Hezbollah to expand beyond their typical strategic and 
tactical guerrilla repertoire and, to some extent, fight like a state. The same can be said 
about the Islamic State and other irregulars around the world who have learned to harness 
technology and external support, and learned to employ both in new ways.  
3. Explaining Why Irregulars Won  
Asymmetry of motivations existed in four of the six conflicts (the Irish Troubles, 
the Chechen Wars, the 2006 Lebanon Crisis, and al-Qaeda’s War Against the West). But, 
                                                 
347 “Global Terrorism Index 2015,” National Consortium For The Study of Terrorism and Responses 
to Terrorism (New York: Institute For Economics and Peace, November 2015), 
http://economicsandpeace.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Global-Terrorism-Index-2015.pdf. 
348 Frank G. Hoffman, “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges,” Joint Force Quarterly 52, no. 1st Quarter 
(2009), 34–47; Max Boot, War Made New: Weapons, Warriors, and the Making of the Modern World, First 
trade paperback printing, August 2007, A Council on Foreign Relations Book (New York, NY: Gotham 
Books, 2007), 472.  “The boundaries between “regular” and “irregular” warfare are blurring. Even non-
state groups are increasingly gaining access to the kinds of weapons that were once the exclusive preserve 
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American power.” 
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with the exception of the 2006 Lebanon Crisis, irregulars did not prevail in these conflicts 
as a result of an asymmetry of motivations. Instead, irregulars mostly benefitted when 
motivations were symmetrical, as they have been in the Colombian conflict and the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. With the addition of the Troubles, these conflicts are three of 
the longer, more costly irregular wars that have continued in a cyclic fashion; generation 
after generation has known only anger and enmity and continued the conflict because 
grievances remain unresolved. Although, as these conflicts demonstrate, political and 
psychological costs eventually erode the will to persist over time, enabling 
transformational leaders to move the parties closer to peace through negotiations. When 
irregulars can endure and survive long-term, they may not defeat their opponent, but as 
these three cases suggest, they can prevail politically. 
This period also suggests that irregulars succeed more often when they remain a 
relevant long-term threat to the strong, forcing the strong to choose to negotiate or grant 
them concessions. To accomplish this, these cases reveal that irregulars need external 
support and safe havens to survive, and international support to help move their adversary 
towards the negotiating table. All six cases show that external support helped the 
irregulars sustain themselves, and impose costs on their adversary year after year. 
Though, even with external support, the Chechen’s were unable to defeat the Russians. 
The Irish Troubles, the Chechen Wars, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the 
Colombian conflict, and al Qaeda’s war against the West indicate that asymmetry of 
motivations may not fully explain irregular success in the post-Cold War era. Though 
these cases do indicate that motivation and the will to win are relevant causal factors of 
irregular success or failure. When asymmetry of motivations exists irregulars have 
succeeded by coercing or compelling their adversary to quit by influencing public 
opinion and perceptions.   
This chapter reveals that this is accomplished by raising the political and 
psychological cost of the war; winning the battle of the narrative; securing popular 
support; and by provoking international intervention and mediation. Conversely, when 
motivations are symmetrical, irregulars first had to adapt and rely on safe havens and 
external support to survive. Only then could the irregulars demonstrate continued resolve 
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and commitment to the armed struggle while pursuing political and psychological 
warfare strategies to persuade their adversary to negotiate.  
The next chapter will compare and contrast Chapters III, IV, and V to reveal the 
similarities and difference between each period of irregular warfare.  Furthermore, the 
following chapter will reveal which factors influenced irregular warfare the most.  
Additionally, Chapter VI will serve to explain why the weak prevail in irregular conflicts 
when they do. Finally, the theory of asymmetry of motivations will be compared to 
alternative theories, such as asymmetry of interests, asymmetry of violence, asymmetry 


















VI. IRREGULAR WARFARE AND IRREGULAR SUCCESS  
Part One reviewed fifteen irregular conflicts that occurred in three separate 
periods: post-WWII, 1945 to 1962; mid-to late-Cold War, 1963 to 1991; and post-Cold 
War, 1992 to 2016. The conflicts in each of these periods demonstrated how major 
geopolitical events shaped irregular warfare. These cases also revealed the evolution of 
irregular warfare and irregular actors, as well as, the dynamics that shaped each period.  
This helped illuminate general conditions that enabled irregulars to succeed and revealed 
the best explanation for why irregulars win. This chapter will compare and contrast the 
three time periods in Chapter III, IV, and V to define why irregulars win and to identify 
which factors enable their success the most.  
The irregular conflicts in the first period were first shaped by the results of WWII 
and the decisions that were made during the war termination process.  This period 
demonstrated how new beliefs and international organizations shape irregular warfare.  
Specifically, the new world order under the UN opened the door of opportunity to 
nationalist and leftist revolutionaries alike. As this period revealed, irregular conflicts 
were mostly asymmetrical as exemplified by totally motivated indigenous irregulars, and 
limitedly motivated external powers.  Two exceptions were found: the Huk Rebellion and 
the Cuban Revolution. These two conflicts revealed not only that internal conflicts are 
symmetrically motivated, but also that irregulars can win when motivations are both 
symmetrical and asymmetrical.  
This period revealed that irregulars might succeed more as a result of international 
dynamics, and the competence and capability of their adversaries, than because of their 
efforts and actions. Additionally, the cases in this period demonstrate that irregulars 
might fail at first, but succeed over time if their opponent’s goals or commitment change 
going forward. Finally, the seven cases reviewed in this period reveal that perceptions of 
legitimacy and popular opinion influence support and the will to win.   
Irregular warfare evolved from the post-WWII period as early as 1948; Western 
ideals clashed with Marxist–Leninist thought, igniting new tensions and irregular 
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conflicts around the world. Max Boot refers to this period of irregular warfare as 
“Radical Chic” due to the rise of leftist revolutionaries.349 Though, the cases in this 
chapter revealed that the irregular’s motivations were not all that different from their 
predecessors.  The conflicts in this era often arose due to weak or corrupt governance and 
the desire for political, economic, and social change.   
Again, like the previous period, internal irregular conflicts in this era were 
symmetrically motivated. This revealed that political and psychological costs are not as 
influential when commitments and motivations are symmetrical. In other words, when 
the irregular’s motivation and commitment is equal to their adversary’s, the conflict will 
likely be long, bloody, and expensive.  
Unlike the previous era, though, external actors provided more pronounced 
support and influence in the internal irregular conflicts in this era. The cases in this thesis 
revealed that the weak succeeded during this period either because external support was 
provided to them, because their adversary lost external support, or because the 
international community intervened in the interest of human rights.  Beyond this, though, 
popular opinion and support remained significant factors driving motivation and the will 
to fight in these irregular conflicts.  
This second period of irregular warfare illuminated three important points.  First, 
external support is crucial for the weak, but it does not explain their success.  Second, 
“silver bullets” may not exist, but the introduction of specific technology into irregular 
warfare may enable irregulars to change conflict dynamics enough to enable their 
success. Finally, this period demonstrates that the fight will invariably continue as long as 
grievances exist, the irregulars stay motivated, and can evade their opponent.   
The collapse of the Soviet Union and the fall of the Berlin Wall shaped the 
context and conduct of irregular warfare once again. The prevalence of ethnic, racial, and 
religious tensions and violence shaped irregular warfare throughout the 1990s. Several 
significant trends emerged during this period such as the rise of religiously motivated 
                                                 
349 Boot, Invisible Armies, 397–399.  
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global terrorism and the growth of communications technology. This period evolved 
again after al-Qaeda’s 2001 terrorist attacks, the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, and the 
2003 invasion of Iraq. This most-recent period of irregular warfare is mostly defined by 
the influence of networks and the importance of popular opinion.  
The most recent cases, such as the 2006 Lebanon War and al-Qaeda’s war against 
the West, are defined by complexity and convergence. In particular, the way people 
communicate and consume information has changed, providing irregulars greater access 
to wider audiences.  Furthermore, this period revealed that states, such as Iran and Syria, 
are increasingly using proxies like Hezbollah, to deter, disrupt, and defeat other states.350 
This suggests that irregulars are increasingly capable of competing with, defeating, and 
coercing the strong in a multi-polar world.  
The evidence from the third period of irregular warfare revealed that motivation 
could be divided between internal irregular conflicts that are symmetrically motivated 
and irregular conflicts with external powers characterized by asymmetric motivations. 
Though, explaining why the weak won during this period was difficult to conclude; three 
conflicts remain unresolved, one ended in a draw, irregulars prevailed in one, and the 
strong prevailed in the other.  Nevertheless, the six cases reviewed in this period suggest 
that conflicts do not have to end, and the weak do not have to win, for irregulars to 
succeed.  
This period also demonstrated that modern nation states could still employ brutal 
and violent methods as long as they can control the narrative and the flow of information. 
Additionally, this period revealed that peace is temporary when grievances are not fully 
addressed. Finally, the evidence from this period suggests that the Internet, narratives, 
and ideas may be the most effective weapons enabling irregular success.  
                                                 
350 Frank G. Hoffman, “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges,” Joint Force Quarterly 52, no. 1st Quarter 
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A. FACTORS ENABLING IRREGULAR SUCCESS 
The cases reviewed in this thesis also reveal several mechanisms that enabled 
irregular success. These mechanisms are not significant enough to explain fully why 
irregulars win when they do.  Instead, they are best considered as accelerators that create 
better conditions for irregulars to achieve success.  These accelerators are the Internet, 
international organizations, movement brokers or entrepreneurs, and existing social and 
political fractures.  
The Internet has significantly altered the practice of irregular warfare. Technology 
and the Internet have enabled irregulars, to reach larger and more distant audiences, at a 
faster rate. As the cases in this thesis demonstrate, irregulars can use the Internet for 
propaganda purposes, to wage political warfare, to recruit members and build popular 
support, to raise funds, to plan and coordinate operations and activities, to collect 
intelligence, and to deceive their opponents. Never before have singular actors and minor 
groups had access to diverse audiences and the ability to shape the perceptions and 
opinions of millions of people worldwide. Clay Shirky notes, “As the communications 
landscape gets denser, more complex, and more participatory, the networked population 
is gaining even greater access to information, more opportunities to engage in public 
speech, and an enhanced ability to undertake collective action.”351  In other words, we 
are just beginning to fully appreciate the impact communications technology and the 
Internet will have on the future of irregular warfare.  
The strong no longer have a monopoly on information; neither can they isolate 
their populations from the reality of war or the ideas and influence of radicals and fringe 
groups. This makes the strong more susceptible to the irregulars’ propaganda and 
subjects their cause and actions to greater scrutiny. In effect, these cases demonstrate that 
irregulars are increasingly able to exploit their opponent’s actions against them, 
specifically by challenging the legitimacy of their actions and the justice of their cause. 
Thus, as Hezbollah and al-Qaeda’s use of the media demonstrate, irregular warfare may 
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be becoming less of a political exercise and more of a social practice.352 Additionally, as 
the Cuban Revolution, the Vietnam War, and the 2006 Lebanon War demonstrate, 
traditional media such as television and radio have a significant impact on shaping 
international perceptions of irregular conflicts. In other words, irregulars do not necessary 
need to coerce or compel their adversary’s government or military leadership. Irregulars 
can manipulate the Internet and the media to shape perceptions of the war to influence 
their adversary’s mass base to affect change. Unquestionably then, as recent evidence 
suggests, the media, the Internet, and communications technology are increasingly 
contributing to the success of irregular actors. 
Chapters III, IV, and V indicate that international and regional organizations with 
state-like powers have become increasingly powerful in enabling irregular success. These 
cases demonstrate that a strategy of internationalizing a conflict or engaging the wider 
global community in internal and regional affairs can be used to balance asymmetries in 
resources, capabilities, power, and even technology. Though, internationalizing a conflict 
is not a standalone strategy, as these intergovernmental organizations often have limited 
authority, resources, and will to intervene.353 Nevertheless, international organizations 
are willing to get involved when it is in their interests, as in the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict; when collective security is threatened, as in the War with al-Qaeda; or when 
atrocities are committed on a grand scale, as in El Salvador.354 Non-state actors used to 
rely on state-sponsors and brokers to elicit help and support from international and 
regional organizations. Now, though, as technology becomes increasingly smaller, 
cheaper, and easier to use, irregulars are not at the mercy of traditional journalists, change 
agents, and movement entrepreneurs to reach larger audiences and generate increased 
domestic and international support. Nonetheless, the cases in this thesis suggest that 
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sponsors and brokers are still important in enabling irregular success by building 
relationships, particularly between irregular groups and their adversary’s population.  
The irregular conflicts reviewed in this thesis reveal that sponsors and brokers 
such as Edward Lansdale or Charlie Wilson often serve as the catalyst of change and can 
mean the difference between success and failure for the weak. Just as strong-ties are 
important within networks—weak ties are important between networks.  Weak ties are 
significant because they cross group boundaries and bridge or connect members of 
different groups.355 Traditionally, irregulars were forced to rely on individuals with 
crosscutting ties between groups—such as journalists, college professors, businessmen, 
and civilian-soldiers or reservists, to link disparate groups.  Though, technology and the 
Internet have reduced the significance of some of these brokers in spreading ideas and 
narratives.  Nonetheless, the cases in this thesis demonstrate that brokers, change agents, 
and mobilization entrepreneurs still enable irregulars to mobilize greater resources that 
exist outside of their control. Put differently—in the absence of organic political and 
psychological warfare capabilities, non-state actors and weaker powers can employ 
brokers to coerce and compel their opponent, expand their tactical and organizational 
capabilities, spread their narrative and expand awareness, and bridge the gap between 
their organic capabilities and those of the wider international community.  
Brokers also help irregulars widen and increase existing fractures in their 
adversary’s government, society, and military. Several cases in this thesis reveal the 
significance of existing fractures in the government or society of the strong. Specifically, 
cases such as the Soviet-Afghan War reveal how fractures within existing political and 
socioeconomic processes can create organic opportunities for the weak.356 In other 
                                                 
355 Shin-Kap Han, “The Other Ride of Paul Revere: The Brokerage Role In the Making of the 
American Revolution,” Mobilization 14, no. 2 (2009): 143–62, 144; Peter Marsden, “Brokerage Behavior 
in Restricted Exchange Networks.” in Social Structure and Network Analysis, 1982, CA: Sage, 201–18. 
Marsden defines brokerage as a process “by which intermediary actors facilitate transactions between other 
actors lacking access to or trust in one another.” 
356 Doug McAdam, Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970, 2nd ed. 
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words, the weak have a clear advantage when the strong already suffer from political or 
social domestic unrest.  
Fractures can be created to change the dynamics. The Indonesian National 
Revolution, the First Indochina War, and the Cuban Revolution demonstrate that 
irregulars can create fractures with propaganda, by exploiting the media, and by 
increasing political and psychological costs for their adversary. Similarly, irregulars can 
provoke the strong into overreacting to exploit the injustice of their cause and actions.  As 
in the First Indochina War, this serves to create fractures and widen the divide between 
their opponent and their government, and their people. In effect, these fractures enable 
the irregulars to force their opponent to choose between continuing the war and risking 
the welfare of their nation.  
B. EXPLAINING IRREGULAR SUCCESS: 1945–2016 
The three periods indicate that there is no definitive typology of irregular warfare 
or singular answer for why irregulars succeed. Chapters III, IV, and V indicate that local 
culture and environment and regional and international dynamics uniquely shape each 
irregular conflict and actor. Thus, these cases, and the periods in which they occur, did 
not reveal any single reason why irregulars succeed, nor did it find any correlation 
between the irregular’s ideology, strategy, environment or capabilities to their success in 
irregular warfare. Though, these cases suggest that irregulars do not typically succeed 
militarily, only politically.357 Furthermore, the analysis of Part One indicates that four 
significant points or trends relate to irregular success.  
First, the evidence from Chapters III, IV, and V, as well as from comprehensive 
databases, shows that the weak have become increasingly more successful.358 
                                                 
357 Mandel, The Meaning of Military Victory, 14. In fact, “[A] classic error in warfare is to mistake 
military victory for political victory.”  
358 Jon Brunberg, “Colonial Wars,” Wars Since 1900, The Polynational War Memorial (2004-2013): 
http://www.war-memorial.net/wars_all.asp?tags=Colonial+Wars&submit=Find&q=3; Max Boot, “Invisible 
Armies Insurgency Tracker,” Council on Foreign Relations, 18 April 2013: http://www.cfr.org/wars-and-
warfare/invisible-armies-insurgency-tracker/p29917; Max Boot, Invisible Armies: An Epic History of 
Guerrilla Warfare from Ancient Times to the Present, 1st ed. (New York, NY: Norton, 2013), 559. Boot’s 
database of 443 irregular conflicts dating back to 1775 finds that irregulars are winning more frequently. 
 112 
Specifically, irregulars prevailed when asymmetric motivations existed by coercing and 
compelling their adversaries to quit. Irregulars, for the most part, accomplished this by 
raising the political and psychological costs of the war. Though, these cases also 
demonstrated that political coercion was more effective when irregulars petitioned and 
gained the support of other states, as well as, regional and international organizations.  In 
these terms, the irregulars co-opted the coercive power of these actors to force their 
adversary to leave.  
Second, these cases reveal that irregulars can succeed politically, and gain a better 
peace, even from a draw, after suffering military defeat or while locked in a stalemate.359 
For example, the FLN were defeated militarily but won politically, as did Hezbollah. 
Similarly, the PA achieved political success throughout the years during successive 
rounds of negotiations. They may not have achieved statehood, and the conflict is not 
over, but they have succeed politically and gained international recognition, credibility, 
and legitimacy. Finally, the PIRA demonstrated that irregulars could still prevail 
politically from a draw as long as they achieve a better peace.  
 Third, the evidence from these cases reveals that states that are totally motivated 
or committed, as in internal irregular conflicts, are not easily compelled or coerced to 
quit, even by other states and international organizations. In these situations, irregulars 
must find a way to survive repression and attrition, while eroding their opponent’s will to 
fight. To accomplish this, as these cases demonstrate, irregulars must consciously and 
relentlessly work towards political solutions such as negotiations. Though, they also 
reveal that it is a difficult process because negotiating presents several challenges for 
both the weak and the strong.  All parties need to be in agreement or the deal will not be 
honored, and it may cause a split in the group with the emergence of a more radical 
faction.  
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Negotiations often require a transformational leader such as Gerry Adams or 
Arafat; someone “who can imagine an end to the armed struggle, who has the physical 
and moral courage to pursue that path, who has won the respect of their comrades in the 
movement, who can speak with authority and act with discretion, and perhaps most 
important, who can bring his people along, whether by persuasion, intimidation, or 
force.”360 This is because states view negotiations as a slippery slope that rewards bad 
behavior.361 The Colombian conflict and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict reinforce this 
concept. Therefore, when irregulars cannot coerce or compel their adversary to quit, their 
success hinges on their ability to persuade and convince their adversary to negotiate.  
Finally, these periods demonstrate that irregulars succeed when motivations are 
both symmetrical and asymmetrical. When motivations are asymmetrical, irregular 
success hinges more on external perceptions and opinions. Conversely, when motivations 
are symmetrical, irregular success is more dependent upon domestic opinion and support. 
Ultimately then, the analysis from Chapters III, IV, and V indicates that irregular success 
and motivation appears related to public opinion and popular support. Nevertheless, this 
conclusion must be compared and contrasted with the arguments made by Andrew Mack, 
Ivan Arreguín-Toft, Jeffery Record, and Gil Merom.362 
1. Asymmetry of Strategy  
Arreguín-Toft claims that the weak win when the strong employ the opposite 
strategy of their opponent.363 More specifically, Arreguín-Toft argues that the weak win 
if they use an indirect strategy against their opponent’s direct strategy or a direct strategy 
against their indirect strategy.364 Ivan Arreguín-Toft defines the direct approach for the 
weak as the defense because it targets their adversary’s armed forces to destroy their 
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capacity to fight.365 Conversely, the weak can win with an indirect approach, defined as 
guerrilla warfare or terrorism, which seek to destroy an adversary’s will to fight.366 
Ultimately, Arreguín-Toft asserts that these strategies will enable the weak to force their 
adversary to abandon the fight to avoid increasing costs.367 The evidence in this thesis 
supports Arreguín-Toft’s theory, but it also reveals some flaws and shortcomings.  
The Mau Mau Uprising, the Malayan Emergency, the Soviet-Afghan War, and the 
First Chechen War support Arreguín-Toft’s strategic asymmetry theory.  In the case of 
the Mau Mau Uprising and the Malayan Emergency, the irregulars lost because the 
British successfully used an indirect approach that was not overly barbaric.  The British 
isolated the irregulars, hunted them down, and infiltrated their ranks with pseudo-gangs 
to defeat the irregulars. In these cases, the weak were not capable of establishing an 
effective defense against the British. Alternatively, the Mujahedeen and the Chechen 
Rebels demonstrated that they could defeat their adversary when they used an indirect 
approach against their opponents’ direct approach. Though, Russia also used mixed 
strategies that included barbarism in both cases.  Therefore, it is very difficult to attribute 
irregular success to strategy alone when multiple strategies are employed in the same 
conflict. In fact, the strong and the weak used mixed strategies in most conflicts reviewed 
in this thesis.  
Furthermore, the evidence presented indicates that the strong are not limited to 
barbarism as an indirect strategy alone; the strong can use other indirect strategies, such 
as COIN, to effect victory. Similarly, the weak can apply direct strategies other than the 
defense; strategic swarms, leadership targeting, ambushes, raids, and indirect fire can all 
be applied offensively against their opponent’s forces. Arreguín-Toft’s theory also does 
not account for political and psychological warfare strategies, nor does it address what 
                                                 
365 Ibid., 105. Ivan Arreguín-Toft defines direct approaches as those that target an adversary’s armed 
forces in order to destroy that adversary’s capacity to fight. The direct approach for the strong is the attack.  
He defines indirect approaches as those that seek to destroy an adversary’s will to fight. The indirect 
approach for the strong is barbarism. 
366 Ibid., 105.  
367 Ibid., 105.  
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happens when multiple strategies are used sequentially or simultaneously as in the 2006 
Lebanon War. Ultimately, Arreguín-Toft’s theory remains important, but it needs to be 
expanded and updated to account for additional types of strategic interaction such as 
political warfare and the application of mixed strategy.  
2. Asymmetry of Resources  
Jeffery Record looks at this topic from the opposite lens. Rather than asking why 
irregulars win, Record asks why states lose. Record suggests that the strong lose when 
irregulars impose military and political costs on them, thereby coercing them to quit.368 
He goes on to suggest that the strong lose when they suffer from a combination of poor 
strategic choice, a lack of political will or the inability to isolate the weak.369 Record 
concludes that external assistance enables the weak the most to succeed. Ultimately, the 
irregular conflicts reviewed in this thesis support this theory.   
It is very hard to distill reasons for irregular success across the three periods of 
time reviewed in this thesis. Nonetheless, there were a few factors that stood out in every 
case—external support and access to safe havens. In fact, Chapters III, IV, and V 
demonstrated that external support and access to safe havens is a necessary requirement 
for irregulars to succeed. Though, these cases also indicate that external support and 
access to safe havens are not uniformly important in every case, or in every period for 
that matter.  During the first period reviewed, the post-WWII era, irregulars, did not 
benefit as much from external support or safe havens.  In contrast to this, external 
support, and safe havens, in particular, was critical to the success of the weak during the 
mid-to late-Cold War era. This second period revealed, quite intuitively, that external 
support and safe havens are more important and critical to the irregular in internal 
                                                 
368 Record, Beating Goliath, vii.  
369 Record, Beating Goliath, xii. 24, 130. “External assistance can take many forms; from political 
support, to provision of money, to supply of arms, military advice and territorial sanctuaries and the 
introduction of foreign military forces;” Ben Connable and Martin C. Libicki, How Insurgencies End 
(Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2010), xvii, 34–40. Similar to Record, Connable and Libicki argue that 
irregular success is determined by access to safe havens that shield irregular actors from their adversaries. 
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irregular conflicts. On top of this, the cases in this thesis also suggest that significance of 
external support and assistance is dependent upon the nature of the environment.  
The jungles of Vietnam and the mountains of Afghanistan made safe havens less 
critical than in the Middle Eastern or Rhodesia. Additionally, these cases demonstrate 
that quality, rather than quantity matters in relation to external support provided to the 
irregulars. For example, the ZANU and ZAPU received a great deal of support and 
training from Cuba, the Soviet Union, and the Chinese. Though, this support achieved 
little more than increasing ideological fractures and capabilities amongst the rebels. 
Conversely, the United States provided some financial aid and advisory support to 
Magsaysay and modest aid and advisory support to the Mujahedeen. In both cases, even 
this limited support had a tremendous effect on the Huks and the Soviet Union.  
3. Asymmetry of Violence  
Merom’s asymmetry of violence theory suggests that the state cannot match the 
irregular’s level of violence without inciting moral outrage.370 Specifically, Merom 
asserts that members of the educated elite, students, and citizen-soldiers are responsible 
for shifting focus from the war to the “free marketplace of ideas.”371 Therefore, Merom 
concludes that the weak win because they can afford to be more violent as they have 
more at stake if they lose.372 In other words, the weak win because the strong surpass 
their population’s violence threshold and lose domestic support for the war against the 
weak.  
Several cases reviewed in this thesis support Merom’s argument.  Specifically, the 
First Indochina War, the Algerian War of Independence, and the Vietnam War were 
irregular conflicts in which the strong lost domestic support for their brutality against the 
weak. In each of these cases, educated elite, students, and military reservists were 
                                                 
370 Gil Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars: State, Society, and the Failures of France in 
Algeria, Israel in Lebanon, and the United States in Vietnam (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), 75, 230–231.  
371 Ibid., 20, 22. Merom defines the “normative difference” as the difference between the cost of war 
and what objectives and methods are morally acceptable.  
372 Ibid., 11. 
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responsible for shifting the focus away from the war to the “free marketplace of ideas.” 
Similarly, this was also used to legitimize violence against the weak.  
The Russians demonized the Chechen rebels as terrorists to ensure domestic 
support for their campaign to reclaim Chechnya. Also, the United States uses the label of 
terrorism to shape perceptions of ongoing operations, to continue overseas contingency 
operations fifteen years after invading Afghanistan. As these two examples prove, and 
Andrew Erdmann suggests, nations can often continue to fight when costs are perceived 
as proportional to the interests at stake.373 Therefore, Merom’s argument is only 
significant when the domestic population determines that the costs are not worth the 
benefits.  
Similarly, this thesis found that Merom’s argument is limited when commitment 
and motivation are symmetrical between adversaries and when wars are internal to a 
state.374 In effect, costs will continue to mount unrestrained when both sides are totally 
motivated. These again suggest that popular support and opinion matter more than the 
actual costs incurred; costs are relative to interests and their perceived importance—not 
by the government, but by the domestic population.  
4. Asymmetry of Interest  
Andrew Mack argued in Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars that victory in 
irregular warfare boils down to political will.  Essentially, if the will to fight is destroyed, 
“then its military capacity—no matter how powerful—is totally irrelevant.”375 Mack 
went on to claim that the weak have more to lose and are therefore more politically 
determined to win than the strong whose survival or sovereignty is not threatened.376 
Mack concluded that irregulars must win by imposing a steady accumulation of political 
and psychological “costs” on their opponent to destroy their opponent’s will to fight.377 
                                                 
373 Erdmann, “The U.S. Presumption of Quick, Costless Wars,” 64.  
374 Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars, 11, 75.  
375 Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars,” 179. 
376 Ibid., 181–182. 
377 Mack, “Why Big Nations Lose Small Wars,” 185. 
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Furthermore, Mack adds that rising costs produce internal dissent and moral outrage, 
which drive motivation down. Though, this cases reviewed in this thesis indicate that this 
is not always true, particularly in the Salvadoran Civil War and Colombia conflict.  
This thesis found that irregulars only defeated their opponents’ will by imposing 
political and psychological costs in three of the nine conflicts won by the weak.  The Viet 
Minh, the FLN, and the DRV (of note, this includes Ho Chi Minh’s forces twice and the 
FLN, many of whom fought with the French in Indochina and learned from the Viet 
Minh) compelled their adversaries to quit as a result of rising costs. In addition to these 
three conflicts, the Netherlands, the British, and the Israelis were affected by rising 
political and psychological costs. Though in these cases, the costs were not imposed 
directly by the weak, but by external third parties such as the United States, and 
international organizations such as the United Nations, or regional organizations such as 
the NATO or the Arab League.  
Therefore, the irregular conflicts presented in this thesis indicate that Mack may 
have hit on something significant without fully developing how irregulars manipulate 
motivation and the will to win. Mack’s argument for rising costs and moral outrage 
suggest that other forces are directly responsible for driving political will. Specifically, 
the evidence in this thesis suggests that there is more to be said about political and 
psychological costs and their impact on motivation.  
5. Asymmetry of Motivations 
The theory of asymmetric motivation suggests that success is related to the 
importance of an actor’s goals and their commitment to achieving them compared to that 
of their adversary.  In other words, the weak win when their goals and commitment are 
total, and their opponents are both limited.  This theory parallels Andrew Mack’s theory 
of interest asymmetry in that actors are more committed and willing to endure high costs 
when they face existential threats. It logically follows, as a general rule, that the strong 
pursue limited goals in irregular warfare, as the threat to them is by definition not 
existential. Thus, this theory suggests that weak most often succeed politically because 
the strong cannot fully mobilize the resources or the political will to exterminate the 
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weak. Furthermore, the strong eventually quit irregular conflicts because they cannot 
politically, economically, and socially afford to fight protracted wars against elusive 
irregulars that refuse to fight according to international laws and conventional norms. In 
other words, the weak win unless they are completely annihilated by the strong.  
This theory suggests that irregulars are most successful when they can compel or 
coerce their adversary to negotiate terms for peace, abandon their cause, or at the very 
least, delay or deter further aggression.378  Furthermore, because few options are 
available to the characteristically weaker irregular—they are forced to pursue indirect 
strategies that result in protracted conflicts. Therefore, the goal of the irregular is “to 
destroy not the capacity, but the will” of the adversary.379 This is achieved by employing 
indirect strategies against their adversary’s forces, their government, and their population. 
This, in turn, raises the costs of the war, widens existing fractures, and convinces 
domestic audiences that the war is undesirable to erode their motivation and will to fight.  
The cases in this thesis demonstrate that irregulars have a significant advantage 
when their adversary is limitedly committed. Eleven of the seventeen cases of irregular 
warfare reviewed in this thesis exhibited asymmetric motivations. Within these eleven 
conflicts, irregulars succeeded seven times. Though, the cases in this thesis also revealed 
that irregulars prevail when motivations are symmetrical. Six of the seventeen cases 
reviewed in this thesis exhibited symmetrical motivation. Irregulars prevailed in three of 
these six instances—the Cuban Revolution, the Rhodesian Bush War, and the Salvadoran 
Civil War. Furthermore, irregulars achieved measurable political success in the Israeli-
                                                 
378 Patrick C. Bratton, “When Is Coercion Successful? And Why Can’t We Agree on It?,” Naval War 
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379 S. Kalyanaraman, “Conceptualisations of Guerrilla Warfare,” Strategic Analysis 27, no. 2 (June 
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Palestinian conflict and the Irish Troubles.380 Therefore, irregular success is not 
dependent on asymmetric motivations alone, but motivation in general.  
6. Why Irregulars Succeed When They Do 
Irregulars can succeed politically by negotiating or by coercing or compelling 
their adversary to quit—even when they are locked in a stalemate or after suffering a 
military defeat. The evidence presented in Chapters III, IV, and V indicates that several 
conditions contribute to the success of irregulars: major geopolitical events; regional and 
local political and social dynamics; and their adversary’s capabilities. These chapters also 
suggest that several factors enable irregulars to succeed: the Internet, international and 
regional organizations; movement brokers; and existing social and political fractures. 
Furthermore, Chapters III, IV, and V also found that Andrew Mack’s, Ivan Arreguín-
Toft’s, Jeffery Record’s, and Gil Merom’s arguments are compelling and explain why 
irregulars win when they do to a limited extent.381 Similarly, the success of irregulars is 
not always explained by asymmetric motivations. Ultimately then, this chapter concludes 
that no single condition, factor or explanation fully explains why irregulars win when 
they do. This is not to say that motivation is irrelevant or of little explanatory value. 
The cases reviewed in Chapters III, IV, and V, and the analysis presented in this 
chapter, suggest that the will to win remains central in understanding irregular success. 
Irregulars can prevail when motivations are symmetrical and when they are 
asymmetrical. Their success appears to hinge on their ability to erode their opponent’s 
will to fight by swaying opinions and shaping popular support. Therefore, this thesis 
suggests that the centrality of motivation to irregular success is relative to, and dependent 
upon public opinion and popular support. In other words, public opinion and popular 
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support determine one’s motivation and will to fight. Perhaps then, asymmetry of opinion 
best explains why irregulars win when they do.  
This concludes Part One of this thesis. Part Two will consider two classic 
irregular wars in greater detail: the Algerian War of Independence and the Vietnam War. 
The second part of this thesis will trace motivations over the duration of each conflict to 
show how motivations fluctuate and to reveal the antecedent conditions that influence 
motivations. Then this thesis will evaluate these conditions, to determine how the 
irregulars influenced intrinsic motivations, as well as, extrinsic motivations.  This will 
serve to explain how the weak prevail in irregular conflicts when they do.  
C. NOTES ON CASE SELECTION FOR PART TWO 
The Algerian War of Independence and the Vietnam War are chosen for the 
analysis of motivation in Part Two of this thesis. These conflicts are chosen because clear 
asymmetry of motivations existed between the weak and the strong and because the weak 
won in both instances. These conflicts are also chosen based on the characteristics of the 
strong and the weak. The United States and France are both wealthy republics with open 
societies. Additionally, both countries have similar socioeconomic dynamics with highly 
educated middle classes and professional militaries. These similarities are important as 
they reduce the number of variables that may obscure the significance of motivation or 
the other factors considered. Still, there is variation between the two cases; the conflicts 
took place in different geographic areas amongst different cultures for different reasons; 
France was trying to subjugate Algeria while the United States was trying to keep South 
Vietnam free.  
It could be argued that more relevant conflicts exist and should take precedence in 
this analysis. In fact, there are; the war with al Qaeda and the War in Donbass are two 
irregular conflicts that best represent current trends in irregular warfare. Although, 
tracing motivations in these conflicts and trying to extrapolate how and why irregulars 
win is too premature at this juncture in time as both conflicts continue to this day.  To the 
point, the Algerian War of Independence and the Vietnam War are extensively 
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researched and documented and offer the clearest contemporary examples of asymmetry 
of motivations in irregular warfare.  
Finally, most of the factors influencing irregular warfare since 1945 are found in 
these conflicts. Both conflicts were protracted struggles that started slowly, years before 
violence broke out.  The weak were also totally motivated, while the strong were 
limitedly committed in both conflicts. Additionally, external support and safe havens 
were significant factors that shaped both conflicts.  Further, various strategies were used 
by both sides in each war; direct attack, defense, barbarism, terrorism, guerrilla warfare, 
psychological warfare, and political warfare were used by the strong and the weak at 
different points of time in each conflict with drastically different results.  These conflicts 
were also influenced by the media and shaped by domestic events.  Although both 
conflicts predate the Internet and social media, both do highlight the significance of 
popular support and its relationship to motivation and war termination.   
Ultimately, these conflicts and the lessons they contain remain relevant today.  
There is little “new” about irregular warfare in the post-Cold War Era. The advances in 
technology and the changes within the Human Domain only serve to exacerbate existing 
conditions, factors, and effects. In other words, the Internet may make it easier to recruit 
and influence opinions, and irregulars may be able to destroy a tank easier with an anti-
tank guided missile, but these are not true revolutions in military affairs.  These advances 
in technology merely make it easier for the irregulars to operate at a faster rate in larger 
spaces at greater distances. Therefore, the Algerian War of Independence and the 
Vietnam War are evaluated in Part Two to determine how motivations fluctuate and how 





VII. THE ALGERIAN WAR OF INDEPENDENCE 
The Algerian War of Independence is a classic irregular war fueled by 
nationalism, religion, and ethnicity. Like many irregular conflicts, the Algerian War of 
Independence was fueled by the desire for self-determination and independence. 
Furthermore, communist sentiments clashed with nationalist ideals, and great disparities 
existed between the belligerents’ size, capability, and strength. Additionally, like several 
other irregular conflicts, such as the Indonesian National Revolution and the First 
Indochina War, clear asymmetries existed between the limited goals and motivation of 
the French and the total goals and motivation of the FLN. Also, as in these previous wars, 
the weak won politically; they compelled and coerced the French to leave Algeria. 
Finally, several significant factors that shaped irregular warfare during this period are 
found in this conflict: external support, the media, and political and psychological costs, 
are present in this case.   
The war between the French and the Algerians began in 1954 and concluded in 
1962. Initially, the Front de Liberation Nationale (FLN) was totally committed while 
France was limitedly committed during the eight-year conflict.382 Outnumbered, ill-
equipped, and untrained, the Algerian irregulars initially conducted hit and run attacks 
against the French.383  They recognized early though, that they could not defeat France 
militarily, so the FLN focused their efforts indirectly on France’s critical 
vulnerabilities—its’ war-weary populace and its’ legitimacy in Algeria. In the end, 
despite nearly being annihilated in 1959, the FLN succeeded in politically defeating 
France.    
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The FLN accomplished this by internationalizing and politicizing their cause, to 
bring international pressure on France, and to delegitimize France’s claim to Algeria. 
Second, the FLN expanded their propaganda campaign to draw attention to the French 
military’s brutality and atrocities. Next, the FLN used terrorism against European 
Algerians and domestic French citizens to widen the fractures between the Fourth French 
Republic, the French army, and the French population. As a result, the FLN successfully 
undermined France’s motivation and persuaded them that their goals were not worth the 
effort. Ultimately, after a bloody and protracted six-year-long conflict, the FLN 
compelled the French to leave Algeria altogether in 1962.384 In effect, the FLN were able 
to shape their adversary’s behavior by manipulating their motivation, while also 
sustaining their intrinsic motivation throughout the war.   
This chapter will trace the FLN’s and France’s commitment and motivation 
throughout the Algerian War of Independence to discover how the asymmetry of 
motivations affected the outcome of the war. To this end, the motivation assessment 
framework from Chapter II will be applied to this case. By looking at changes to the 
actor’s narrative and goals, changes in their force size, changes in the breadth and depth 
of their operations, and changes in their willingness to accept costs and risk, it becomes 
apparent that motivations fluctuated for both the French and the Algerians during the war 
(see Figure 1). Finally, the FLN’s actions will be considered in greater detail to illuminate 
the ways and means irregulars used to shape intrinsic and extrinsic motivation.  
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Figure 1.  Motivation in the Algerian War of Independence 
A. EVALUATING MOTIVATION IN THE WAR 
The Algerian Nationalists’ commitment and motivation grew significantly in 
1937 after Messali Hadj organized the Parti du Peuple Algerien (PPA, Algerian People’s 
Party).385 Additionally, the Algerian Nationalists’ commitment and motivation continued 
to climb following World War II, particularly after the Sétif massacre.386 Eventually the 
FLN formed in 1954, after France failed to institute economic and political reforms or 
grant basic rights to the Algerians.387 
The Algerian War of Independence officially began on All Saints Day, November 
1, 1954. It was on this day that the FLN first demonstrated their commitment and resolve 
by issuing a list of demands and declaring their right to self-determination. As the 
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Proclamation was issued, the Armée de Libération Nationale (ALN, the militant wing of 
the FLN), executed seventy pre-planned terrorist attacks throughout Algeria.388 Based on 
this, the FLN’s commitment at the beginning of the war was total; they were fully 
committed to their pursuit of independence.     
In contrast to this, France was only limitedly committed to preserving Algérie 
française in 1954.389 The French were overextended at the time; they were dealing with 
nationalist uprisings in Morocco and Tunisia and the French army was withdrawing from 
Indochina after a crushing defeat. Additionally, as Galula recounts, the “[M]ajority of 
French people hated to contemplate the prospect of another long, drawn out war, in 
Algeria or anywhere else.”390 For this reason, the French began the war with limited 
commitment toward Algeria. Although, France’s commitment and motivation toward the 
Algerian War of Independence grew rapidly in the following months.   
For the French, Algeria was a domestic issue; as Laqueur notes, “Algeria was not 
a colony but part of metropolitan France, the distance from Algiers to Marseille was no 
greater than from Marseille to Lille.”391 Thus, by 1955, French and Algerian 
commitment significantly shifted as French motivation increased rapidly and FLN 
motivation began to waver. The FLN suffered from internal division and disagreement 
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between its leadership; there was a general lack of political direction for the country.392 
More specifically, there were problems within the FLN between the “external and 
internal delegations, problems with tribalism and cohesion, and problems between the old 
leadership (like Ben Bella) and new leaders who had moved up due to combat losses.”393 
In addition to being fractured, the FLN also remained relatively small, ill-equipped, and 
incapable. Also, the FLN’s initial attacks were largely ineffective, and the French were 
able to quell the violence relatively quickly.394 Nevertheless, these attacks also caught the 
French garrison troops in Algeria off guard. Alexander and Kieger note that as “FLN-
ALN raids and ambushes became more frequent and widespread in 1955, the inadequacy 
of the quality and quantity of forces available to counter them was starkly exposed.”395  
As a result, the French responded by increasing troop levels in 1955 and ultimately 
committed up to half a million French soldiers to the counterterror effort in Algeria.396  
By 1956, France’s commitment and motivation soared as they succeeded in 
isolating the FLN. The French largely cut the FLN off from internal and exterior support, 
established a home guard to protect outlying villages, and used air superiority to destroy 
FLN safe havens in the desert and mountain regions within Algeria.397 As a result, the 
FLN’s commitment and motivation declined.398  This did not last long; the FLN’s 
motivation began to recover from their initial losses in August of 1956 after their 
leadership met in the Soummam Valley. The “two key outcomes of this meeting were, 
first, the decision to internationalize the war and, second, the decision to launch an all-out 
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campaign in Algiers in the winter of 1956–57 to put European civilians, officials, police 
and gendarmes in constant fear for their lives.”399 This conference served to strengthen 
the FLN’s commitment and motivation as it solidified their goals and unified their 
leadership and operating procedures.  
In the fall of 1956, the French demonstrated increased commitment and 
motivation in the months following the Suez Crisis to regain their glory once more. By 
January 28, 1957, the French had initiated the Battle of Algiers.400 French motivation 
climbed with each success during the battle, particularly after annihilating the FLN 
organization and leadership in Algiers.401 Although the French military’s use of torture and 
accusations of war crimes began to sour French society, decreasing their will to persist in 
Algeria. In addition, the French Fourth Republic’s motivation suffered after their decision 
to mobilize thousands of reservists, which “[s]ent shock-waves through the body of 
French society.”402 The FLN’s motivation also suffered throughout 1957 as a result of 
France’s counterinsurgency campaign.  
The FLN bounced back later that year as their campaign to internationalize their 
cause began to take root. The FLN’s newspaper, the El Moudjahid, and an external 
broadcasting service, the Voix de l’Algerie, publicized the brutality of the French 
campaign in Algeria.403 The FLN also benefited from multiple publications that were 
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distributed to the French domestic population and the international community as well.404 
Additionally, the FLN continued to increase the political and psychological costs for the 
French government by exporting terrorism to France to demoralize the French public. As a 
result, France’s social and political will began to decrease.  
Despite swelling costs, the French military continued to be highly committed and 
motivated as they expanded counter-FLN operations throughout Algeria and into neighboring 
Tunisia and Morocco.405 Also, the French military began to take more risks with 
indiscriminate reprisal attacks, widespread use of torture, and massive air strikes on suspected 
FLN safe havens.406 This led to increased international pressure, particularly after then-
Senator John F. Kennedy’s epic speech to the United States Senate in 1957 titled 
Imperialism—The Enemy of Freedom, in which he denounced France’s actions in 
Algeria.407 Also, repeated hearings at the United Nations addressing the situation in Algeria 
were clear signals to the French government that the international community would not 
tolerate the war in Algeria much longer.  
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The Gouvernment Provisoire de la Republique Algerienne was established in Cairo in 
1958 with the support of the Arab League and the Soviet Union.408 This government in exile 
succeeded in bringing about more condemnation by the international community, 
particularly within the United Nations and the United States.409  Thus, by the end of 
1958, France’s political will and domestic motivation began a steady downward spiral. 
Capitalizing on this, the FLN exported their terrorism and violence to mainland France, 
spreading fear throughout Paris with a campaign known as the Café Wars.410 This led to 
the collapse of France’s Fourth Republic, and with it, France’s motivation to continue the 
fight in Algeria.   
In 1959, France’s motivation and commitment rose slightly after Charles de Gaulle 
and General Challe instituted a new policy and strategy that led to the military defeat of the 
FLN. Although, it was also during this time de Gaulle realized that “Algeria is costing us—to 
say the least—more than she is worth to us.”411 Soon thereafter, in September of 1960, 
121 French intellectuals published an open letter (Manifeste des 121), denouncing the French 
army’s actions and acknowledging the legitimacy of the Algerians’ cause. Thus, de Gaulle 
soon recognized that his people were no longer willing to tolerate the war in Algeria on moral 
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grew from 650 billion francs per year at the beginning of the conflict, to well over 925 billion a year by 
1956.   
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grounds and that negotiating with the FLN was necessary to spare France from spiraling 
further into chaos.412  
The French government’s decreasing commitment to the war in Algeria became 
evident with Charles de Gaulle’s 1959 radio broadcast, in which he offered the Algerians 
self-determination, mass amnesty for nationalists’ prisoners, and the commutation of all 
death sentences.413 As a result, a new divide emerged between the government, the 
colons, and General Challe’s loyal officers.414  A conspiracy coalesced, “it consisted of 
disgruntled professional soldiers, soured by Indochina and Suez, Gaullist (and Petainist) 
war veterans, supporters of Pujade and those whose persuasion was even further to the 
Fascist and anti-Semitic right.”415 Many of the French special units (particularly the 
Paras and the Legion) and the pieds noirs remained highly motivated to maintain Algérie 
Française—to restore their honor and protect the remaining Europeans residing in 
Algeria. Thus, with the outbreak of the second putsch in 1961, de Gaulle’s government faced 
a possible coup and civil war.416  
Amid escalating OAS violence in France and Algeria, the French government and 
the French populace began to lose their motivation and interests in maintaining Algérie 
française. With the exception of the OAS, and elements within the French Foreign 
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Legion and the Paras, by 1961, France’s commitment and motivation had totally 
collapsed. Conversely, the FLN’s motivation and commitment continued to grow as French 
soldiers began to depart Algeria, and the FLN gained formal recognition from the United 
Nations.417  Following the Evian Accords in 1962, the Algerians gained their independence.  
B. EFFECTS OF MOTIVATION ON THE OUTCOME OF THE WAR 
The asymmetry of motivations presented in Figure 1 reveals how commitment 
fluctuated over the course of the Algerian War of Independence. The FLN began the war 
completely committed to their goal of independence from France. Although, the FLN’s 
motivation and commitment wavered early in the conflict as they suffered heavy losses and 
setbacks. The FLN’s motivation and commitment recovered after they solidified their 
organizational structure, goals, and strategy during the 1956 Soummam Valley meeting. This 
was short lived as the FLN’s motivation and commitment suffered another devastating 
blow in 1957 during the Battle of Algiers, and later after the completion of the Morice 
line in 1958. Still, the Algerian nationalists remained largely motivated and committed 
and continued to motivate the Algerian populace and petition the international 
community. This effort was aided by the situation in France, Charles de Gaulle’s rise to 
power, and his public decision to grant the Algerian’s their independence.   
The French entered the war in Algeria with limited goals, and thus, were only 
limitedly committed. The French were incapable of fully committing to Algeria in 1954 as 
they were still withdrawing and recovering politically and economically from the First 
Indochina War. Nevertheless, the French reacted quickly to suppress the rising FLN violence 
and became very committed to protecting the pieds noirs and to preserving their political and 
economic interests in Algeria. By 1957, France had become very committed and their 
motivation soared with each victory over the FLN, particularly after the Battle of Algiers. The 
French domestic population’s commitment and motivation began to decrease during this 
period too with the publication of French brutality and torture in Algeria. This widened the 
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political and social fractures in France, and with increased economic strain, the Fourth French 
Republic collapsed in 1958.  
This brought the French government’s commitment and motivation to a new low. In 
contrast to this, the French military, particularly the French Foreign Legion and the Para’s, 
remained highly committed and motivated in Algeria. Though, after the second putsch, 
France’s motivation plummeted again. By the end of the war, the FLN’s motivation continued 
to grow while France’s commitment to Algeria dissipated. The next section of this chapter 
will examine the actions that influenced the FLN’s and France’s commitment and motivation.   
C. MANIPULATING INTRINSIC AND EXTRINSIC MOTIVATION 
The Algerian War of Independence is a significant case study as it relates to 
asymmetries of motivation. By all accounts, France defeated the FLN militarily, and at 
times, was fully capable of defeating them politically. The FLN eventually prevailed 
because France’s domestic situation deteriorated to the point that de Gaulle had to choose 
between continuing the war and risking the welfare of the Fifth French Republic. In other 
words, the French lost the war because the French populace and their government lost the 
motivation and the will to fight. The question is then, what did the FLN do to influence 
the motivation of the French public, their government, and their military to speed 
France’s departure from Algeria? Furthermore, what did the FLN do to sustain their 
intrinsic motivation over the course of the conflict?  
1. Manipulating Extrinsic Motivation 
Externally, the FLN employed several strategies and exploited several fractures and 
political opportunities to destroy their adversary’s motivation. Overall, the FLN’s decision to 
pursue their independence politically and psychologically enabled them to erode France’s 
political will to fight. In general, their decision in 1956 to internationalize their cause enabled 
them to bring the weight of the United States, the Arab League, and the United Nations to bear 
on France in support of their cause. Also, by appealing to the international community and 
gaining their approval, the FLN increased their credibility, legitimacy, and opened new 
opportunities for political and material support.   
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Second, the FLN’s decision to export the war to mainland France contributed 
significantly to changing the average French citizens’ perspective on the war. Also, by using 
terrorism and psychological warfare in France, the FLN succeeded in diverting the French 
government’s attention away from Algeria to their domestic situation instead. This strategy 
further decreased France’s motivation to continue the war in Algeria and drove the wedge 
deeper between the French populace and their government.  
Third, the FLN structured their narrative on the principle of “justice” instead of on 
land reform or “control” over resources or territory. It is a widely acknowledged fact that 
the FLN were equally as brutal and barbaric as the French military was. Nevertheless, the 
FLN won the information war by demonizing the French military and publicizing their 
war crimes while downplaying their own terrorist acts and branding their cause as 
righteous and legitimate. In effect, the FLN played on the morality of the French and the 
legitimacy of colonialism to defeat France’s political cause. In doing so, the FLN brought 
attention to the Algerian War and successfully modified the international community’s 
perspective regarding the situation in Algeria. Multiple external contributing factors led 
to the FLN’s success and the downfall of France in Algeria also. While the FLN 
influenced external motivations, in many regard, they also benefited from existing 
circumstances and political opportunities, and the actions of key brokers that bridged the 
gap between the FLN and other larger populations.   
Even before 1954, France was not in a position to wage a protracted war. 
Additionally, France weakened their political claim to Algeria and their national image 
by relying on overwhelming force to pacify their colonial subjects. In turn, the French 
population’s tolerance for their military’s brutality increasingly eroded on moral grounds. 
Despite the French government’s attempt to suppress news and information coming out 
of Algeria, French journalists, clergy, and disgruntled soldiers continued to expose the 
violence in Algeria and publicized the true nature of the war. As a result, by 1958, many 
individuals worldwide also began to take a stand against France’s actions in Algeria, 
placing additional pressure on the French government to find a way out of the war.  
The FLN also benefited and capitalized on two main political opportunities: the 
first putsch and the collapse of the Fourth French Republic, and the second putsch and the 
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political crisis that ensued. Ultimately, the internal political and economic fissures that 
first became a factor for France in 1954 only widened with growing financial costs and 
increased concern over France’s conduct in Algeria. By 1959, with the formation of the 
OAS, de Gaulle was forced to commit his full attention to regaining control of his 
country instead of on the war in Algeria. Though, the FLN also had to sustain their 
motivation. 
2. Manipulating Intrinsic Motivation 
The FLN took four deliberate steps that enabled them to sustain and improve their 
internal motivation over the course of the war. First, the FLN laid out clear goals and a 
vision for Algeria in their 1954 Proclamation; this stated their intentions, their end state, 
and offered the French a diplomatic solution. By doing this, the FLN built instant 
credibility and legitimacy, thereby increasing popular support for their cause.  
Second, the FLN addressed problems with its organizational design and internal 
structure during the 1956 Soummam Valley Conference. This conference succeeded in 
consolidating FLN leadership and restructured its network to increase security and 
survivability.418 This redesign also formalized the FNL’s organizational structure, roles, 
and areas of responsibility, which enable the group to improve their internal 
communication, coordination, and operational effectiveness.  
Third, the FLN used propaganda to convince Algerians, the French, and the 
international community of their resolve and the legitimacy of their cause. Finally, when 
the FLN recognized that they could not secure their independence from within Algeria, 
they formalized their external network and gained recognition and support from nation-
states, regional organizations, and international bodies. Of note, several movement 
entrepreneurs or brokers, such as journalists, educated elite, religious leaders, and former 
soldiers worked to shed light on Frances misdeeds and the plight of the Algerians. Their 
work significantly shaped the nature of the conflict, enabling the FLN to defeat the 
French politically.  
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Finally, the FLN succeeded in bringing the weight of the international community 
down on the French to persuade them that it would be better to quit than to continue their 
fight in Algeria. The FLN accomplished this with a political and psychological warfare 
strategy that increased their legitimacy and boosted international support for their cause, 
while simultaneously attacking and discrediting France’s colonial claim. Thus, the FLN 
succeeded in manipulating their adversary’s commitment and motivation by exploiting 
key political opportunities and existing fractures in French society. The next chapter will 
evaluate the asymmetry of motivations in the Vietnam War to determine how the 
Vietnamese Communists influenced intrinsic and extrinsic motivations. 
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VIII. THE VIETNAM WAR 
The Vietnam War is a timeless example of an irregular conflict characterized by 
asymmetric motivations and international intervention. Lasting more than a decade, the 
American portion of the Vietnam War was the “most brutal and most destructive guerrilla 
war in modern history.”419  Fundamentally, this was a protracted internal war between 
Hanoi and Saigon.420 Like several other irregular conflicts, the Vietnam War evolved 
into a regional conflict and a larger struggle between Communism and the West.421  
The Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese Communists exploited many of the 
same grievances found in other irregular conflicts, such as government corruption and 
abuse, as well as, land and economic reforms.422 Additionally, the outcome of this war 
was significantly influenced and shaped by several factors such as external support and 
access to safe havens.423 Furthermore, the various direct and indirect strategies used in 
this conflict will reveal the effect of strategic interaction on commitment and 
motivation.424 Finally, this case will demonstrate how the media influences popular 
sentiment, and how this factor influences commitment and motivation in irregular 
warfare.425  
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The Vietnam War was an irregular struggle with significant conventional 
interludes. This chapter will consider the Vietnam War as both an irregular conflict 
between the U.S. military and the Viet Cong (VC), and as a conventional war between 
the United States and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). Additionally, this 
chapter will study the Vietnam War within the context of the larger Cold War, between 
the United States and the People’s Republic of China and the Soviet Union.426  In doing 
so, it will be shown that asymmetry of motivations existed between the United States and 
the Vietnamese Communists.427  It will then be shown that the weak won by influencing 
intrinsic and extrinsic motivation. Furthermore, this chapter will reveal how the weak 
shaped and manipulated motivation.  
To understand how the Vietnamese communists defeated the United States, the 
motivational framework from Chapter II is applied to the American experience in the 
Vietnam War between 1963 and 1973. By looking at changes to the actor’s narratives and 
goals; changes in their force size; changes in the breadth and depth of their operations; 
and changes in their willingness to accept costs and risk, it will be shown that North 
Vietnam’s and the Viet Cong’s motivation remained high while United States 
commitment and motivation started very low, peaked in 1968, then declined and faded by 
1973 (see Figure 2). The next section of this chapter will evaluate the commitment and 
motivation of the Viet Cong and the United States over the course of the war.  
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Figure 2.  Motivation in the Vietnam War 
A. EVALUATING MOTIVATION IN THE WAR 
The struggle between the Vietnamese Communists and the United States was 
marked by great asymmetries of motivation. For many Vietnamese Communists, and the 
Viet Cong in particular, this was a protracted struggle that slowly began to take shape 
after the defeat and departure of the French, and Diem’s refusal to participate in 
nationwide elections.428  Thus, the North Vietnamese Communists and the Viet Cong’s 
(former Viet Minh) commitment and motivation to defeat Diem, to unify North and 
South Vietnam, began to grow as early as 1955. By 1960, the Viet Cong and NLF 
political cadre had heavily infiltrated South Vietnam.429  By 1962, the Viet Cong and the 
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National Liberation Front’s political cadre actively prepared the environment by co-opting 
organic social and political networks; harassing ARVN units; preaching to the peasants, and 
assimilating into local villages.430 Thus, by 1963, the Viet Cong’s commitment and 
motivation were very high as their control throughout the South continued to expand.  
Vietnam hardly registered with the American public until 1961.431 Although 
President Kennedy became increasingly concerned and committed to supporting Diem, 
he remained wary of his advisors and the experts who were pushing for more intervention 
in Vietnam, particularly after the Bay of Pigs fiasco.432  As a result, the United States’ 
military’s role remained limited to providing aid and advisory support to the GVN and 
the ARVN.433 Thus, the U.S. commitment and motivation in Vietnam was almost non-
existent in the early 1960s. As the Administration’s interest and concern grew, so too did 
its’ commitment and motivation.434  
Nineteen sixty-three proved to be a pivotal year. The Viet Cong launched their 
first significant attack against the ARVN during the Battle of Ap Bac.435 This battle was 
not only a military defeat for the ARVN but also, a political and psychological blow to 
Diem’s government. In response, Diem instituted strict population control measures, 
which alienated the local population and incited unrest and protest, particularly among 
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Buddhist Monks, several of whom resorted to public immolation.436 As Diem’s 
government grew unstable and his control more tenuous, President Kennedy adopted a 
neutral position toward Vietnam and moved to withhold further aid from Diem.437 
Unfortunately, with the assassination of President Kennedy later that year, the ascension 
of Lyndon Johnson brought increased United States involvement and commitment to 
South Vietnam.438 Still, the United States remained only partially committed to the war, 
despite President Johnson’s desire to contain the spread of communism in South 
Vietnam.439  
United States commitment and motivation changed significantly in 1964. At first, 
President Johnson’s policy was to “wait and see,” but the President became more 
committed to expanding operations in Vietnam after hostilities increased between 
American advisors and Communist forces.440 The Gulf of Tonkin “incident” provided 
President Johnson with the required justification he was looking for.441 The President not 
only received Congressional approval to expand operations, but Gallup polls show that 
the majority of the American public supported him as well.442 At the same time, the Viet 
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Cong and NLF cadre continued to exert increased control over Southern hamlets, 
enabling them to expand their guerrilla operations against the U.S. military and the 
ARVN. 
The Republic of Vietnam continued to suffer internal political divisions 
throughout 1965, and the U.S. government grew concerned after a second coup deposed 
Khanh for General Minh.443  To make up for this political and military weakness in 
South Vietnam, U.S. commitment increased significantly as the U.S. military assumed 
more operational responsibility in 1965.444 The U.S. military increased its’ footprint from 
just over fifteen thousand advisors to 184,000 combat troops.445 President Johnson also 
authorized and launched a massive bombing campaign in North Vietnam: Operation 
Rolling Thunder.446 In response, the Viet Cong increased their attacks and infiltrated 
additional guerrillas and resources into the South.447 Furthermore, Giap moved large 
conventional army divisions into South Vietnam, to force the U.S. military and the 
ARVN to fight a two front war—an insurgency throughout the South and a conventional 
war against the NVA.448 On top of this, fractures began to emerge in the United States 
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million, and Johnson approved U.S. forces to engage in offensive combat operations. The U.S. military began to 
search and destroy operations, and by the end of 1965, 55,000 sorties were flown and 22,000 tons of bombs had 
been dropped. 
447 Boot, Invisible Armies, 420. By the end of 1965, there were over 134,000 Communist regulars and 
guerrillas in the South. Asprey, War in the Shadows. 1143. Soviet aid to the communist movement in the 
South increased in 1965 to $500 million. The Viet Cong also mounted large-scale attacks throughout the South, 
particularly around Binh Gai, Saigon, Song Be, Danang, Dong Xai, Chu Lai, Plei Mei, and in the Ia Drang Valley.  
448 Robert B. Asprey, War in the Shadows: Guerrillas in History (New York: W. Morrow, 1994), 
1100;  Vo Nguyen Giap, People’s War People’s Army-The Viet Cong Insurrection Manual for 
Underdeveloped Countries (New York, NY: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967), xix. Guerrillas usually are 
effective “when the main body of their enemy is otherwise engaged, and, two, when they operate in a 
country of isolated communities—as in Southeast Asia today.”  
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due to the U.S. military’s expanded role in Vietnam, the inequitable implementation of 
the draft, and the Civil Rights Movement.449 
By 1966, General Westmoreland’s “search and destroy” strategy and President 
Johnson’s “Rolling Thunder” had failed to destroy the Viet Cong and the communist 
influence in South. In fact, this strategy only served to destroy civilian infrastructure, 
increase human suffering and loss of life, and boosted internal and external support for 
the Communists.450  As a result, the U.S. began to adopt a more robust pacification 
strategy and implemented the Chieu Hoi amnesty program.451 Domestically though, 
public support decreased significantly as a result of continued instability in the 
Government of South Vietnam, the Fulbright hearings, and the Buddhist protests in 
1966.452 Specifically, the Fulbright hearings exposed the American public to 
Congressional and elite criticism of the war.453 Furthermore, the Buddhist revolts 
changed American perceptions of the war and challenged the justification of the 
Administration’s containment policy.454 Regardless, the Johnson administration 
continued to press forward, committing more troops and resources despite growing 
domestic dissent.  
                                                 
449 Mary Susannah Robbins, ed., Against the Vietnam War: Writings by Activists (Syracuse, NY: 
Syracuse University Press, 1999), 20. “Some of the first signs of opposition in the United States to the 
Vietnam War came out of the civil rights movement—perhaps because the experience of the black people 
with the government led them to distrust any claim that it was fighting for freedom.” The day Johnson was 
telling the nation about the Gulf of Tonkin incident and announcing his campaign to bomb North Vietnam, 
black and white activists were gathering in Mississippi at a memorial service when “One of the speakers 
pointed bitterly to Johnson’s use of force in Asia, comparing it with the violence used against Blacks in 
Mississippi.;” Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars, 234.  “President Johnson relied on draftees and 
enlisters, sharply limited the call-up of reservists and National Guardsmen, and (unlike Korea) used both 
sparingly because of his fears of consequences of acting otherwise…a system of deferments and 
exemptions protected the sons of the educated middle-class.”  
450 Boot, Invisible Armies, 417–420; Asprey, War in the Shadows, 1143. Soviet aid increased to 
almost one billion dollars in 1966.  
451 Asprey, War in the Shadows, 1127.  
452 Eric V. Larson, Casualties and Consensus: The Historical Role of Casualties in Domestic Support 
for U.S. Military Operations (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 1996), 24.  
453Sheldon Appleton, “The Public, the Polls, and the War,” Vietnam Perspectives 1, no. 4 (May 1966), 
7. 
454 Asprey, War in the Shadows, 1171; Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars, 235. “By early 
1966, the Vietnam War had become a dominant public issue.”  
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By 1967, the United States had spent twenty-five billion dollars on the war effort, 
and over five hundred thousand soldiers had deployed to Vietnam.455 The U.S. 
Administration reported to the American public at the time that the Communists were 
losing and the end was in sight.456 Unfortunately, these claims served to reduce the 
Administration’s credibility, as the war raged on and costs continued to climb without 
achieving any real progress.457 Additionally, the American public’s support for the war 
began to decrease as the country became more divided due to the anti-war movement.458  
Furthermore, the growing Chinese presence in North Vietnam deterred the U.S. 
government and restrained the U.S. military’s ability to cut the Communists off from 
external support and access to safe havens.459 The Viet Cong during this time received 
reinforcements to make up for their losses, enabling them to continue to resist and disrupt 
the U.S. military and the ARVN.460 Therefore, U.S. commitment was beginning to reach 
its limits as internal fractures began to emerge, while the Viet Cong’s commitment and 
motivation continued to soar despite battlefield losses.  
                                                 
455 Asprey, War in the Shadows, 1178.  
456 Ibid., 1189–1193. In 1967, U.S. forces had 9,000 killed in action, suffered 60,000 wounded, and had lost 
1,822 planes and 1,416 helicopters. Westmoreland was reporting that the Viet Cong’s casualty rate was nearly 
1700 a week, infiltration from the North was down to 12,000, and Viet Cong recruitment in the South was down 
from 7,000 to 3,500 a month. 
457 Carroll, “The Iraq-Vietnam Comparison.” Gallup polls found that President Johnson’s approval 
rating fell from 57% in January 1966 to 27% in August of 1967. 
458 Larson, Casualties and Consensus, 59–60. Escalation sentiments peaked in 1966 and began to 
decline by1967. Furthermore, withdraw sentiment among the American public increased from 1966 to 
1970; Robbins, Against the Vietnam War, 20–24. Student organizations around the country turned out against 
the war in protest. Additionally, the Catholic Church became outspoken critics of the war in 1967. Specifically, 
Father Philip Berrigan joined artist Tom Lewis and committed acts of civil disobedience in the United States. 
459 Boot, Invisible Armies, 425. China’s presence kept the U.S. from invading the North or Laos to either 
defeat the North Vietnamese regime outright or at least cut the Viet Cong off from their line of support. By 1967 
the Chinese had 170,00 troops in the North. Summers, On Strategy, 57. “The Chinese exploded their first 
nuclear device on 16 October 1964, just as our involvement in Vietnam began to escalate.”  This changed 
the nature of the conflict and made the U.S. government more concerned about Chinese intervention and 
confrontation with a nuclear power.  
460 Boot, Invisible Armies. By the end of 1967, there were over 280,000 Vietnamese Communist, to 
include NVA regulars and Viet Cong guerrillas in the south. 
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Both Viet Cong and American commitment peaked in 1968 during the Tet 
Offensive.461 Tet was a tactical defeat for the Communists; it nearly wiped out the Viet 
Cong and damaged their intrinsic motivation.462  At the same time, Tet was also a 
strategic win for the North Vietnamese Communists. The size of Tet shocked the U.S. 
and convinced the American public that the Administration was not honest about U.S. 
progress in Vietnam; increasing doubt that the war could be won militarily.463 As a 
result, political tension increased to the extent that President Johnson decided that he 
would not run for a second term, and General Abrams was chosen to replace General 
Westmoreland.464 While Tet brought the war to the forefront of U.S. domestic concern, it 
had failed to evoke a widespread communist uprising in the South.465 As the United 
States grew increasingly divided over Vietnam, the Vietnamese Communists also found 
themselves trying to reassure the NVA and the Viet Cong to have patience and not to be 
discouraged by their losses from the Tet Offensive.466 Thus, both the Vietnamese 
                                                 
461 Ibid., 423. Giap launched a surprise attack with 84,000 fighters. This was another costly defeat for 
Giap: 37,000 communists were killed, and 5,800 were captured, while only 1,001 American and 2,082 
South Vietnamese troops were killed. But this was a major political and psychological win for the 
Communists. 
462 Oberdorfer, Tet!, 329. A wave of dismay was swept over the Communists. “The Viet Cong lost the 
best of a generation of resistance fighters, and after Tet increasing numbers of North Vietnamese had to be 
sent south to fill the ranks. The war became increasingly a conventional battle and less an insurgency.” 
Sorley, A Better War, 14. Roughly 45,000 Communists were killed during the Tet and the Viet Cong never 
fully recovered from these losses.   
463 Larson, Casualties and Consensus, 27. 63. “Tet seems to have affected the willingness to support 
further escalation of the war.” Polling data shows that most Americans wanted to continue the war after Tet 
until peace negotiations could take place and a withdrawal plan could be made. Oberdorfer, Tet!, 174. “The 
Tet Offensive made two immediate and important contributions toward legitimizing the war was a political 
issue. First it provided dramatic evidence that the Johnson administration had been misleading the 
public…Second, Tet liberated politicians, journalists and ordinary citizens from the restraining influence of 
their earlier positions on the war.”  
464 Asprey, War in the Shadows, 1313; W. Scott Thompson and Donaldson D. Frizzell, eds., The 
Lessons of Vietnam (New York: Crane, Russak, 1977), 108. “The extent of North Vietnam’s psychological 
victory in the United States became apparent on March 31, 1968, when the President of the United States 
announced that he would sacrifice his political future in exchange for peace talks. The stock market reached 
a new high. The stage was set for American withdrawal from the war.” 
465 Ibid., 251. The Vietnamese Communists could not understand why the “revolutionary masses did 
not rise up against the foreigners” and the ARVN. Asprey, War in the Shadows. 1220.  
466 Oberdorfer, Tet!, 225. The Ho Chi Minh and his political cadre used propaganda to refocus the 
NVA and the Viet Cong after losing thousands of fighters during Tet. They had to convince the Vietnamese 
Communists that the strategic offensive could not be accomplished in one operation, patience was required 
as it would take months to accomplish.   
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Communists’ and United States’ commitment and motivation decreased slightly in 1968 
following Tet.    
In 1969, under General Abrams’ leadership, renewed pacification efforts and a 
new strategy of Vietnamization was adopted, further eroding Viet Cong influence in the 
South.467  Combined with focused efforts to deny the Viet Cong access to safe havens 
and cut them off from external support, the U.S. military and the ARVN largely 
neutralized the Viet Cong.468 Though, the larger war effort was constrained by the 
presence of over 300,000 Chinese military personnel in North Vietnam.469 Additionally, 
American perceptions of the war had fully changed in the wake of Tet; by 1969 the 
majority of Americans no longer believed the war was worth continuing to contain 
communism.470  Most Americans believed the costs outweighed the benefits of staying in 
Vietnam.471   Still, the American public remained mostly committed due to the number of 
POW’s held by the Communists, and because the U.S. had already invested too much in 
South Vietnam to let them fail.472 Still, the U.S. commitment and motivation suffered 
another setback after the New York Times broke the news of CIA and U.S. Special 
Forces’ operations in Laos.473  
The war was fundamentally different in 1970; before Tet, the North Vietnamese 
Communists used the Viet Cong to wear down the U.S. military and erode U.S. 
                                                 
467 Sorley, A Better War, xi, 169. U.S. military presence also peaked in 1969 with 543,300 Americans 
in South Vietnam.  
468 Ibid., xii; Asprey, War in the Shadows, 1317. The Communist also suffered the loss of Ho Chi 
Minh in 1969. However, President Nixon’s decision to halt B-52 air strikes and his decision and public 
announcement to withdraw forces from Vietnam emboldened the Communists.  
469 Brantly Womack, China and Vietnam: The Politics of Asymmetry (New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2006), 176. On top of this, China spent nearly 20 billion on military aid (anti-aircraft, 
transportation construction, provided 5 million tons of food by 1969.  
470 Larson, Casualties and Consensus, 26. By 1969, the American public mostly did not believe 
containment was a valid justification for the war.  
471 Ibid., 26–29. “[I]nvestment of U.S. prestige, blood, and treasure may have actually increased the 
perceived equities in the outcome for many.” 
472 Ibid., 61–66. The number that wanted to stay, versus the number that wanted to withdraw was 
roughly equal. But when the issue of POWs was brought into the debate, most people favored staying in 
Vietnam until the U.S. government could negotiate with the DRV to bring them home. 
473 Asprey, War in the Shadows, 1316.  
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government resolve.474 After Ho’s death and the Viet Cong’s defeat in 1969, the Vietnam 
War had become more of a conventional duel between the NVA and the U.S. military.475 
The NVA Communist forces remained fully committed; the Communists continued to 
disrupt U.S. forces and raise the cost of the war, materially, politically, and 
psychologically for the United States. This divided the American public; 54% of 
Americans polled by Gallup reported that they approved of Nixon’s handling of the war 
in 1970, but 57% of Americans also believed that Vietnam was a mistake.476  
Additionally, several domestic issues overshadowed the U.S. military effort in 
Vietnam.477 As a result, the U.S. government began to look for a way out of Vietnam to 
achieve “peace with honor,” to avoid incurring further costs and to stall the growing 
domestic crisis in the United States.478 This led to the redeployment of soldiers and the 
first major reduction in American commitment since Tet.479  
With the publication of the Pentagon Papers amid the PX scandals and Lt. 
Calley’s conviction for the Mai Lai massacre, the domestic crisis in 1971 rocked the 
Nixon Administration and plagued the U.S. military effort in Vietnam.480 The U.S. was 
no longer willing to “‘pay any price’ to assure the survival and success of liberty in 
                                                 
474 Harry G Summers, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (Novato, CA: Presidio 
Press, 1995), 76–88. The Viet Cong guerrillas distracted, harassed, and slowly eroded American will for 
the North Vietnamese regulars to achieve decisive results in conventional battles. Their guerrilla war was 
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475 Ibid., xiii. The United States won the guerrilla war in South Vietnam. After Tet, the war was 
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came from the North Vietnamese regular forces in the hinterlands.”  
476 Carroll, “The Iraq-Vietnam Comparison.” 
477 Ibid., 6; Sorley, A Better War, 175. By 1970, budget pressures started to take a toll on the 
Pentagon. Asprey, War in the Shadows, 1329–1341. The United States was suffering, on average 750 
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478 Record, Beating Goliath, 4.  
479 Asprey, War in the Shadows, 1330. President Nixon kept to withdrawing troops, 115,500 by 1970 and 
another 150,000 by 1971.  
480 Asprey, War in the Shadows, 1343–1359.  
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Southeast Asia.”481 Conversely, Giap’s regular forces demonstrated increased capability 
and heightened resolve during the 1972 Eastertide Offensive. The ARVN held off the 
offensive with the aid of American air support, killing an estimated 100,000 NVA 
regulars.482 This was a massive military defeat for the Communists; they were forced to 
go on the defensive to recover and reconsolidate until conditions improved in 1975.483 
Therefore, the Vietnamese Communists’ commitment and motivation suffered as it had in 
1968 following the Tet Offensive.  
The United States’ will to continue the war in Vietnam decreased significantly in 
1973 after the Paris Peace Accords were signed and several POWs were released. With 
an approval rating of 75%, more Americans approved of Nixon’s conduct of the war than 
ever before.484 Regardless, Congress attempted to cut funding for the war as Nixon 
continued to advocate for passive assistance to the GVN to prevent the North from 
invading.485 The Communists used this opportunity, as they had during previous 
negotiations, to reinforce the NVA in the South.486 With the NVA in position and the 
departure of U.S. forces, the Communists invaded South Vietnam. In the end, Saigon fell 
to the NVA and the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in 1975.487 Thus, the United States 
had lost the will to fight by 1973, and by 1975, had effectively lost the war.  
                                                 
481 Laqueur, Guerrilla Warfare, 276. 
482 Summers, On Strategy, 112–113.  
483 Asprey, War in the Shadows, 1508. Reinforcements and material continued to poor from the North 
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484 Carroll, “The Iraq-Vietnam Comparison.” 
485 Sorley, A Better War, 364.  
486 Ibid., 365. 
487 Ibid., 356, 364. The U.S. could have negotiated from a position of strength in 1972, but domestic 
political factors undermined the military’s ability to win the war. Congress cut funding for the war in 
Vietnam in 1973, forcing the Administration to order the military to withdraw combat forces from 
Vietnam. Summers, On Strategy, 76, xiii. “The guerrillas in Vietnam did not achieve decisive results on 
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B. EFFECTS OF MOTIVATION ON THE OUTCOME OF THE WAR 
The relative commitment and motivation of the United States and the 
Communists during the Vietnam War is shown in Figure 2. This estimate is a composite 
based on changes to the actors’ narratives, force sizes, changes to the depth and breadth 
of their operations, and changes in their willingness to accept costs. This figure shows 
that the Viet Cong began this conflict highly committed and motivated to succeed. 
Conversely, the United States entered the war with the limited goal of preserving the 
Government of South Vietnam as part of its containment strategy.  
U.S. commitment and motivation also shifted significantly on three occasions (see 
Figure 2). First, U.S. commitment decreased in 1963 as a result of turmoil in the GVN 
and Kennedy’s assassination. Then the U.S. commitment and motivation dropped briefly 
in 1968 after Tet as domestic unrest increased in the United States. Finally, U.S. 
commitment and motivation decreased significantly in 1969 after President Nixon 
decided to decrease the number of forces in Vietnam. Though, in general, U.S. 
commitment and motivation increased steadily under the Johnson administration and 
peaked in 1968. From this point, U.S. commitment and motivation declined progressively 
as President Nixon moved to extricate the United States from Vietnam in 1969. This was 
a turning point for the United States as fractures continued to widen in America.  
U.S. commitment and motivation rose slightly in 1970 under General Abrams’ 
leadership with his shift in strategy and its effect on the Viet Cong remnants. Though, 
President Nixon had already made the decision to reduce combat forces. Still, the U.S. 
remained highly committed as bombing continued in the North while the U.S. 
administration pushed for negotiations to resume. In the end, President Nixon caved to 
increased domestic political pressure, and by 1973 U.S. commitment and motivation was 
exhausted. In other words, the U.S. lost the war because it lost the motivation to fight due 
to domestic political and social fractures.  
At the same time, the Vietnamese Communists’ motivation continued to rise 
despite their occasional costly battlefield defeats (see Figure 2). In fact, their commitment 
and motivation only suffered two major setbacks, requiring them to change their strategy 
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to recover and reconsolidate: the 1968 Tet Offensive and the 1972 Eastertide Offensive. 
Ultimately, although the communist forces were wholly inferior to the U.S. military in 
size and capability, and had suffered significantly more casualties and setbacks, they 
remained fully committed and motivated. This demonstrates that the Communist’s total 
goal of uniting Vietnam carried their commitment and motivation through to the end.  
This case demonstrates the significance of asymmetry of motivation and its effect 
on the outcome of irregular warfare. The next section of this chapter will evaluate 
internal and external factors that affected the belligerent’s motivation, to understand how 
the Communists maintained resolved while they eroded the United States’ commitment. 
C. MANIPULATING EXTRINSIC AND INTRINSIC MOTIVATION 
The Communists slowly eroded the United States’ commitment and motivation by 
increasing the cost of the war. It was ultimately domestic political and social pressure that 
brought about the exit of U.S. forces in Vietnam. The 1968 Tet Offensive, combined with 
several other events, served to drive the wedge deeper between the United States 
government, its’ military, and its’ population. Ultimately, the Tet Offensive exacerbated 
an existing budget crisis, a growing domestic social movement, President Nixon’s 
deception of the American people, and the inequality of the draft.488  In effect, these 
factors eroded America’s commitment to South Vietnam and its’ motivation to continue 
the war. But this only explains why the United States’ ultimately left Vietnam; it fails to 
address how the Communists manipulated U.S. commitment and motivation. More 
                                                 
488 Richard M. Nixon, The Memoirs of Richard Nixon, with a New Introduction, 1st Touchstone ed, 
The Richard Nixon Library Edition (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1990), 499. March 29, 1971, 1LT 
William Calley was found guilty by an Army court-martial of the premeditated murder of 22 South 
Vietnamese civilians at Mai Lai. Sorley, A Better War, 175. The 1970 budget crisis began to take a toll on 
the Pentagon. Asprey, War in the Shadows, 1329–1343. By 1970, the United States was suffering, on average 
750 casualties a day, and it was costing the American people $70 million a day. Nixon’s refusal to acknowledge 
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Robbins, Against the Vietnam War, 26. Finally, Vietnam War protests climaxed in 1970 when Nixon’s 
activities in Cambodia were publicized, and when Kent State and Ohio students were shot by the National 
Guard while protesting. 
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importantly, it does not explain how the Communists prevailed despite being defeated 
militarily. 
1. Manipulating Extrinsic Motivation 
The North Vietnamese Communist’s success is ultimately the result of their 
strategy against the United States. This is not to say that their success is the result of 
failed U.S. policy or strategy. Rather, the Viet Cong and the North Vietnamese 
Communists employed a three-pronged strategy that externally shaped the United States’ 
motivation and its commitment to South Vietnam.489 First, the Communists implemented 
a political warfare strategy to cement their influence and control within South Vietnam, 
to erode the South Vietnamese government’s control, and to reduce the United States’ 
commitment to the war. Second, the Communists used psychological warfare to exploit 
existing grievances, such as Buddhist and Christian tensions and land rights among poor 
farmers in South Vietnam, to gain popular support and to widen fractures between the 
U.S. government, its military, and its population. Finally, the Communists used the Viet 
Cong’s guerrilla warfare strategy to disrupt and wear down the U.S. military in 
preparation for the North Vietnamese Army’s conventional offensive.  
Beyond this, several external factors aided the Viet Cong and contributed to their 
success. First, existing political and social fractures in South Vietnam and the United 
States affected the commitment and motivation of both belligerents. Additionally, 
numerous political opportunities influenced their commitment and motivation. Finally, 
although the Communists did not direct the media outright, the media’s coverage of this 
war had a significant impact on the American domestic population and the international 
community at large.   
                                                 
489 Asprey, War in the Shadows, 977. The Communists launched a two-pronged strategy- a political 
struggle and military struggle. The political struggle called for a three-pronged program that first focused on 
consolidation of areas already controlled by the VC, re-organization of the villages under Diem’s control, 
reeducation of the South Vietnamese population and co-opting civil services. The military struggle was 
subservient to the political struggle.  
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The Communists’ success began with a political warfare campaign that was 
initiated well before the United States became heavily involved in Vietnam.490 Ho Chi 
Minh’s political efforts in the South were initiated following Diem’s refusal to participate 
in the final declaration of the Geneva Convention in 1956.491  By 1957, the Communist 
began a concerted effort to co-opt the peasant majority, by usurping the South, village by 
village.492  This deliberate effort was carefully planned and executed to ensure full 
support and cooperation of the local population. The Communists first assessed and 
surveyed each village covertly, then they elevated common grievances and removed 
existing government institutions and administers to re-organize village networks. Central 
to this strategy, were targeted assassinations of key administrators and “prophylactic 
executions” of potential adversaries and opponents.493 This ultimately allowed the Viet 
Cong to assume administrative control over the local Vietnamese population, bolstering 
their control in the South, enabling them to “swim like fish in the sea” while operating 
against U.S. and South Vietnamese forces.494 The Viet Cong’s political warfare effort 
was dependent upon a psychological warfare campaign that enabled them to expand their 
support and mobilize the masses against the GVN.  
The Viet Cong’s psychological effort was vital in “cognitively liberating” the 
South Vietnamese. As the Communists saw it, their first task was to win the battle of the 
minds in South Vietnam.495  This is easier said than done because Vietnam is not a 
                                                 
490 William R. Andrews, The Village War: Vietnamese Communist Revolutionary Activities in Dinh 
Tuong Province, 1960–1964 (Columbia: University of Missouri Press, 1973), 45. Many of the Viet Cong’s 
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491 Ibid., 20.  
492 Polk, Violent Politics: A History of Insurgency, Terrorism, and Guerrilla Warfare, from the 
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493 Lewis H. Gann, Guerrillas in History, Hoover Institution Studies 28 (Stanford, CA: Hoover 
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494 Andrews, The Village War, 26.  
495 Ibid., 27.  
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homogeneous society; several ethnicities, religions, and social classes are found 
throughout South Vietnam.496  As a result, the Viet Cong had to meld the peasant 
majority’s grievances with the problems of the working class, minorities, and religious 
groups to create a cohesive narrative to unify the South Vietnamese against their 
government. To achieve this, charismatic political cadre used propaganda, political 
education, and intense indoctrination to reeducate the South Vietnamese population.497  
Additionally, the Communists used psychological warfare as a means of population 
control also. In particular, they employed village spies and security organizations, mat 
hoi vein, to ensure cooperation with the Viet Cong and the communist party.498 Though, 
what started out as a battle for the minds in South Vietnam became “a struggle for 
American public opinion.”499 The Communists tailored their psychological warfare 
campaign and propaganda to exploit the U.S. domestic situation by encouraging antiwar 
                                                 
496 Nguyen Van Thieu, Our Strategy for Guerrilla War, In Guerrilla Strategies: An Historical 
Anthology from the Long March to Afghanistan, ed. Gérard Chaliand (Berkeley, CA: University of 
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497 Ibid., 314.  
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activities and troop misconduct.500  Ultimately, the Communists’ psychological warfare 
strategy increased their survivability and freedom of maneuver while also eroding the 
U.S. military’s morale and the American people’s will.  
Finally, the Viet Cong’s guerrilla warfare strategy was fundamental in 
manipulating U.S. motivations. This strategy exploited the U.S. military’s “big-unit war” 
and enabled them to prevail over the long term by raising the costs of the war for the 
United States.501  Instead of engaging the U.S. militarily head on, the Viet Cong fought 
from the shadows using hit and run tactics to keep the U.S. military off balance.502 By 
choosing when and where to hit the U.S. military, the Viet Cong dictated the pace of the 
war and attacked only when it was advantageous to them. Additionally, when the U.S. 
military succeeded in isolating them, the Viet Cong simply faded back into the villages, 
underground tunnels, and jungles to re-emerge another day.503 Though in the end, it was 
not the Viet Cong that defeated the United States, but the North Vietnamese 
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Vietnam. “To the American people who are courageously opposing the aggressive war waged by the U.S. 
government, I convey my greetings on behalf of the Vietnamese people… Let them intensify their 
opposition to the U.S. government’s aggressive war in Viet Nam so as to prevent their sons and brothers 
from being used as cannon-fodder for the private interests of their oppressors and exploiters… Officers and 
soldiers of the United States and its satellites, who had been driven into this criminal war, listen to reason! 
There I no enmity between you and the Vietnamese people. The U.S. imperialists are forcing you to serve 
as cannon-fodder and die in their place. They are doomed to defeat. Demand your repatriation so that you 
can be re-united with your parents, wives, and children! The Vietnamese people will support your 
struggle.” Record, Beating Goliath, 20.  “[The U.S. antiwar movement] was essential to our strategy. The 
American rear was vulnerable. Every day our leadership would listen to the world news over the radio to 
follow the growth of the American antiwar movement…it gave us confidence that we should go on in the 
face of battlefield reverses.”  
501 Sorley, A Better War, 5.  
502 Vo Nguyen Giap, People’s War People’s Army-The Viet Cong Insurrection Manual for 
Underdeveloped Countries (New York, NY: Frederick A. Praeger, 1967). 
503 Ibid., 56.  
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Communist’s overall plan to “make the war so costly for the United States that it would tire 
and withdraw.”504 
In addition to the Communists’ multi-pronged strategy, existing fractures in 
government and civil society, both in South Vietnam and the United States, eroded 
America’s motivation. First, Diem and his brother Ngo Dinh Nhu’s actions and policies 
served to undermine their control within South Vietnam and put them at odds with the 
Kennedy administration.505  Diem and his brother failed to address popular grievances, 
oppressed minorities and the poor, censored the press, and forced people into strategic 
hamlets that turned into nothing more than “concentration camps full of unwilling 
guests.”506 In addition to government corruption and oppression, the ARVN and Diem’s 
secret police were particularly brutal in suppressing protesters and government 
opponents.507  Furthermore, when the ARVN came face to face with the Viet Cong, their 
poor training, lack of leadership, and low morale became evident.508 Unfortunately, 
while the ARVN’s performance eventually improved under U.S. advisory support, the 
Republic of Vietnam’s government remained weak and fractured for the duration of the 
war. After Diem was deposed and later murdered, General Khanh assumed control of the 
government for a few months until General Minh deposed him. The Government of 
South Vietnam splintered twice more before the end of the war. This placed more of a 
                                                 
504 Laqueur, Guerrilla Warfare, 269. 276. The Viet Cong succeeded as a result of guerrilla attacks that 
disrupted American attempts to establish base areas, lines of communication, supply depots and thwarted 
their pacification efforts.  
505 Asprey, War in the Shadows, 1005. Diem ran his military down to the tactical level and behaved 
like a “warlord.” 
506 Ibid., 993–1012, 1008.  
507 Boot, Invisible Armies, 416.  
508 Asprey, War in the Shadows, 1004; Polk, Violent Politics: A History of Insurgency, Terrorism, and 
Guerrilla Warfare, from the American Revolution to Iraq, 177; Asprey, War in the Shadows, 1005. 1140. 
The ARVN suffered because they lacked proper training and had poor leadership. The U.S. military trained 
them conventionally, so they made the same mistakes as the French, staying on the roads, using heavy 
vehicles. “By end of 1966, it was becoming clear that American troops had undertaken a task for which they were 
neither organized nor trained, a task that they did not understand-indeed, a task that could only have been 
accomplished by the South Vietnamese themselves.” Nguyen Van Thieu, Our Strategy for Guerrilla War, In 
Guerrilla Strategies: An Historical Anthology from the Long March to Afghanistan, ed. Gérard Chaliand 
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1982), 299. The South Vietnamese and the U.S. governments 
failed because they did not understand the rural situation and the actual grievances held by the poor. 
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burden on the U.S. military and increased political stress between the U.S. government and the 
GVN.  
United States’ motivation and commitment suffered from fractures in domestic 
politics and society. From Bay of Pigs and the Cuban Missile Crisis to the assassination 
of President Kennedy; from President Johnson’s micromanagement of the war to Nixon’s 
deception of the American people and the Watergate scandal; the United States 
government suffered one internal crisis to the next.509 On top of this, Westmoreland’s 
failure to understand the nature of the war, and his reliance on casualty counts as a metric 
of success, ultimately misled the U.S. administration and the American public into 
thinking victory would be around the next corner.510 Additionally, the way the draft was 
implemented was widely unpopular and corroded the military from within, leading to a 
class and race war and widespread drug and alcohol use within the military, particularly 
in Vietnam.511 This served to amplify the Civil Rights Movement, creating an antiwar 
movement that became so contentious and at times violent, that it bred suspicion, 
wariness, and increased the divide between the American people and the 
Administration.512 Finally, the coup de grace: the war became prohibitively costly for the 
United States. Thus, Congress attempted to cut funding against the wishes of the 
Administration in 1973.  
                                                 
509 Asprey, War in the Shadows, 998; Boot, Invisible Armies, 420–424; Robert S. McNamara and 
Brian VanDeMark, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam, 1st ed. (New York: Vintage 
Books, 1996),  247. 106. 108. 109. There was great animosity between President Johnson and the 
Kennedys. MacNamara notes that the U.S. mission lacked leadership under President Johnson; the Joint 
Chiefs were poorly informed and not working toward a unified plan. On top of this, the Joint chiefs were 
frustrated by Johnson’s handling of the war and self-imposed restrictions. They also failed to estimate 
China’s willingness to put troops into North Vietnam.  
510 Asprey, War in the Shadows, 1120. Command ignorance was a problem in Vietnam. Westmoreland 
fought the war conventionally, and the military did not understand the nature of the conflict or have sufficient 
intelligence on the Viet Cong or the NVA. Ultimately, the General Westmoreland and President Johnson alienated 
the Vietnamese population with their search and destroy tactics and indiscriminate bombing; Boot, Invisible 
Armies. 418. Westmoreland measured progress in body counts, and he did not care about collateral damage or 
civilian casualties. And the U.S. were so busy chasing the Communists militarily that they forgot to address the 
political and social needs of the people of South Vietnam. Asprey, War in the Shadows, 1322. “American 
bombing had long since given the North Vietnamese people a genuine stake in the war.” 
511 Merom, How Democracies Lose Small Wars, 324; Boot, Invisible Armies, 417. 
512 Robbins, Against the Vietnam War, 20.  
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Beyond this, dozens of specific political opportunities had an effect on the 
belligerents’ commitment and motivation. For example, the Viet Cong and the NLF’s 
commitment and motivation soared as a result of the power vacuum left in the wake of 
Diem’s government; enabling them to put the ARVN on the run and expand their control 
throughout the South.513 Additionally, the Buddhist protest of the war in 1966 added fuel 
to the anti-war movement and raised concern among the American public.514 And finally, 
Lt. Calley’s actions, along with the Kent State incident, campus uprisings, and massive 
protests in Washington and around the country in the early 1970s served to draw the U.S. 
government’s attention and commitment away from the war.515 These events boosted the 
Communists’ motivation and reinforced their narrative while eroding U.S. credibility and 
legitimacy in South Vietnam. In addition to political opportunities, the media played a 
significant role in shaping behavior and motivations during the Vietnam War.  
The Vietnam War was the subject of open, often bitter debate on television, radio, 
and in the newspapers. The media openly reported on rising losses, setbacks, and high-
level debate and dissent among public officials, soldiers, and community leaders.516 
Additionally, in breaking with prior journalistic practices, the media began to speculate 
on U.S. policy and strategy and publicized covert and clandestine military operations 
                                                 
513 Asprey, War in the Shadows, 1046.  
514 Ibid., 1171.  
515 Robbins, Against the Vietnam War, 26.  
516 Asprey, War in the Shadows, 1166–7, 1338, 1316. In 1966, Ambassador Kennan challenged the 
Administration’s argument that South Vietnam was a strategic interest. So did Retired General David Shoup who 
was a Medal of Honor winner and former Commandant of the Marine Corps and member of the Joint Chiefs. 
Additionally, in 1966, Harper’s Magazine published a letter from Retired General James Gavin 
“Challenging the logic of escalation.” That same year, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee initiated the 
Vietnam hearings, which were televised to the U.S. public. Further, in 1969, the New York Times broke the 
story on the CIA’s covert war in Laos, and in 1970, Life Magazine published an article in which Clark Clifford 
(who was President Johnson’s Secretary of Defense) very publically, questioning President Nixon’s actions 
and openly disagreed with his conduct of the war. Robbins, Against the Vietnam War, 21. 31. In 1967, 
Martin Luther King openly spoke out against the war. “Wallace Terry, a Black American reporter for Time 
magazine, taped conversations with hundreds of Black soldiers; he found bitterness against army racism, 
disgust with the war, generally low morale. More and more cases of “fragging” were reported in 
Vietnam—incidents in which service men rolled fragmentation bombs under tents of officers who were 
ordering them into combat or against whom they had other grievances. The Pentagon reported 209 
fraggings in Vietnam in 1970 alone.”  Asprey, War in the Shadows, 1343. In 1971, the media publicized 
stories of widespread drug use amongst U.S. troops in Vietnam.  
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before they were acknowledged by the Administration.517 Finally, “More than ever 
before, television showed the terrible human suffering and sacrifice of war.”518 As a 
result, the Administration was not capable of isolating the American public from the 
disturbing realities of the war, nor were they able to operate freely without betraying the 
trust of the American people. Ultimately, the media’s coverage of the war served to raise 
awareness and heighten American concern.519 Although the media’s coverage of the war 
fueled the anti-war movement and increased existing political tensions—it did not overly 
decrease American popular support for the war.520 Therefore, the Viet Cong’s three-
pronged strategy, in conjunction with existing fractures and political opportunities, 
externally shaped the United States’ motivation to fight and its’ commitment to South 
Vietnam. Nevertheless, as important as this is, the Viet Cong also had to sustain internal 
motivation to endure against the U.S. military.  
2. Manipulating Intrinsic Motivation 
Critical to the Communist’s success was their ability to exist and fight in South 
Vietnam despite the overwhelming size and capability of the U.S. forces and the ARVN. 
Several factors enabled the Communists to persist for over a decade. First and foremost, 
the Communists received substantial military aid and support from China and the Soviet 
                                                 
517 Nixon and Nixon, RN, 404. Nixon had not decided on what to do with the bombing moratorium or 
the future of the war when the Boston Globe announced that Nixon planned to withdraw 300,000 men 
during 1970. Soon after that, Dan Rather, reporting for CBS, announced that Nixon was considering 
increasing troop withdraws, fewer B52 raids, and a reduction in fighting and possible ceasefire before the 
end of the year. This was all reported in advance of Nixon’s decision or any announcement regarding the 
future of the war. Walter Cronkite, “CBS News Special Report” (CBS News, February 27, 1968), 
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=106775685. ) “Both in Vietnam and Washington to 
have faith any longer in the silver linings they find in the darkest clouds. For it seems now more certain 
than ever, that the bloody experience of Vietnam is to end in a stalemate. To say that we are closer to 
victory today is to believe in the face of the evidence, the optimists who have been wrong in the past. To 
say that we are mired in stalemate seems the only realistic, if unsatisfactory conclusion… But it is 
increasingly clear to this reporter that the only rational way out then will be to negotiate, not as victors, but 
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518 Nixon and Nixon, RN, 350.  
519 Summers, On Strategy, 39. “[T]he majority of on scene reporting from Vietnam was factual—that 
is the reporters honestly reported what they had seen firsthand.”  
520 Larson, Casualties and Consensus, 61.  
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Union.521  China’s presence in North Vietnam, in particular, was extremely influential in 
deterring U.S. military operations outside of South Vietnam.522 Additionally, military 
industrial complexes in Communist China and the Soviet Union enabled supplies to flow 
unabated down the Ho Chi Minh Trail, enabling the Communists to escalate the number 
and size of their guerrilla attacks against American and ARVN patrols and outposts.523  
Furthermore, the Communists continued to evade U.S. forces and the ARVN by melting 
into the dense triple canopy jungles of Vietnam and neighboring sanctuaries in Cambodia 
and Laos.524 On top of external support, North Vietnam was greatly aided by the 
structure and organizational design of their forces.   
Organizationally, the Viet Cong assimilated into South Vietnam; the U.S. military 
lacked sufficient enemy intelligence because the enemy could not be separated from the 
population. The Viet Cong achieved this with a political campaign that ultimately 
enhanced their control and reinforced their survivability.525  Central to this was the 
deliberate and painstaking effort of the political cadre that worked “village by village” to 
educate, indoctrinate, and “cognitively liberate” the populace.526 By living among their 
people, the political cadre began by co-opting organic family and kinship networks and 
                                                 
521 Womack, China and Vietnam, 177–181. China did not need to get involved in Vietnam, but they 
wanted to stay involved because they were at odds with the Soviet Union. 
522 Ibid., 174. “From 1965 to 1975 China remained the most important source of foreign aid and support for 
the Democratic Republic of Vietnam in its continuing struggles with the United States and the Saigon regime.” 
Despite the cultural revolutions and a food shortage, China continued to support Vietnam, even after Kissinger’s 
visit in 1971. China even increased its’ aid after Nixon’s visit in 1972. Ultimately, China’s aid was essential to the 
Communist North Vietnamese victory.   
523 Sorley, A Better War, 373; Asprey, War in the Shadows,1193. The Communists had ample supplies 
of ammo and resources as a result of open supply lines from Russia and the Soviet Union. Polk, Violent Politics: 
A History of Insurgency, Terrorism, and Guerrilla Warfare, from the American Revolution to Iraq, 179. 
“Despite constant bombardment, there was an “undiminished flow of men and supplies.”  
524 Sorley, A Better War, 218. 
525 Andrews, The Village War, 25; Nguyen Van Thieu, Our Strategy for Guerrilla War, In Guerrilla 
Strategies: An Historical Anthology from the Long March to Afghanistan, ed. Gérard Chaliand,  (Berkeley, 
CA: University of California Press, 1982), 315. Nguyen Van Thieu was an NLF leader and a member of the 
NLF’s central committee. “[P]olitical work must follow the armed struggle very closely. The armed 
struggle helps break the regime’s grip and opens the way for propaganda and political work. But political 
work is always necessary. Without it, there can be no victory.”  
526 Polk, Violent Politics: A History of Insurgency, Terrorism, and Guerrilla Warfare, from the 
American Revolution to Iraq, 173; Laqueur, Guerrilla Warfare, 271.  
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then worked clandestinely to expand and project their influence to neighboring 
hamlets.527  Additionally, the cadre succeeded in building support for their cause by 
presenting their goals and ideologies within the framework of existing grievances and 
narratives, such as nationalism and land reform, rather than communist or Marxist ideals 
outright.528 As a result, they were able to breed discontent and recruit the population to 
rise up against the local government and the U.S. military. 
To sustain their control over the population, the Viet Cong, and the political cadre 
had to adapt and overcome the growing success of the U.S. pacification efforts. To these 
ends, the Communists used population control measures such as truth councils, kiem 
thao, to encourage people to self-report to ensure loyalty to the resistance and the 
party.529  Furthermore, the Communists often resorted to physical coercion; reinforcing 
their control over the local population with brutality, terror, and torture.530 Ultimately, 
this provided the Viet Cong with freedom of maneuver, enabled them to disrupt U.S. and 
ARVN forces, and chipped away at U.S. morale by increasing the duration and the costs 
of the war. The next chapter will compare and contrast Chapters VII and VIII to 
determine how the weak often defeat the strong. It will then summarize the lessons learned 
in this thesis to explain why and how irregulars succeed when they do.  Additionally, the 
following chapter will offer recommendations for future research, and it will suggest 
alternative ways to support and defeat irregulars.  
 
 
                                                 
527 Nguyen Van Thieu, Our Strategy for Guerrilla War, In Guerrilla Strategies: An Historical 
Anthology from the Long March to Afghanistan, ed. Gérard Chaliand (Berkeley, CA: University of 
California Press, 1982), 314.  
528 Laqueur, Guerrilla Warfare, 273; Andrews, The Village War, 20–67; Nguyen Van Thieu, Our 
Strategy for Guerrilla War, In Guerrilla Strategies: An Historical Anthology from the Long March to 
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529 Andrews, The Village War, 117.  
530 Ibid., 115.  
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IX. CONCLUSION  
This thesis sought to explain why and how irregulars win when they do for two 
main reasons.  First, this thesis sought to understand how the U.S. government, and SOF 
in general, could support the weak more effectively to achieve limited goals in irregular 
warfare.  Additionally, the purpose of this thesis was to reveal how the United States can 
defeat irregulars more efficiently when they threaten U.S. interests.  
The intent of Part Two was to understand how irregulars manipulate extrinsic and 
intrinsic motivation and to demonstrate how asymmetry of motivations enables irregulars 
to succeed. Thus far however, this thesis has argued that asymmetries of motivation do 
not fully explain irregulars’ successes. Alternatively the analysis of Chapters III, IV and 
V in Chapter VI revealed that popular opinion and support explain why motivation 
fluctuates in irregular warfare. Therefore, the lessons from Chapters VII and VIII are still 
relevant and useful. Chapter VII and VIII from Part Two traced motivation in the 
Algerian War of Independence and the Vietnam War to gain insights into how motivation 
fluctuates over the course of a conflict, and to reveal how irregulars shape motivation 
intrinsically and extrinsically to enable their success. 
This final chapter will compare and contrast Chapter VII and VIII to reveal how 
motivations are influenced and shaped to enable irregulars to succeed. Finally, 
recommendations for further areas of study to expand on these lessons and to account for 
emerging threats and strategic trends in irregular warfare will be discussed. This discussion 
will also propose ways to defeat irregulars, and how the United States military can enable 
irregulars to succeed in pursuit of U.S. political goals. 
A. SHAPING MOTIVATION AS A MEANS OF MODIFYING BEHAVIOR 
“Motivation” and “will” are intrinsically biological and psychological; they are 
the catalyst for human action found in every individual or group action and interaction. It 
is why we get out of bed in the morning and go to work every day. It is why we save for 
retirement and wear helmets when we ride a bike. It is also why we go to war—and it is 
why we stop fighting. At the most basic level, motives are “[T]he forces within a person 
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that affect his or her direction, intensity, and persistence of voluntary behavior.”531 
Motives are multidimensional; they are both intrinsic and extrinsic. In other words, 
irregulars must first foster intrinsic motivation, which are forces that drive participation 
and sustain collective action.532 Then, irregulars must shape and manipulate their 
opponents’ extrinsic motivation. This means that irregulars must condition and reinforce 
behavior either with punishment or positive and negative rewards to compel their 
adversary to negotiate or quit.533 Therefore, to understand how to make people fight 
harder, or stop fighting altogether, it is critical to understand how intrinsic and extrinsic 
motivations are shaped and manipulated. 
1. Shaping Intrinsic Motivation in Irregular Warfare 
The Algerian War of Independence demonstrated that intrinsic motivation is 
critical to the success and survival of the irregular. If the irregular neglects intrinsic 
motivation, it will likely fail to mobilize the necessary support required to survive or 
flounder due to organizational fractures and inefficiencies. Additionally, as this first case 
demonstrates, intrinsic motivation enables irregulars to adapt and evolve, but also, to 
improve public opinion and popular support to increase collective action and freedom of 
maneuver.  
                                                 
531 Steven Lattimore McShane and Mary Ann Young Von Glinow, Organizational Behavior: 
Essentials, 1st ed. (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2007), 24. 
532 Richard M. Ryan and Edward L. Deci, “Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivations: Classic Definitions 
and New Directions,” Contemporary Educational Psychology 25, no. 1 (January 2000): 54–67, 
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1993. Organizational Change and Redesign. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 10, 228. Organizational 
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533 Ryan and Deci, “Intrinsic and Extrinsic Motivations.” Extrinsic or external motivation is modified 
through force, political, psychological or social pressure, persuasion, or full assimilation of the idea as their 
own or just. 
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  The FLN improved intrinsic motivation in four different ways. First, the FLN 
laid out clear goals and a vision for Algeria in a clear public proclamation.  This not only 
increased domestic and international visibility and concern but also, built credibility and 
legitimacy for their actions. Second, the FLN readdressed their organizational structure 
and design after suffering major losses. This maintained intrinsic motivation and enable 
the irregulars to continue to fight amid leadership targeting and repression. Furthermore, 
this increased the FLN’s overall security and survivability, and formalized their 
organizational structure, roles, and areas of responsibility. In effect, this improved their 
internal communication, coordination, and operational efficiency and effectiveness. 
Furthermore, the FLN used propaganda internally to foster collective action and to 
increase popular support. Finally, the FLN formalized and expanded their external 
networks to gain recognition and support from other nation-states, regional organizations, 
and international bodies.  
Alternatively, the Vietnamese Communists’ intrinsic motivation and their 
organizational effectiveness and security benefited from significant Chinese and Soviet 
military aid and support. Specifically, China’s presence in North Vietnam not only 
deterred the U.S. military but also improved the Vietnamese Communists’ intrinsic 
motivation. On top of this, the NVA and Viet Cong’s access to external safe havens 
improved their internal motivation and aided their ability to recoup and recover from 
major setbacks.  
More significantly, though, the North Vietnamese conducted nearly a decade of 
advanced force operations to prepare the environment before the Vietnam War. The 
Communists used political warfare, indoctrination, and political cadre to co-opt organic 
networks and organizations to ensure their organizational effectiveness and survival. This 
strategy enabled the irregulars and the NVA to hide among the population while 
disrupting U.S. military operations. This also enabled them to fully understand and 
appreciate friendly, enemy, and neutral populations to expand their support networks and 
improve their narrative to increase collective action. The Communists achieved this with 
a mix of political and physical coercion, terrorism, brutality, and torture. Though, doing 
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so increased their intrinsic motivation by improving their organizational effectiveness, 
security, and freedom of maneuver.  
These two chapters and the two conflicts they profile reveal that commitment and 
motivation are not fixed. They fluctuate over the duration of a conflict in response to 
internal and external forces. To win, irregulars should focus their efforts on maintaining 
their motivation while decreasing their opponents. Interestingly, both of these cases 
reveal that it was the French and American people, not their military, which ultimately 
lost the will to fight and pressured their respective governments to quit and withdraw. 
Thus, these two chapters indicate that irregulars are likely to prevail when they can 
reduce their opponent’s popular and political will to fight. To this end, these cases reveal 
several common practices irregulars used to influence intrinsic motivation.  
Irregulars manipulate and shape intrinsic motivation by addressing their 
organizational design and effectiveness. In particular, irregulars should improve intrinsic 
motivation after operational failures, as a result of external pressures, and to expand 
capabilities.534 As these cases indicate, efforts to improve intrinsic motivation should 
focus on mobilizing support and encouraging collective action by focusing on three 
causal forces—purpose, people, and the environment.535  
Intrinsic motivation is influenced and driven primarily by organizational 
leadership. Charismatic leaders such Castro and Nasrallah set a direction, developed a 
vision and strategy, aligned, motivated, and inspired people.536 Moreover, leaders foster 
and develop an organizational culture that defines boundaries, conveys a sense of 
identity, generates commitment beyond oneself, and enhances stability and control within 
the organization.537 In effect, leaders connect the needs of individuals with the needs of 
                                                 
534 Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the 
World Wars, 1st ed. (Cornell University Press, 1984), http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.7591/j.ctt1287fp3, 47.  
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opportunities present in the international political system.  
536 John P. Kotter, “What Leaders Really Do,” Harvard Business Review Best of HBR, no. 
Breakthrough Leadership (December 2001): 85–96. 
537 Deborah Gibbons, “Organizational Principles” (Lecture, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, 
CA, April 12, 2016). 
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the group. As Deborah Gibbons explains: “If we understand how these needs influence 
people’s desires and actions, we can do a better job of motivating them.”  Ultimately, 
then, leaders motivate others by “taking advantage of structural opportunities, to 
articulate cultural themes, and to manipulate incentives for action.”538 Leaders also 
enable and shape another dimension of intrinsic motivation too—purpose.  
Action without purpose can lead to decreased motivation, and thus, lesser 
amounts of action.  Therefore, to build and sustain motivation, leaders and organizations, 
such as the ALN and the Viet Cong, used goals to drive individuals toward a common, 
purposeful end. Gibbons notes that “with clearly defined and challenging goals, 
commitment from participants, objective and timely feedback, and confidence in one’s 
ability to perform, goal setting can lead to dramatic improvements in performance.”539 
Clarifying roles and establishing clear and specific performance objectives further 
enables this.540 This is exactly what the FLN leadership did during the Soummam Valley 
Conference.541 Beyond this, organizations typically evolve from and are products of their 
environment.  
The Algerian War of Independence and the Vietnam War also indicate that 
irregular organizations improve intrinsic motivation by responding and adjusting to 
environmental constraints and opportunities.542  More to the point, internal motivation, 
one’s desire to participate out of free will, is a product of social ties, a perception of 
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organizational effectiveness, and interests in the political issue.543 For example, the 
Vietnamese Communists adjusted their narrative to address local grievances such as 
government and land reform rather than on larger communist issues. Therefore, irregulars 
must consider how they craft their narrative and how they are structured and governed to 
align with local environments and populations.544   
Similarly, irregular groups, such as the Mujahedeen and the Chechen Rebels, 
often emerge and develop from informal, organic social networks that are composed of 
strong ties between tight-knit members of the community who share similar political 
beliefs, desire common goals, and trust each other.545 These networks are particularly 
important in mobilizing people during the latent and incipient phase of irregular 
warfare—by socializing potential members to the group’s raison d'être, cognitively 
liberating them from the confines of inaction, and providing opportunities to 
participate.546 This explains why the Viet Cong were so successful in South Vietnam 
before 1967. However, networks evolve over time as organizations move beyond 
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overall pattern or shape of the network” while “Network governance describes the authority relationships 
among the network members specifying how goals are established, decisions made, actions coordinated and 
controlled, re-sources allocated, and disputes arbitrated and resolved, all in the pursuit of network 
outcomes, legitimacy and accountability.” Further, “Informal networks are spontaneous, ad hoc and 
voluntary interactions that emerge organically, serendipitously, and opportunistically,” while formal 
networks “have a purpose or goal that guides collective action. These types of networks exist to get 
something done such as the production of goods or services, or the development of new ideas and 
innovations.”  
545 Tucker, “Terrorism, Networks, and Strategy: Why the Conventional Wisdom Is Wrong,” 8-9; 
Mohammed M. Hafez, “The Ties That Bind: How Terrorists Exploit Family Bonds,” CTC Sentinel 9, no. 2 
(February 2016): 15–17. 
546 Diani, McAdam, and Passy, “Social Movements Matter,” 23–25. The author notes that networks 
“[I]ntervene in the early stage of the participation process” by providing three core functions—a 
socialization function, a structural connection function, and a decision shaping function. McAdam, 
Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970, 48–51. McAdam explains that 
cognitive liberation is a “[T]ransformation of consciousness within a significant segment of the aggrieved 
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recruitment and become more focused on a cohesive strategy, overall security, and long-
term survival.547  As a result, networks may become more formalized and more centrally 
governed at higher echelons as goals and leadership are solidified.548 This was the case 
for some groups such as the PA, but it is not true in all cases, particularly amongst 
contemporary irregulars and networked terrorist groups such as al-Qaeda. Ultimately, to 
maintain and improve upon intrinsic motivation and one’s willingness to participate, 
organizations must constantly reassess their needs and capabilities in relation to their 
internal structure and the environment. 
2. Shaping Extrinsic Motivation in Irregular Warfare 
The FLN shaped and manipulated extrinsic motivation by first politicizing and 
internationalizing their cause to bring the weight of the United States, the Arab League, 
and the United Nations to bear on France in support of their cause. This also increased 
the FLN’s credibility, legitimacy, and opened new opportunities for political and material 
support. The FLN also exported the war to mainland France to raise political and 
psychological costs, and shift the focus of the war from Algeria to France’s domestic 
marketplace of ideas. This decreased France’s motivation to continue the war in Algeria 
and drove the wedge deeper between the French populace and their government. 
Additionally, the FLN structured their narrative on higher level needs such as the 
principle of “justice” instead of on lesser or local needs such as land reform or “control” 
over resources or territory. This enabled the FLN to win the war of ideas and battle of the 
narrative. In effect, the FLN played on the morality of the French and the legitimacy of 
colonialism to defeat France’s political cause. Beyond this, the FLN also benefited from 
existing social and political fractures in France.  
In contrast to this, the North Vietnamese Communists employed a three-pronged 
strategy to shape U.S. motivation and its’ commitment to South Vietnam. First, the 
Communists implemented a political warfare strategy to reduce the United States’ 
                                                 
547 Tucker, “Terrorism, Networks, and Strategy: Why the Conventional Wisdom Is Wrong,” 12.  
548 Roberts, “Network Design Continuum: Moving Beyond the Fault Lines in Social Network Theory 
and Research,” 26.  
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commitment to the war. The Communists first used this strategy and leveraged their 
relationship with China and the Soviet Union to frustrate and complicate the war for the 
U.S. government. The Communists also used psychological warfare to widen fractures 
between the GVN and the U.S. government. This exploited the U.S. domestic situation by 
encouraging dissent, and increasing tensions and doubt amongst Americans and U.S. 
troops. Finally, the Communists used guerrilla warfare to disrupt the U.S. military while 
they employed conventional warfare to increase political and psychological costs for the 
United States. This dual strategy exploited the American Way of War and the U.S. 
military’s propensity for large conventional military operations.549 Ultimately, the 
NVA’s and Viet Cong’s mixed strategy raised the cost of the war and widened existing 
social and political fractures within the United States.  
These two cases indicate that shaping and manipulating external motivations are a 
matter of strategy.  On the surface, war appears to be a contest of strength, but at the core, 
war is a contest of wills.550 This battle for the minds can be conducted directly through 
conventional brute force—or indirectly through political and psychological finesse. As 
the cases in this thesis demonstrate, brute force is not always an option—either because 
of internal organizational weaknesses, a desire to avoid repression, or because it is 
politically unfeasible.551 As a result, the North Vietnamese and the Algerian Nationalists 
reveal that political and psychological warfare may be more suitable to winning the 
contest of wills and battle for the minds by sowing dissent within an enemy’s camp, 
                                                 
549 Russell Frank Weigley, The American Way of War: A History of United States Military Strategy 
and Policy, Indiana University Press paperback ed, The Wars of the United States (Bloomington: Indiana 
University Press, 1977). Russell Weigley notes that American’s tend to focus on large maneuver based 
attrition warfare. 
550 Clausewitz, Howard, and Paret, On War, 69, 75, 91. “War can be of two kinds, in the sense that 
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551 Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine, 45. Posen also adds that “Organizations resort to political 
strategies when material ones are too expensive or are proscribed…”  
 169 
persuading an opponent to quit, or persuading everyone else that their opponent’s cause is 
immoral and unjust.   
The irregular conflicts defined by asymmetric motivation reviewed in this thesis 
reveal that irregulars often prevail by coercing and compelling their opponent to quit. 
Coercive diplomacy and compellence are strategies that target the motivation of state 
leaders and elites.552 However, for coercion to be effective, the irregular must not only 
have a credible capability but must also be willing to follow through on threats of 
force.553 While coercion is most often associated with nuclear weapons and deterrence—
the FLN, PIRA, FARC, Hezbollah, Chechen rebels, and al-Qaeda have proven that 
terrorism and guerrilla warfare can also be used by the weak to coerce, compel and 
bargain with the strong.554 Notably, the primary factors favoring the success of coercive 
diplomacy are the same that often exist in irregular conflicts—an asymmetry of 
motivations favoring the coercer, a sense of time urgency on the part of the target, and the 
target's fear of unacceptable escalation.555 By design then, this suggests that irregulars 
should employ coercive diplomacy as a strategy to shape an opponent’s motivation and 
thus, their will to fight. Complementing this is the use of psychological warfare to 
persuade enemy, friendly and neutral parties to win the battle of the narrative and the war 
of ideas.556 
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Jacobowitz, “Psychological Operations, An Introduction,” in Psychological Operations: Principles and 
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As of late, irregulars such as al-Qaeda have demonstrated that psychological 
warfare is a cheap tool and an effective strategy that can be used to persuade relevant 
populations to alter what they think and believe, to influence how they act and behave.557 
As this thesis has illuminated, irregulars accomplish this by reducing an opponent’s 
morale and combat efficiency; creating dissent and dissatisfaction; promoting civil 
resistance and disobedience within a populace; or enhancing the legitimacy of one’s 
cause through any communication means.558 In essence, irregulars have become 
increasingly adept at using psychological warfare to win the battle of the narrative. The 
FLN and Hezbollah proved that victory in irregular warfare is not “only about whose 
military wins but whose story wins.”559 In effect, narratives have significant influence 
and can shape perceptions, opinions, and support for or against belligerents. Furthermore, 
as Nasrallah and al-Qaeda demonstrate, irregulars have a significant advantage in the 
battle of the narrative as they are bound less by the truth and subject to less scrutiny than 
the strong, particularly amongst local and regional audiences. Though, to extrinsically 
shape motivation, irregulars must not only change perceptions, but also, what people 
believe. In other words, they must win the war of ideas.  
To win the war of ideas, irregulars must target all of the relevant populations—to 
include friendly, enemy, and neutral parties that have the ability to influence internal and 
external opinions driving motivation.560 The Algerian Nationalists demonstrated that 
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irregulars win the war of ideas by persuading neutral and adversarial populations that 
their cause is just and their actions legitimate. Even more important, the irregulars must 
work to convince these populations that their adversary’s cause is unjust, immoral and 
illegitimate.561 The cases in this thesis demonstrate that the strong might be compelled to 
quit when relevant populations believe that their cause and actions violate “jus ad 
bellum” and “jus in bello,” particularly when asymmetry of motivations exist. 
Convincing international populations that the strong are in violation of either of these two 
principles can induce them to intervene on behalf of the irregulars or constrain the strong 
politically. Similarly, when irregulars can persuade their adversary’s population of the 
same, existing political and social fractures often increase and domestic pressure builds, 
compelling the adversarial government to quit and withdraw. The Vietnamese 
Communists demonstrated that this strategy serves to reduce the will of the strong by 
fracturing the proverbial Clausewitzian triangle by driving a wedge between their 
adversary and their adversary’s population and government.562  
Because instruments of statecraft hinge on state powers, it is often misunderstood 
that political and psychological warfare strategies are exclusive to states alone.  However, 
as several of the conflicts in this thesis demonstrate, irregulars can employ political and 
psychological warfare as well. While irregulars lack the required political tools to 
conduct diplomacy, political action, or impose economic sanctions, they can access state 
powers and the instruments of statecraft through state sponsors, as Hezbollah did through 
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Lebanon and Iran.563 Though, states and state sponsors are not the only entities that 
irregulars can use to coerce, compel, and convince adversaries to bend to their will.  
Irregulars can, and have often appealed to international and regional organizations for 
support.  By doing so, the irregulars can co-opt the coercive power of these institutions to 
extrinsically reduce their adversary’s will to fight.  
The success of these strategies also depends on the judicious application of force, 
at the right time, and at the right place, and against the right target. Several of the 
irregulars profiled in this thesis demonstrated that too much violence, terrorism, and 
barbarism could produce significant negative results. Though, the PIRA and several 
others have demonstrated that used judiciously, terrorism and small unit attacks, 
particularly used in swarms, can enable the irregulars to succeed. In fact, swarm tactics 
can be found in several of the cases reviewed in this thesis—the FLN conducted seventy-
preplanned and dispersed IED attacks against the French; the Viet Cong and the NVA 
launched simultaneous strikes throughout South Vietnam during the TET Offensive in 
1968; and swarming was also observed in Northern Ireland, Chechnya, Afghanistan, and 
Iraq. As these examples demonstrate, swarming can produce significant effects on an 
opponent’s psychological and political will to fight. Furthermore, the rise of network 
warfare and networked irregulars such as al-Qaeda, and the increased availability of 
communications technology, suggest that irregulars will be more capable and effective in 
using swarm tactics in future irregular conflicts.564   
Ultimately, the irregular conflicts reviewed in this thesis reveal that the irregulars’ 
ability to succeed depends upon their ability to maintain intrinsic motivations while 
shaping and influencing their opponent’s extrinsic motivations. Thus, the irregular’s 
ability to do so though depends on their ability to survive, adapt, and grow by improving 
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support and collective action, and by structuring their organization according to their 
environment and their adversary. Furthermore, their ability to shape their opponent’s 
motivation is determined by their ability to choose and employ the right indirect 
strategies—such as guerrilla warfare, terrorism, psychological warfare, and coercive 
diplomacy. Fundamentally then, if irregulars heed theses lessons or sponsors and enablers 
such as U.S. SOF can instruct, advise, and assist based on the principles outlined in this 
chapter, irregulars will likely succeed in irregular warfare.  
B. CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
In the dialectic of will…the stronger will wins out. It is not enough to 
weaken the adversary’s will while not either winning over all those who 
waver or believe, that they can be neutral, or at least intimidating them, 
but it is also crucial, instead, to keep the will of the fighters, and also the 
sympathizers, strong. More than half the conduct of irregular war is 
psychological warfare, psychological assault, as well as psychological 
defense and psychological armament.565  
— Friedrich August Frhr. Von der Heydte  
1. Recommendations for Future Areas of Study and Research 
As people become increasingly connected through technology, and as individuals 
are more able to express their opinions, the strong (and open democratic societies, in 
particular) must accommodate the opinion and will of the masses.  Therefore, irregulars 
will be increasingly successful as communications technology (e.g., social media) 
enables them to persuade, convince, and influence friendly, neutral, and adversarial 
audiences. This theory warrants further consideration and analysis, particularly in light of 
Russia’s recent success in Crimea and the Islamic States’ ability to influence ideas and 
support worldwide. As we move further into the digital age and irregulars learn to exploit 
the Internet of things, understanding how to shape and influence ideas and opinions may 
prove vital to winning irregular conflicts.  
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Furthermore, the Arab Spring, the Color Revolutions, and the War in Donbass 
indicate that we may be moving towards a new period of irregular warfare. This new 
period is defined by the importance of domestic and international opinion and 
characterized by the irregular’s ability to influence political and social change without 
taking up arms.  In other words, public opinion and support has become a weapon for the 
weak to affect change. Therefore, future study and research should be dedicated to 
understanding how social movements intersect with irregular warfare, and how these 
movements begin and are sustained. Additionally, additional research should be 
conducted to identify ways and means to counteract social movements, or enable them to 
effect change. 
2. Recommendations for Enabling and Countering Irregulars 
U.S. Special Operations Command is the proponent for surgical strike and special 
warfare within the Department Of Defense.  The individuals and forces that comprise 
U.S. SOCOM are specially selected, trained, and equipped to conduct irregular warfare in 
support of U.S. national policy objectives during peace and times of war.  As a result, 
SOF conduct a number of activities that fall under the IW umbrella, not only to support 
the weak but also to defeat irregulars. Specifically, SOF help defeat irregulars by 
conducting FID, COIN, and CT, among other operations, to unilaterally, bilaterally, and 
multilaterally defeat adversarial irregulars that threaten U.S. strategic interests. All too 
often, though, the U.S. directs its efforts towards the visible threat—the irregular. To 
date, the U.S. government and military have occasionally succeeded in disrupting and 
defeating terrorism and dangerous irregulars around the world using this technique. 
However, doing so has come at significant cost in blood, treasure, and soft power. The 
lessons revealed in this thesis indicate that the United States could improve its ability to 
defeat irregulars more often.  Instead of pursuing the current strategy of annihilation and 
attrition, the U.S. should adopt a long-term sustainable strategy that is compatible with its 
limited goals.   
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a. General Recommendations 
First, the evidence in this thesis suggests several broad lessons apply to both U.S. 
sponsored and supported irregular operations and counter-irregular operations.  First, the 
United States should not become entangled overseas if the conflict does not meet the 
criteria of “jus ad bellum” and cannot be fought by “jus in bello.” The lessons in this 
thesis suggest that the key to success for the United States in limited conflicts is to 
maintain legitimacy, to limit the involvement of U.S. conventional forces, and to 
maintain favorable public opinion and support.  Furthermore, the U.S. should continue its 
current policy of relying on SOF in limited warfare to reduce exposure and the impact on 
the U.S. population.  This, in turn, will limit war weariness, maintain flexibility and 
control, and will likely shield government policy from wavering public opinion. 
Additionally, this thesis suggests that the U.S. should reinvest in a political and 
psychological warfare department or office at the strategic and national level—an 
organization that has not existed since WWII—to administer, coordinate, and implement 
“influence” operations and activities to win the war of ideas. Also, the U.S. government 
should be wary of the pitfalls of the American Way of War and recognize that “In a 
limited war, there is no victory, only achievement of policy objectives.”566 Additionally, 
as the cases in this thesis suggest, the United States government should not draw a red 
line against negotiating, and should be more willing to consider political solutions that 
are not bound by unconditional defeat or surrender.  
b. Countering Irregulars 
  In countering irregulars, the U.S. should adopt the lessons learned from the 
British in Malaya and Kenya.  First, successful COIN begins and ends with focused 
efforts to stand up a legitimate, organic, and sizeable home guard.  Second, successful 
counter irregular operations are driven by solid intelligence. In particular, human 
intelligence operations should be the priority before, during, and after irregular 
engagements. Third, U.S. SOF and other government agencies should not focus their 
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efforts solely on the tactical employment of indigenous forces to counter irregulars. 
Instead, the U.S. should focus on infiltrating irregular organizations to co-opt and 
degrade them from within. Fourth, the U.S. should focus its efforts on embedding SOF 
leaders into the partner force hierarchy, as Lansdale was in the Philippines. His example 
reveals that mid-to-senior level SOF leaders can be effectively employed and leveraged 
to enable our partners to disrupt, demobilize, and defeat irregulars by advising them on 
their organizational design, organic employment of political and psychological warfare 
capabilities, as well as, advising and assisting with indigenous COIN and CT operations. 
Finally, the U.S. government should work to counteract the psychological efforts of 
irregulars using the Internet and social media to win the war of ideas and the battle of the 
narrative.  
c. Supporting Irregulars 
Alternatively, there are several lessons for SOF and U.S. sponsorship of 
irregulars.  The easiest and most passive way to enable irregulars is to provide financial 
aid or limited military arms and ammunition. Specifically, the U.S. should inject specific 
technology to enable irregulars to live-stream events to shape opinion and support by 
exploiting their adversaries’ brutality and violence.567 Additionally, instead of supplying 
small arms or throwing money at irregulars, the U.S. should inject specific modern tools 
or weapons to aid irregulars in defeating their adversary’s technological advantages. 
Strategically, the U.S. government can assist irregulars in waging political and 
psychological warfare against their opponents from in their country, in Washington, and 
from the seats of U.S. representatives in international and regional institutions.  
Operationally, U.S. SOF should assist and advise irregulars on how to improve collective 
action and how to design their organization to more effectively and efficiently defeat 
their opponent based on the resources available and their environment. Tactically, the 
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U.S. SOF should instruct irregulars on how to take advantage of accelerators such as the 
Internet to exploit their adversary’s existing social and political fractures. Ultimately, 
U.S. SOF should continue to enable the irregular’s tactical and operational activities, but 
more should be done to focus their strategic efforts on raising political and psychological 
costs for their opponent. To this end, U.S. SOF should become more proficient in 
advising irregulars to employ political and psychological warfare to win the war of ideas 
and to widen existing political and social fractures in their adversary’s camp to convince, 
compel or coerce them to stop fighting.   
3. Conclusion 
This thesis sought to explain why and how irregulars win when they do and how 
asymmetries of motivation affected the outcome of irregular warfare over the last seventy 
years. The purpose of this study was four-fold. The main intent of this research was to 
understand how United States Special Forces and the U.S. government could better 
support irregulars to further our interests. Additionally, this question was also designed to 
identify alternative approaches towards countering irregular actors.  Furthermore, this 
thesis sought to reveal the importance of motivation in irregular warfare and attempted to 
illuminate the ways and means motivation can be manipulated and shaped to enable 
success in irregular warfare. Finally, this study was conducted to reveal the evolution of 
irregular warfare and the factors that have enabled irregulars the most in recent history.  
In the end, the theory of asymmetries of motivation did not fully explain why 
irregulars succeed. Similarly, as several cases in this thesis demonstrate, Andrew Mack, 
Ivan Arreguín-Toft, Jeffery Record, and Gil Merom equally failed to explain thoroughly 
why the weak win.568 Nevertheless, the lessons that were brought forward in this thesis 
reveal that irregulars succeed by eroding or destroying their adversary’s motivation or 
will. In other words, motivation is dynamic and subject to change based on internal and 
external forces.  This thesis demonstrated that “will” is not a fixed variable, but one that 
is subject to frequent change as motivations are manipulated intrinsically and 
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extrinsically over time.569 Thus, motivation or will is paramount in explaining and 
understanding why irregulars win when they do; irregulars prevail by creating 
asymmetries of motivation when they do not exist and exploiting them when they do. 
Therefore, regardless of motivations at the beginning of a conflict, the key to success in 
irregular warfare is to reduce an opponent’s motivation or will to fight. This conclusion 
not only explains why irregulars often prevail but also illuminates an alternative approach 
towards enabling and defeating irregulars. 
The evidence in this thesis indicates that popular support might drive motivation 
and the will to fight. This presumes that the will to fight will be high when opinion and 
support are high. Conversely, when popular support or opinion declines, so too does 
motivation and the will to persist in irregular conflicts. This is similar to one of Max 
Boot’s findings in Invisible Armies.570 Boot found in his study of irregular conflicts 
between AD 66 and 2008 that the rise of public opinion has been the most important 
development in irregular warfare.571 Boot attributes this rise to the spread of democracy, 
improved access to education, the spread of communications technology, and the 
influence of international organizations.572 The evidence in this thesis supports this claim 
and Boot’s argument affirms the notion that will and motivation is the key to success in 
irregular warfare. Specifically, the strong can no longer afford to enact and follow policy 
without concern for popular opinion and support. Therefore, the strong are more 
vulnerable to domestic and international opinion, which are increasingly accessibly and 
influenced by the weak.   
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This thesis concludes that irregulars reduce their opponent’s will to fight by 
shaping opinions and perceptions to influence support and collective action. Additionally, 
several factors, accelerators, and strategies were identified that enable irregulars to shape 
intrinsic and extrinsic motivations. Irregulars succeed, in most cases, by increasing the 
cost of the war through indirect means; by arousing international attention and provoking 
intervention; by shifting the focus of the war to their adversaries’ domestic situation; by 
exploiting existing political and social fractures; and most importantly, by winning the 
battle of the narrative and the war of ideas. Ultimately, this thesis found that irregulars 
reduce their adversary’s will to fight and eventually win, by shaping opinions and 
perceptions to create asymmetries of motivation and exploit existing ones. Finally, this 
thesis presented some recommendations for future research and some suggestions for the 
U.S. government and the Special Forces Regiment. These lessons are worth considering, 
as irregular warfare is ever changing along with shifts in geopolitical dynamics, 
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